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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation seeks to substantiate the thesis that Nietzsche's 
physiological thinking constitutes a radicalisation of Kantian critique. To 
this end it attempts to mark out some of the salient points of the latter 
project and to examine the ways in which it falls short of its own 
potential radicality. 
In chapters one and two the categories of relation - in which Kant 
articulates his theory of the temporal connection of phenomena explicitly - 
are traced through the Analytic and Dialectic of the Critique of Pure 
Reason and are read against the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the 
Understanding which implicitly contains another theory of time. 
Since the Critique of the Teleological Faculty of Tudgerment complements 
Kant's theory of the temporal cohesion of phenomena, the third chapter 
offers a reading of it under the aspect of its relation to the wider 
project of critique. 
Chapter four draws together the multiple strands around which Kantian 
critique can be shown to mutate into Nietzsche's philosophical physiology 
and the theory of temporality implicit in it. Finally, Nietzschean 
physiology is presented in terms of his thinking of the becoming of matter, 
in terms of the will to power as eternal recurrence. 
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Although I have consulted existing translations whenever possible, for 
two reasons I have found it necessary to quote both in the original German 
and in English. Firstly, as concerns the material from the KSA I quote, a 
substantial part of Nietzsche's unpublished notes, the so-called Nachlaß 
(volumes 7 to 13), has not yet been translated and I felt it was necessary 
to give the reader access to the interpretative decisions I obviously had 
to make in translating this material and that this access could only be 
guaranteed if the reader was given both versions. Secondly, although we 
have The Will to Power, as translated by Hollingdale and Kaufmann, I 
disagree with their interpretative decisions in such a large number of 
cases that I have felt it necessary, more often than not, to modify their 
translations or even to completely re-translate. And again I felt the 
reader should be made aware of the nature of these changes. 
Although Norman Kemp Smith's translation of the first Critique and Werner 
Pluhar's translation of the third Critique are on the whole much more 
reliable than those of Hollingdale and Kaufmann, some modifications were 
still necessary. 
I have indicated throughout whether an existing translation has merely 
been modified (t. m. ), hence this term encompasses the entire range from 
minor adjustments to complete rewriting, or whether the English is my 
translation altogether (m. t. ). 
As concerns quotes from Nietzsche in German, I have made what might 
appear a rather daring orthographic decision but one which common sense 
seemed to dictate. Throughout the KSA Colli and Montinari retain 
Nietzsche's spelling which appears rather archaic by modern German 
standards. On the other hand, Wilhelm Weischedel, the editor of the German 
edition of Kant's works I have used, to a large extent modernises Kant's 
spelling along the lines he explains on pp. 826-830 of volume XII of the 
Werkausgabe. Since I have not had access to Kant's original script and 
hence had to quote from his texts as presented by Weischedel, the 
anachronism of Nietzsche's German appearing more archaic than Kant's loomed 
large. I felt it would be less disturbing to modernise Nietzsche's spelling 
(although I have not-tampered with-any capital initial letters used by him 
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INTRODUCTION 
This text offers a reading of Kant's theoretical philosophy from the 
perspective of Nietzsche's physiological thinking. It is not always readily 
accepted that there is a significant connection between Kant and 
Nietzsche's thought and although there are well over two hundred and fifty 
references to Kant and his works throughout Nietzsche's oeuvre' (and 
innumerable other ones which make implicit reference to Kant), doubts are 
sometimes cast on whether Nietzsche was a particularly thorough or 
attentive reader of Kante. Although Nietzsche's writings are obviously not 
concerned with producing detailed textual studies of the works of Kant, we 
should not ignore the strong subterranean ties between them. Nietzsche 
himself puts the case with forceful simplicity when he says 'I would not be 
possible without Kant' ("Ich wäre nicht möglich ohne Kant. " KSA 13,25 (71, 
m. t. ). One aspect of this thesis will therefore be to unfold this 
pronouncement and to draw out the sense in which Nietzsche's thought is a 
continuation, but also a transformation, of Kant' s. To do so serves a dual 
purpose. It shows Nietzsche to be part of a particular historical and 
philosophical trajectory when even to this day it is not always 
acknowledged that Nietzsche's thinking can and must be understood in 
relation to (as well as, of course, in conflict with) the philosophical 
tradition. One of the assumptions which guides my readings of Nietzsche is 
that the significance of much of what he says is not finally comprehensible 
when it is not placed against the background of the Kantian edifice against 
which it is so often written. A second consequence of this reading strategy 
is, I hope, that the Kantian critical text is in turn enriched when its 
Janus-headed position in the history of philosophy and in the trajectory of 
thought, is foregrounded. This point is taken up and developed below. 
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I do not of course claim that to read Nietzsche's thought as in some 
respects a radicalisation of that of Kant is a wholly original move. Gilles 
Deleuze, in Nietzsche et la philosophie (1962), devotes an entire chapter 
to Nietzsche' s 'method', critique, and to its derivation from the figure 
who is thereby portrayed as one of Nietzsche's most influential 
predecessors, namely Kant. Although this dissertation does not for the most 
part follow Deleuze's procedure very closely, it understands itself to be 
in implicit dialogue with his overall project of a re-reading of the 
philosophical tradition in these terms. Other works which could be 
mentioned in this context include Jean Granier's Le probleme de la veritd 
daps la philosophie de Nietzsche (1966) which, although tending towards the 
scholastic, has the distinction of being another 'early' text to place 
Nietzsche alongside Kant; and a little known text by Olivier Reboul with 
the auspicious title Nietzsche critique de Kant (1974) which gives 
substance to many of Deleuze's comments in the above-mentioned texts. 
Furthermore, this dissertation is not of course the only one to offer a 
detailed textual study of some aspects of the Kant-Nietzsche relation. But 
in a recent register of West European and North American academic theses on 
Nietzsche, written between 1900 and 1980,4, only ten concentrated on this 
relation and none of these worked through the textual and thematic areas 
which are discussed in the present study. For rather self-evident reasons, 
most of the texts which explore the Kant-Nietzsche relation focus on 
Kant's 
ethical writings and on Nietzsche's re-interpretation of the issues raised 
in them. But a consideration of Kant's practical philosophy, or even any 
aspect thereof, would have extended the scope of this study beyond the 
bounds of the acceptable. 
At any rate, another, equally challenging and important project seemed 
to 
me the exposition of Nietzsche's reflections on Kant's critical conception 
of natural science and on the philosophical conceptuality with which 
Kant 
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underwrites it. In other words, I wanted to trace the development of 
thinking which leads Nietzsche to expose the shrivelled, timid little god 
lurking in the crevices of Kant's critical theory of nature, to observe him 
driving out the old idol and releasing nature from the tyranny of god into 
the delirium of a material becoming. 
Nietzsche himself on occasion implies that natural science is the next 
receptacle for anxieties about human self-definition, that it is the next 
dispenser of reassurance and security, after the gradual erosion of 
morality with the realisation of the death of God: 
"Die Wissenschaft - das war bisher die Beseitigung der vollkommenen 
Verworrenheit der Dinge durch Hypothesen, welche alles 'erklären' - also 
aus dem Widerwillen des Intellekts an dem Chaos. - Dieser selbe 
Widerwille ergreift mich bei Betrachtung meiner selber: die innere Welt 
möchte ich auch durch ein Schema mir bildlich vorstellen und über die 
intellektuelle Verworrenheit herauskommen. Die Moral war eine solche 
Vereinfachung: sie lehrte den Menschen als erkannt, als bekannt. Nun 
haben wir die Moral vernichtet... Die Physik ergibt sich als eine Wohltat 
für das Gemüt: die Wissenschaft (als der Weg zur Kenntnis) bekommt einen 
neuen Zauber nach der Beseitigung der Moral - und weil wir hier allein 
Konsequenz finden, so müssen wir unser Leben darauf einrichten, sie uns 
zu erhalten. 11 
"Science - that was until now the eradication of the complete confused- 
ness of things through hypotheses which 'clarify' everything - hence out 
of the aversion of the intellect to chaos. - This same aversion seizes me 
in the contemplation of myself: the inner world I would also like to 
represent to myself pictorially, by means of a schema, and come out of 
the intellectual confusedness. Morality was such a simplification: it 
taught the human being as understood, as known. - Now we have destroyed 
morality... Physics reveals itself as a restorative for the spirit: 
science (as the path to knowledge) attains a new magic after the 
eradication of morality - and because solely here we find a consequence, 
we have to arrange our lives accordingly, in order to preserve science 
for us. " (KSA 14,24 ( 181, my omissions, m. t. ) 
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The contention is, then, to put it in general terms, that 'god', the 
Platonic-Christian two-world theory, has fled the site of theology (driven 
out, not least, by Kant's critical delineation of its legitimate domain) 
but has secretly found refuge in the allegedly objective conceptuality 
which underlies Kant's critical projection of the rational natural 
sciences, as offered in the first Critique and (the second part of) the 
third Critique. And although Nietzsche diagnoses that, paradoxically, it is 
the will to truth which overcomes Truth (God) (eg. GdM/GoM III. ), it is not 
a will to truth which hunts down the God that lurks in the interstices of 
Kantian (theoretical) critique but rather an intense desire to affirm the 
materiality and mortality of the body which Kant, and Platonism, so 
forcefully seek to suppress. To recognise, affirm and establish the 
suppurating, aching, dying body of the thinker as the basis, even as a 
perverse 'ground' for thinking, this I take to be the chief task of 
philosophy after Nietzsche. 
It must also be remembered, though, that Kant understands critique as a 
propaedeutic to the system of philosophy (eg. KrV/CPR A841, B869), and as not 
yet actually carrying out the metaphysics for which critique determines the 
legitimate scope. In a distant echoing of this, the present reading of 
Kantian critique merely understands itself as a quasi-propaedeutic to the 
(wholly unsystematic) affirmation of physiology. I have only attempted to 
show some of the philosophical elements which minimally had to be in place 
in order for that affirmation to become possible at all - and, at any rate, 
perhaps an academic dissertation would not be the most conducive setting 
for such an attempted affirmation,.. 
But before we can turn to the four chapters which carry out the detailed 
readings of Kant and Nietzsche which seek to substantiate this thesis, it 
is necessary to outline in broad terms my understanding of their respective 
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philosophical projects and with it the reading strategies employed 
throughout. 
Modern philosophy commences with Kant. It is with his critical works that 
philosophy gets its first taste of freedom from speculative theology and 
begins to throw off the shackles of perennial concern with proofs for the 
existence of god and seeks instead, so to speak, proofs for the existence 
of man. 
But it is not only the destabilisation of a theologised philosophy which 
distinguishes Kantian critique. More generally, it seeks to curb 
speculative reason's 'natural', seemingly unavoidable tendencies to assume 
an unconditioned as given. Hence Kant proposes to examine the ideas of 
reason about the soul or the I, about the nature of causality in the world, 
and about God in order to banish their claims to foundational status from 
the domain of the legitimate formation of knowledge. But the question is 
whether Kant's theoretical Critiques really succeed in their critical 
aspirations or whether an illegitimately assumed unconditioned merely 
resurfaces at other points in the text. Hence one of the subsidiary theses 
of this dissertation is that Kant is able to apply the critical method he 
develops to the most blatantly transcendent claims of speculative reason 
but that at certain points throughout his own critical project his text 
relapses into equally unfounded, transcendent assumptions. It is of course 
from the Nietzschean perspective of the will to power, of a perpetual 
production without producer, that this re-examination of Kant's critical 
project becomes possible in the first place. 
To my mind, then, it is the Kantian distinction between transcendent and 
transcendental or illegitimate and legitimate claims to be productive of 
phenomena, which is of central importance in his entire philosophical 
project. Because as a result of this distinction the differences between 
Platonistic, recuperative strands of philosophy and strands of uninhibited 
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productivity of thought are activated. Although he does not explicitly name 
them as such, it is true to say that Platonistic forms of thought can only 
become the object of philosophy because of this distinction introduced by 
Kant. And again it is Nietzsche's thinking which makes explicit what lies 
dormant in that of Kant and it is with and after Nietzsche that it becomes 
possible to assess Kant according to the criteria introduced by his own 
critical philosophy. So on one level the question, posed from a Nietzschean 
vantage point, of how critical Kantian critique really is, runs through the 
four chapters of this study. 
A second set of questions arises from a tension which pervades parts of 
the first Critique. For without unduly reducing the polyvocity of the first 
Critique, it may be said that there are essentially two deeply conflictual 
strands in it. On the one hand it is an exposition of those rational 
structures which Kant sees as constitutive of knowledge. This aspect of the 
text is obviously most strongly represented by the categorial system and 
the organisation it imposes throughout the text (for instance in the 
Principles and the chapters on the ideas of Reason). 
But alongside the rational elements of the critical text there runs the 
thought of synthesis which arises most emphatically in the context of the 
'Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding' (KrV A94 - B169, 
hereafter referred to as the Transcendental Deduction). In Kant's text 
synthesis is initially merely a structural requisite. After he has isolated 
what he calls the two stems of knowledge (intuition and concepts), Kant 
needs to demonstrate that and how their respective material can be 
integrated in the formation of distinct phenomena and this happens in a 
synthesis, according to Kant. But with the aid of Nietzsche (and Deleuze) 
it is possible to read synthesis as an early (as yet, by Kant, unrealised) 
instance of an unconscious productive process which both precedes and 
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contributes to different forms of individuation. 
Closely connected with this reading of the critical text in terms of the 
structures of consciousness and rationality as against the unconscious 
processes which are productive of them are the Kantian theories of time 
which permeate his critical texts. One of the chief claims of this study is 
that throughout the theoretical Critiques at least two conflicting 
conceptions of temporality vie with each other. One of them supports the 
rational structures Kant elaborates whereas a second, much more concealed, 
subterranean conception of time attaches to the synthetic processes Kant 
outlines. My contention is that this second type of temporality can be seen 
to filter into Nietzsche's non-Platonistic rethinking of temporality, into 
his thought of the eternal recurrence of the same. That chapters one, three 
and four keep returning to a discussion of the Transcendental Deduction is 
intended to echo the manner in which synthesis returns as phenomena and the 
manner in which recurrence recurs in the same. I hope to have clarified 
these repetitions in chapter four. 
Even a fleeting glance at the contents sheet should indicate that the 
readings of these issues are, on one level, concentrated around the 
categories of relation. True to the spirit of the age, Kant's Critique of 
Pure Reason systematically poses the question of how it is possible for an 
object of experience to appear to consciousness or, more precisely, what 
the necessary constituents of the production of knowledge of such an object 
are. Foremost among these constituents (together with the forms of outer 
and inner sense, namely space and time transcendentally conceived) are of 
course the categories as introduced in the Transcendental Analytic. With 
his characteristic love of symmetry Kant pares down Aristotle's rather more 
sprawling system of categories to four groups of three and designates them 
quantity, quality, relation and modality. It is in the third of these, in 
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the group of categories called relation, that the possibilities, as they 
present themselves to Kant, of thinking the causal nexus of an object are 
thematised. Furthermore, the relations which are thematised in this group 
of categories are emphatically those of "all time relations of appearances" 
(KrV/CPR A177). This means that they should offer particularly rich 
insights into Kant's notions of temporality, especially given their 
implicit nature in the Analogies, as opposed to their explicit formulation 
in the second part of the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first Critique, 
to which they are occasionally compared in this study. 
The categories of relation also centrally structure the Dialectic of the 
first Critique, in the three chapters of which Kant thematises the 
illegitimate claims of the ideas of reason in terms of the three types of 
relation, namely categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive, on which the 
erroneous syllogisms of speculative reason are based (cf. KrV/CPR A323, B379 
where Kant states this). Hence the categories of relation present a 
singularly useful thread along which it becomes possible to unravel the 
structure of Kant' s critical theory of nature. 
On another level, the discussion, in chapters one and two, of Kant' s 
conception of mechanical causality and accompanying notions of temporality 
in the first Critique is complemented, in chapter three, by a reading of 
the theory of teleological causality in the Critique of the Teleological 
Faculty of Judgements with which Kant finds it necessary to complement his 
theory of mechanism. 
The aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy which this dissertation focuses on 
is that of physiology`. This is an as yet strangely neglected feature of 
Nietzsche's thought. When it is discussed at all this is frequently in the 
context of the Nietzschean physiology of art7. But several strong reasons 
can be cited why it is necessary to concentrate on physiology itself. 
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Before these can be enumerated it has to be pointed out that this text does 
not start from the assumption that it is known what Nietzsche's 
physiological thinking consists of or what it implies'. This means that one 
of the tasks of this text is to elaborate what I understand to be the chief 
elements of Nietzsche's physiological thinking. As regards the Nietzschean 
interface with Kant, this raises the questions whether the categories of 
substance and of (mechanical) causality or the Kantian concept of teleology 
offer an appropriate conceptuality for thinking a Nietzschean physiology. 
Chapters one, two and three seek to answer each of these three questions 
respectively. 
Although Nietzsche's writings are directed against a great many things, 
perhaps the chief target of his thought is Platonism in all its forms. 
There are many different aspects to a Platonistic thinking and throughout 
the history of Western philosophy it has of course found articulation in 
very different guises. But four closely related aspects common to all forms 
of Platonism can preliminarily be isolated. 
There is first of all the structure of Platonism, the two-world theory, 
in which the realm of the forms (of the tSsa) is opposed to that of 'this' 
world and a whole set of values is then distributed between these two 
realms. The forms are associated with purity, eternity and a transcendent 
productive capacity, whereas 'this' world is by comparison fallen, 
transient and unproductive (the details of this distribution are discussed 
in the following chapters, particularly in chapter one). Although it is of 
course possible (and usual) to understand the following three elements as 
mere effects of this original structuring move, for strategic reasons it is 
important to discuss them as separate problems in their own right. 
Chief among these, and hence this is the second aspect of Platonism to be 
mentioned, is its hatred of all that is material. Nature is made up of 
merely inferior copies of a pristine original form, the body is merely an 
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inferior shell which temporarily houses the superior, eternal soul. This 
fear and hatred of materiality expresses itself in moral judgements on what 
are initially simply natural processes. Thus, for instance, the naturally 
occurring putrefactory processes of organic matter are drawn into the moral 
realm: in this Platonistic scheme 'corruption' is not a mere physical 
necessity but a moral and spiritual evil. 
A third element is the suppression of time which occurs in Platonism. As 
was mentioned above, the realm of the forms is designated as eternal and 
unchanging and this is in fact another mark of its purity. The forms are 
not themselves in time, although they effect that which is 'merely' 
temporal, the things of 'this' world. Whatever is in time and hence subject 
to change and, finally and most importantly, subject to death, is thereby 
considered deficient and morally inferior. Hence the greatest good, the 
highest moral instance, God, is of course eternal and unchanging. 
A fourth element concerns the conception of productivity or production. 
In a Platonistic form of thinking the things which make up this world do 
not have any significant or ultimate productive capacity. This is reserved 
for the 'real' world, whose status as primary is underwritten precisely by 
the fact that it alone has this originary productive capability. This point 
is taken up further on in this introduction and it is also discussed in 
greater detail in chapter three. 
It is obvious that the last three elements of Platonism are intimately 
related and that they in fact all mutually imply one another. But in order 
to understand the mechanisms of thought through which Platonism holds sway 
and, for our purposes more importantly, in order to appreciate exactly what 
are the obstacles for any overcoming of Platonism, I consider it important 
to enumerate them separately. Throughout the present study they are also 
treated separately, albeit on the understanding that they form a common 
nexus of problems. 
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Although all these aspects of Platonism (and several other ones which 
will be mentioned) undergo a rethinking in Nietzsche's attempt to overcome 
Platonism, it is the second of the factors mentioned above, namely the 
Platonistic hatred of all materiality which I consider to be of central 
importance to Nietzsche9. My claim is that his answer to the Platonistic 
suppression of the body is to develop an explicitly physiological thinking. 
This has several effects and implications which I consider to be highly 
desirable. One of these is that this new emphasis on the body reminds 
philosophers that thinking is never a purely spiritual activity, but that 
it is finally only yet another bodily activity, however strenuously 
philosophers attempt to deny and forget that fundamental fact. Nietzschean 
physiology reminds philosophy that, historically speaking, pure 
consciousness, ideality or spirituality have only ever been attained on the 
basis of a violent prior denial of physicality. In Nietzsche's 
physiological thinking, the body (even that of the philosopher) is named as 
the site on which the struggles of Platonism, the fight to the death 
between the attempted eradication of an excessive materiality and that 
materiality are fought. 
It is by means of the thought of the will to power as physiology that 
Nietzsche can begin the eventual overcoming of Platonism. By 'will to 
power' I understand the economic differential through which a material 
becoming plays itself out, and not a metaphysical, explanatory principle 
like the forms, reason or Spirit1O. The will to power is formative and 
primary insofar as nothing is 'given' prior to it but it, on the other 
hand, describes the formative, differential play of forces that is 
productive of all becoming, a becoming which is perpetual, unconscious, 
pre- and trans-individual. On the basis of the thought of the will to 
power, the body emerges as the typical instance of such a becoming. It, 
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too, is a becoming without anything stable or pre-given that only 
subsequently undergoes change". In a becoming-body there is nothing 
substantial that becomes and nothing prior that is transformed into a body. 
But as becoming-body it emerges as the 'model' on which to think the 
formations of the will to power. By reinstating the body as the starting 
point for philosophy, Nietzsche simultaneously displaces one of the 
founding moves of Platonism (the denial of the body) and puts the thought 
of the will to power on a firmly materialist footing. All four chapters of 
this study attempt to draw out some of the minutae of this crucial 
reversal. 
Probably the most ignored aspect of the will to power is the radically 
anti-humanist stance from which alone it makes sense as a constituent in a 
new kind of thought which is no longer a cosmology or an ontology of a 
recognisable kind - it does not seek to explain or account for the (human) 
world, it seeks to undo it. It cannot be overemphasised that to identify 
the will to power with any human faculty, proclivity or perspective is to 
reduce it to the most simplistically metaphysical modes of thought and to 
miss entirely the affirmative sense of this force, beyond the petty 
concerns of this impoverished species. Consequently, the physiological 
perspective which is elaborated here should not be taken as yet another 
reassuring confirmation of a philosophical anthropocentrism. On the 
contrary, in the displacement of the anti-materialist impulse of Platonism, 
in its replacement by a physiological thought, the anthropomorphisation of 
nature is also overcome. In its place arises the conception of an excessive 
materiality to which human life is only ever utterly incidental. 
Here it needs to be emphasised that to think matter as intrinsically 
('self'-)excessive is one of the most fundamental implications of a 
Nietzschean physiological thinking which is, after all, not merely a vulgar 
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materialism. The issue of Nietzschean physiology is closely bound up with 
the philosophical task of rethinking the transcendental, that is to say 
with one of the central tasks philosophy has traditionally set itself, 
namely to determine that which exceeds experience, to explore the excesses 
of experience. These have historically been understood to precede and to be 
logically prior to experience and, importantly, to be located in a 'higher' 
realm than that of experience. This implies that matter is conceived as 
deficient, that it can only be understood by recourse to another realm, 
another explanatory instance which supplements this alleged intrinsic 
deficiency of all materiality. As opposed to both vulgar materialist and 
idealist impositions on the nature of materiality, Nietzsche's 
physiological thinking is based on the presupposition that matter is 
'itself' intrinsically self-excessive or self-transcending - and that the 
will to power is the type of thinking with which matter can be understood 
in this way. For this reason the comparison between Kant's notions about 
the categories (of relation, in our case) as the transcendental 
constituents of experience and Nietzsche's complete re-thinking of them in 
terms of the non-causal auto-production of the will to power is also of 
considerable import. The radicality of Nietzsche's re-thinking of 
physiology can be brought out when it is shown which transformations the 
categories of relation have undergone by the time his post-metaphysical 
thought of the body is produced. The aim of this thesis is therefore to 
show the historical roots, in Kant's critical works, of Nietzsche's 
physiological perspective and to contrast these Kantian preconceptions 
concerning the transcendental constitution of 'reality' with the 
Nietzschean thought of a perpetual physiological productivity beyond all 
two-world theories. 
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Since Nietzsche pronounces the death of god, it is widely accepted that 
his is a purely secular, non-theistic philosophy. What is, however, all too 
often overlooked is the fact that it is not the overt or implicit belief in 
and justification or proof of any traditional notion of God that is the 
mark of theistic philosophies, but the participation in those structures of 
thought which formally repeat the key elements of theism. Because it is the 
way in which any two-world theory distributes its values between the two 
strata which is fundamentally theistic, as well as profoundly nihilistic. 
In this projection the lesser ('apparent', 'fallen') of the two worlds is 
thought to be diminished in its productive power, all of which is located 
in the other ('real') world which is itself unproduced. It is this 
distribution between one stratum as passive and produced, as suffering 
inhibited productivity, as against another, higher one which is unproduced 
and which enjoys undiminished productivity which is the essential 
characteristic of such dualistic, theistic systems. 
Thus, even though Kant's critical philosophy emphatically dismisses the 
fundamental tenets of previous speculative theology, it still participates 
in the structures of Platonism. Insofar as the critical system is entirely 
predicated on the theoretical distinction between the conditions of 
possibility of objects of experience and those objects themselves, the 
former of which are productive but not themselves produced, the latter of 
which are fundamentally divested of productivity, transcendental idealism 
does not break with a tradition which stretches back to Plato. Furthermore, 
since the realm of transcendental productivity is identified with the human 
faculties this has the further effect that all significant productivity is 
reduced to the realm of anthropomorphic, human productions. 
To this type of philosophy Nietzsche contrasts a physiological thinking 
in which the productions of the will to power are understood as an ongoing 
synthetic activity, the important aspect of which is that it envisages a 
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production without a producer and hence a nature liberated from all 
anthropocentrisms. 
A further question which animates this dissertation is what the effects 
of the death of 'god' (the Platonistic two-world theory) on the project of 
critique are, and specifically on Kant's version of it as immanent 
critique. The contention, substantiated particularly throughout chapter 
four, is that with the death of 'god' the self-overcoming of Platonism 
which begins to become explicit in immanent critique, can and must be 
further radicalised to encompass the hitherto unexamined claims of 
rationality themselves. The claim is that this process of the 
radicalisation of critique issues in Nietzsche's physiological thinking. 
Another effect of this physiological mode of thought can only be fully 
comprehended in the context of the discussion below (especially in chapters 
one and four). This concerns the fact that in Nietzschean physiology, the 
temporal and the economic or materialist aspects of thinking are no longer 
separated in the way they are throughout the philosophical tradition 
stretching from Plato to Kant. Insofar as Nietzsche's thinking encompasses 
a temporalising aspect in the thought of the eternal recurrence of the same 
and a materialist, economic element in the thought of the will to power, 
Nietzsche is able to heal the rift between them, opened up by the violently 
anti-materialist thinking of Platonism and, crucially, he is able to do so 
on the terrain of the physiological which is capable of incorporating both 
aspects. 
A final point concerns the notion of repetition/2 which this text only 
discusses explicitly in passing. I take this to be the element of 
Nietzsche's thought which is most resistant to any traditional notions of 
comprehension because it is intrinsically unsubsumable to the categories of 
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the understanding. Although this thought is indisputably of central 
importance in Nietzsche's philosophy, the present study only touches on it 
tangentially, and only to the extent that it has any bearing on the project 
of circumscribing Nietzsche's physiological thinking. 
Nietzsche thinks repetition as productive of difference. Insofar as the 
eternal recurrence of the same thematises a becoming in which the 
reproduction of self-differing utterly precedes all seeming identities, 
repetition is thought as productive of both difference and the same. In 
this type of repetition there is nothing substantial which is repeated. It 
is instead the repetitious process 'itself' which is productive in the 
sense that it reproduces 'itself' and, as a by-product, produces what 
appears as the same, as identities, at least to a Platonistic thinking 
oriented towards the assumption of identities rather than to the play of 
difference. 
It must also be pointed out that the body is an instance of such a form 
of repetition, that it too marks a perpetual self-differing in which what 
are only ever relative stabilities are constantly displaced by interlacing 
reproductive processes. In other words, a becoming-body is the most 
immediate model for a non-metaphysical repetition in which differential, 
temporalising matter reproduces its reproduction and more or less 
incidentally also leads to bodily formations. 
On a 'hermeneutic' note, using this basic model, my aim has been to show 
the textual effects of reading the Kantian critical text in terms of the 
repetition it undergoes in Nietzsche's writings. It follows from this very 
specific set of issues with which this thesis concerns itself that the 
readings of both Kant and Nietzsche which are carried out here are highly 
selective and that no claims for a comprehensive interpretation of the 
first or third Critique or of Nietzsche's notes are made. 
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Before we can turn to the detailed discussions of the next four chapters 
a brief note on the nature of the texts considered here is required. It is 
obviously the case that on one level the shift which occurs from Kant to 
Nietzsche concerns the nature of their respective texts and the conception 
of what constitutes a philosophical writing. In this regard, the most 
striking difference between the two thinkers is that Kant's belief in the 
validity of a philosophical system as an appropriate way of articulating 
thought is as absolute as Nietzsche's suspicion of it. This is, as Kant 
explains in the Architectonic of Pure Reason: 
"Weil die systematische Einheit dasjenige ist, was gemeine Erkenntnis 
allererst zur Wissenschaft, d. i. aus einem bloßen Aggregat derselben ein 
System macht ." 
"Because systematic unity is that which first turns vulgar knowledge into 
science, i. e. which turns a mere aggregate of it into a system. " (KrV/CPR 
A832, B860, t. m. ) 
And according to Kant (loc. cit) it is Reason which demands that knowledge 
be thus integrated into a system, without which it remains 'vulgar' and 
merely 'rhapsodic'. For Kant Reason, and the system it dictates, is that 
which guarantees the scientificity, and hence the universal validity of 
knowledge through which alone it is possible to surpass the superstitions, 
prejudices and unfounded beliefs of dogmatic speculative theology. For Kant 
it is Reason which alone can lead to the emancipation of thinking and to 
the Enlightenment which surpasses the Dark Ages which preceded it. For Kant 
it is the infallible sign of an intellectual maturity1s asserting itself 
that thinking articulates itself systematically under the rule of Reason, 
and consequently, as this absolute belief in reason wanes, so the adherence 
to a systematic philosophy diminishes. 
This movement reaches its pinnacle in Nietzsches writings and it is on 
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the basis of the thought of the will to power as physiology that quite 
another picture presents itself. Here unity, or the drive for unification, 
is read as a symptom of a weakening of the will to power and it is, 
conversely, by sustaining an exhaustive differentiation that a body or a 
thinking demonstrates its undiminished force: 
"Je größer der Drang ist zur Einheit, um so mehr darf man auf Schwäche 
schließen; je mehr der Drang nach Varietät, Differenz, innerlichem 
Zerfall, um so mehr Kraft ist da. " 
"The greater the urge to unity is, the more one may deduce weakness; the 
more urge to variety, differentiation, inner decay, the more force is 
there. " (KSA 11,36 1211, WM/WP no. 655, t. m. ) 
It follows that Nietzsche's philosophy, especially when it is in note 
form (which is of course the case with the vast majority of his writings), 
should not be considered as lacking systematicity and hence, the 
implication is, intellectual rigour, but that it should be considered 
positively, as having overcome the intellectual weakness which requires 
recourse to a system. For Nietzsche a system is only ever a defence 
mechanism, an extended spasm, with which thinking seeks to protect itself 
against difference itself, against life. The deeply moral impulses which 
lie behind such schematisations are dissected in the following note which, 
although he is not mentioned by name, clearly implies a reference to Kant: 
"Es gibt schematische Köpfe, solche, welche einen Gedankencomplex dann 
für wahrer halten, wenn er sich in vorher entworfene Schemata oder 
Kategorien-Tafeln einzeichnen läßt. Der Selbst-Täuschungen auf diesem 
Gebiete gibt es unzählige: fast alle großen 'Systeme' gehören hierhin. 
Das Grundvorurteil ist aber: daß die Ordnung, Übersichtlichkeit, das 
Systematische dem wahren Sein der Dinge anhaften müsse, umgekehrt die 
Unordung, das Chaotische, Unberechenbare nur in einer falschen oder 
unvollständig erkannten Welt zum Vorscheine komme -kurz ein Irrtum sei-: 
- was ein moralisches Vorurteil ist, entnommen aus der Tatsache, daß der 
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wahrhaftige zutrauenswürdige Mensch ein Mann der Ordnung, der Maximen, 
und im Ganzen etwas Berechenbares und Pedantisches zu sein pflegt. Nun 
ist es aber ganz unbeweisbar, daß das Ansich der Dinge nach diesem 
Rezepte eines Muster-Beamten sich verhält. " 
"There are schematic heads, such as consider a thought-complex more true 
when it can be inscribed in previously designed schemata or tables of 
categories. The self-deceptions in this area are innumerable: almost all 
great 'systems' belong to this. But the basic prejudice is: that order, 
clarity, the systematic have to attach to the true being of things, 
conversely disorder, the chaotic, incalculable only appears in a false or 
incompletely known world -in short, that it is an error-: - which is a 
moral prejudice, derived from the fact that the truthful, trustworthy 
human being has the habit of being a man of order, of maxims, and all in 
all something calculable and pedantic. Yet it cannot at all be proven 
that the in-itself of things behaves according to this prescription of a 
model civil servant. " (KSA 11,40 191, m. t. ) 
The contrast between 'the true being of things', as opposed to another 
world which 'only appears', and then only as an error, and the fact that 
this division of 'worlds' follows from a moral impulse, echoes Nietzsche's 
innumerable reflections on Platonism. The implication is that a systematic 
articulation of a philosophical project is itself the effect of Platonistic 
modes of thinking. Nietzsche's philosophical project, on the other hand, is 
at all times oriented towards the overcoming of Platonism, and as such it 
requires a non-systematic writing1*, such as can be found in the Nechlaß1&. 
It should be self-evident that this dissertation is in some respects the 
amalgam of many philosophical perspectives. It is impossible for me to 
point to any one figure to whom I am exclusively indebted and, moreover, 
the mention of a writer does not necessarily imply unqualified agreement 
with their reading of either Kant or Nietzsche. But the intellectual 
atmosphere in which this work has grown has been redolent of Heidegger, 
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Deleuze and, to a lesser degree, Klossowski, despite the fact that their 
respective responses to what is termed 'the tradition' have differed so 
markedly. Although this dissertation is deeply parasitic on their thought, 
any explicit consideration of their responses to the points raised here 
would have resulted in a completely unwieldy, monstrously bloated body of 
work. Equally, although many important secondaries have been read and are 
cited in the select bibliography, it has unfortunately been impossible to 
include a discussion of them in this study. 
Finally, my aim throughout has been to offer readings of the primary 
texts of Kant and Nietzsche which would cast a new light on their work. 
This is based on the assumption that their texts still present the greatest 
challenges for thinking today. 
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THE SURGE OF PHYSIOLOGY 
"Unsere heiligsten Überzeugungen, unser Unwandelbares in Hinsicht 
der obersten Werte sind Urteile unserer Muskeln. " 
"Our most sacred convictions, that which is unalterable for us as 
regards the highest values, are Judgements of our muscles. " 
(KSA 13,11 ( 3761 ), WM/WP no. 314, t. m. ) 
I. The Principle of Substance 
"Whole were we who celebrated that festival, unspotted by all the evils 
which awaited us in time to come, and whole and unspotted and changeless 
and serene were the objects revealed to us in the light of that mystic 
vision. Pure was the light and pure were we from the pollution of the 
walking sepulchre which we call a body, to which we are bound like an 
oyster to its shell ." (Phaedrus 250b, c) 
This dirge ends Socrates' account of the myth of fallen souls in the 
Phaedrus. It is immediately preceded by his proof of the soul's immortal, 
uncreated and indestructible nature (245c - 246a). Its immortality is 
proven by its self-moving capacity: it is perpetually in motion, it is that 
which moves the parts of the body, but that motion is not itself caused by 
another preceding it. It is uncreated because self-creating in its motion. 
Since it is self-moving it cannot cease to exist without negating its own 
nature. 
It is clear that at every turn, this 'proof' relies on according the body 
absolute passivity even to the extent that the very notion of the soul, 
here identified entirely with motion, is predicated on the body's 
incapacity for self-caused activity if it is not endowed with soul. 
But it is the tone of the passage quoted above which leaves little doubt 
as to the ultimate value of this idea of the soul: it has to be devised to 
cope with the horror which this suppurating, foetid matter, the body, which 
appears here as little more than a chute towards extinction, instils in the 
author of those lines. 
Some two thousand years later the tone has calmed considerably, even if 
the sentiments remain unabated: 
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"Bei allem Wechsel der Erscheinungen beharret die Substanz, und das 
Quantum derselben wird in der Natur weder vermehrt noch vermindert. " 
"In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in 
nature is neither increased nor diminished. "(KrV/CPR A182, B224) 
This is of course Kant's formulation of the principle of the permanence 
of substance of the first Analogy which occurs in the section of the first 
Critique entitled 'Analogies of Experience'. The general principle of the 
Analogies is that "Experience is possible only through the representation 
of a necessary connection of perceptions" (KrV/CPR A176, B218). The 
necessary connection (Verknüpfung) demanded here is in each case a temporal 
relation and this formulation of the general principle of the Analogies 
thus constitutes a reiteration, in terms of the explicitly temporal aspect 
under which judgements are now being looked at, of the demand for a third 
term (ein Drittes) which is necessary for the association of subject and 
predicate in a synthetic judgement (in the section which deals with their 
highest principle, KrV/CPR A154f, ß1'93f). This third term, the "medium of 
all synthetic judgements"(ibid) is nothing other than time itself. The 
readings of the Analogies which follow will therefore pay particular 
attention to the theory of time which is implicit in them as well as to the 
nexus of temporality and natural production which they thematise overtly. 
In the above formulation of the general principle of the Analogies of 
Experience, the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions is 
said to enable experience. In fact, though, this general demand for such a 
representation finds three different articulations, in that there are three 
types of representation which fulfil this criterion, namely substance, 
causality and reciprocity. So much for an introductory remark to the 
Analogies. We can now pick up the thread of an argument which sees Kant in 
fundamental agreement (or collusion) with certain Platonic strands. 
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It is perhaps riot immediately obvious that the two statements above 
(Plato and Kant's) are in any way related. In what follows, the connection 
will be established. This will initially involve drawing out the meaning of 
the quote from Kant but, on a more subterranean level, the sense, 
directionality or impetus it derives from the Platonic project will also 
have to be shown. 
The proof of this principle of the permanence of substance to which Kant 
proceeds immediately is, as we remind ourselves, necessitated by the 
initial heterogeneity of, on the one hand, empirical intuitions and, on the 
other hand, the pure, a priori concepts of the understanding (KrV/CPR 
A137f). What is to be proven is the possibility of the subsumption of the 
former under the latter. The apriority of time - as pure, a priori form of 
intuition - had already been shown in the Transcendental Aesthetic and, 
equally, that of the categories in general in the Transcendental 
Deductions. What is required at this stage of the first Critique is the 
demonstration of the possibility of their combination by the faculty of 
imagination which already and in general provided the median term for 
sensibility and understanding in the Deductions (KrV/CPR A124, B151). Hence 
Kant now launches the Transcendental Doctrine of Judgement in which the 
possibility of this principle of subsumption is to be shown in respect of 
each category in turn. 
The particular character of the Analogies (as of all of the first 
Critique) is imposed on them by the implications of Kant's Copernican 
revolution. According to this, objects of experience do not exist in formal 
independence of the subjective modes of their perception or, for that 
matter, of their conceptual formation in a consciousness. The apriority of 
the modes of perception (which Kant calls 'receptivity', for instance at 
KrV/CPR A19, B33) means that what are now re-thought as the forms of 
their 
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sensible intuition, space and time, can no longer be thought to appertain 
to objects of experience as their attributes. Instead, and this is what 
constitutes the revolutionary character of this reversal, objects of 
experience qua objects of intuition are produced as objects of intuition in 
space and time; space and time exist logically prior to the objects which 
sensibility receives in and through them. This is referred to as the 
transcendentally ideal nature of space and time. 
The Analogies are entirely predicated on this transcendental ideality of 
time and can only be comprehended, as Kant wishes them to be taken, by 
keeping this prerequisite constantly in mind. Before proceeding to a more 
fully developed reading of the first Analogy, I shall simply summarise the 
main points of the argument, as I understand it. 
The major premise of Kant's proof of the permanence of substance (KrV/CPR 
A182, B224f) is itself developed out of two previously given tenets, the 
first of which is the result of the Copernican turn with which Kant's 
critical philosophy gets underway, namely that all appearances are in time 
(rather than time appertaining to them), but the second of which is merely 
the reiteration of one of philosophy's oldest prejudices, namely that the 
only modes of time are co-existence and succession (KrV/CPR A183, ß226). 
Appearances can only be perceived in temporal relations of co-existence and 
succession - these are the modes within which there is articulated the 
"representation of a necessary (temporal! ] connection of perceptions", 
demanded by the introductory section to the Analogies (KrV/CPR A176, B218, 
my insertion). But necessity can never originate in appearances, in the 
realm of the empirical, but only in the a priori constituents of 
experience. Thus the temporal modes of co-existence and succession are only 
made possible by the form of inner intuition which in this context is 
required to have the character of permanence. 
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The minor premise (KrV/CPR A182, B225) is simply that time itself cannot 
be perceived. That is to say that not only can time in its transcendental 
ideality not be the object of perception (to say this would be tautological 
since the status of all that is accorded transcendentality as being prior 
to, and never itself the object of experience is definitional) but that 
even, strictly speaking, co-existence and succession, the empirical 
determinations of time, cannot be perceived in themselves, that is to say 
apart or in abstraction from appearances in which alone a change or 
concurrence of features can be observed. 
The conclusion to these premises (KrV/CPR A182, ß225), namely that the 
substratum which represents time in general must be found in appearances 
and that this substratum is substance in its temporal articulation of 
permanence, is demanded firstly by the assumption of an a priori, and hence 
necessary, form to underlie the empirically observable temporal relations 
of co-existence or succession and secondly by the fact that only substance 
allows for the attribution of permanence to it so as to provide within the 
understanding a concept by means of which a substrate to regulated 
extension in time can be thought. Needless to say, the former sums up the 
argument from the point of view of sensibility and the latter from the 
point of view of the understanding, thereby indicating the harmonious 
interaction of the two faculties which it was this Analogy's task to prove 
in the first place'. 
Although the argument is prima facie entirely coherent in the framework 
established by the first Critique, it nonetheless carries certain 
implications, some of which prove troublesome for the critical project 
itself and some of which highlight its position within the trajectory of a 
Platonistic metaphysics. 
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In the explanatory paragraphs to this proof it is stated that "... the 
permanent is the substratum of the empirical representations of time 
itself, in which all determination of time is alone possible; " (KrV/CPR 
A183, B226, t. m. ) and "Permanence expresses time generally as the abiding 
correlate of all existence of appearances, of all change and all 
concomitance. " (ibid, t. m, ) and "If one wanted to ascribe a succession to 
time itself, one would also have to think another time in which this 
succession would be possible. " (ibid, t. m. , my emphasis). Here it is 
explicitly stated that time in its apriority must only be associated with 
permanence and never with succession. But under b) in paragraph 6 of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic 'Conclusions from these concepts', the following 
characterisation of time occurs -I quote in full: 
"Die Zeit ist nichts anders, als die Form des innern Sinnes, d. i. des 
Anschauens unserer selbst und unsers innern Zustandes. Denn die Zeit kann 
keine Bestimmung äußerer Erscheinungen sein; sie gehöret weder zu einer 
Gestalt, oder Lage etc., dagegen bestimmt sie das Verhältnis der 
Vorstellungen in unserm innern Zustande. Und, eben weil diese innre 
Anschauung keine Gestalt gibt, suchen wir auch diesen Mangel durch 
Analogien zu ersetzen, und stellen die Zeitfolge durch eine ins 
Unendliche fortgehende Linie vor, in welcher das Mannigfaltige eine Reihe 
ausmacht, die nur von einer Dimension ist, und schließen aus den 
Eigenschaften dieser Linie auf alle Eigenschaften der Zeit, außer dem 
einigen, daß die Teile der erstere zugleich, die der letztern aber 
jederzeit nach einander sind. Hieraus erhellet auch, daß die Vorstellung 
der Zeit selbst Anschauung sei, weil alle ihre Verhältnisse sich an einer 
äußern Anschauung ausdrücken lassen. " 
"Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, that is, of the 
intuition of ourselves and of our inner state. For time cannot be the 
determination of outer appearances; it belongs neither to a shape nor 
position etc, but determines the relation of representations in our inner 
state. And just because this inner intuition yields no shape, we seek to 
replace this want by analogies and represent the time sequence by a 
line 
progressing to infinity in which the manifold constitutes a series which 
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is of one dimension only and we infer from the properties of this line to 
all the properties of time, except for the one, that the parts of the 
former are simultaneous while the parts of the latter are at all times 
successive. From this it also becomes clear that the representation of 
time is itself intuition because all its relations allow of being 
expressed in an outer intuition. " (KrV/CPR A33, B49f, t. m. ) 
Kant here makes four moves which, when compared with his comments in the 
first Analogy, are to varying degrees problematic. 
If we recall that the second part of the Transcendental Aesthetic (from 
paragraph four onwards) has the function of establishing the apriority and 
transcendentality of time, it is reasonable to assume that the time 
mentioned in the passage just cited refers to time in its a priori and 
transcendental aspect. This is underwritten when it is called the form of 
inner sense and when it is said of it that it determines the relation of 
the representations in our inner state. But the contention that "because 
this inner intuition yields no shape we seek to replace this want by 
analogies" according to which the succession of time is represented by a 
line stretching into infinity, incurs several problems. 
Firstly (and least of all), the ' analogies' mentioned here cannot refer 
to the terminus technicus later used in the chapters bearing that name. At 
this point in the text the categories have not yet been introduced and 
since 'Analogy' in the later sense designates the employment of certain 
categories (under the restrictions imposed on them by the pure form of 
inner sense), it is misleading to use this term here. 
But leaving such a relatively trivial point aside, Kant here seems to 
leave unannounced his sudden shift from speaking of time in its 
transcendental, to speaking of it in its empirical employment - if that is 
indeed what he is doing. He can only mean time in its empirical employment 
since he speaks of succession of time (Zeitfolge), that is to say one of 
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the modes or empirical determinations of time (cf. KrV/CPR A182, B226). If, 
however, he does not mean empirical time when speaking of Zeitfolge - and 
since he says of it that the manifold makes up a series in it, he may well 
not mean empirical time - he would be blatantly contradicting his own later 
contentions of a non-empirical time as the permanent substrate of all 
appearances. 
Thirdly and most importantly, the implication of this passage is that 
time 'itself' cannot be represented at all in its own terms (or at least 
not in the terms set out by the critical project) but only in terms of 
space, as linear2. 
Thus it may be inferred that time as such cannot be subject to 
representational thought, that it escapes representational schemas 
altogether and, conversely, that it can only be thought as properly 
temporal, as prior to its translation into spatial terms, in a non- 
representational framework. Here, though, it must be observed that just as 
with one hand Kant gives the specificity of time's transcendentality, he 
takes it away with the other by again reducing time to the representation 
of it in terms of outer sense, although rather than describing this 
manoeuvre in terms of a serious defect, Kant mentions it positively, or at 
least neutrally by simply saying that all representations of time "allow of 
being expressed in an outer intuition". 
But fourthly and lastly, after translating time into a representation in 
space, he then claims that inferences concerning the - essentially 
unrepresentable - nature of time can be made from this, "... we infer from 
the properties of this line to all the properties of time"(my emphasis) - 
except for the one that in the representation of space simultaneity is 
dominant whereas in the representation of time in spatial terms 
simultaneity is replaced by succession. 
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It is difficult to imagine that Kant seriously advocates such an utterly 
simplistic operation in order to arrive at what he terms the properties of 
time. What might in fact be meant by this comment becomes clearer when we 
recall that the table of concepts of the pure understanding is derived from 
the table of judgements (KrV/CPR A70, B95 - the end of A83), in the latter 
of which Kant offers a systematic account of the merely logical functions 
of thought, that is to say those judgements which do not lead to any 
knowledge of objects of experience because they do not engage in the 
operations of sensibility. 
Thus from the categorical judgement which expresses the relation of 
predicate to subject there is derived the category of substance which 
expresses the relation of accidens to substantia. It is clear that the 
judgement which Kant classifies as categorical simply encapsulates the form 
of judgement in general, that form of thought which follows the demands of 
logic, the foremost of which is of course the law of contradiction 
according to which the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and 
not belong to the same subject and in the same respect. It may therefore be 
said that in its categorial employment (category of substance) this law 
represents nothing other than the demand of non-contradiction of 
Aristotelian logic transferred to a theory of time which draws out the 
implications for critical philosophy of the requirement 'at the same time' 
which centrally organises the law of contradiction. 
Thus the demand for a permanent time to underlie the (empirical) 
representation of time as sequential directly results from the adherence to 
the axioms by which identity, in this case the identity of time, is 
critically established (Kant) or assumed as originarily given (Aristotle). 
In other words, time represented lineally expresses time as self-identical. 
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We have seen how the internal requirements of the reversals at the heart 
of the critical project demand time as permanence to be posited as the 
substance underlying all appearances. Change occurs on the basis of the 
permanence of time but time itself does not change, ",.. the time in which 
all change of appearances is to be thought, remains and does not change. " 
(KrV/CPR A182, B224f, t. m. ). It is obvious that time thought transcendentally 
in the manner of Kant cannot itself be conceived as subject to change, 
which Kant shortly thematises under the heading of causality, because if it 
were so conceived this would lead to the transcendent employment of (one 
of) the categories against which Kant warns his readers most vociferously 
throughout and especially in the chapter on 'Phenomena and Noumena'. 
Towards the end of the first Analogy (KrV/CPR A187f, B230f) Kant seeks to 
correct some common misunderstandings about the nature of alteration and 
change. Closely following Aristotle's procedure in his reflections on these 
issues (in De Generatione et Corruptione) Kant distinguishes alteration 
from change by saying that only the permanent, substrate or substance, is 
altered - in respect of its accidentla. This is not to say that substance 
itself is effectively subject to alteration but only that it is solely on 
the basis of the unchanging substrate that alteration can be perceived at 
all. Whereas the accidentia (here momentarily, and only for the purposes of 
the argument, thought in abstraction from their substrate) do not 
themselves alter but undergo a change qua a commencing or ceasing of some 
of their determinations. This is summed up as "all that alters persists and 
only its state [the entirety of its determinations] changes' (KrV/CPR A187, 
ß230, my insertion). 
Kant, again following Aristotle, separates alteration into two modes, 
coming to be (Entstehen) and passing away (Vergehen). Objects, qua 
subjectively derived formal determinations of that which affects our 
senses, come to be or pass away but that which is the ground of the modes 
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of their alteration, that which affects our senses, namely matter itself, 
does not itself come to be or pass away. If we consecutively make the 
following observations: 'the oak is now an acorn' - 'the oak is now a large 
tree' - 'the oak is now firewood', it is clear that the formal 
determinations, the articulations in space and time, of the underlying 
substance (in this example 'the oak' ) undergo changes but, and this is the 
crucial point, the oak, substance, matter itself, does not come to be or 
pass away, although the consecutive states we perceive it to be in change3. 
This must surely constitute one of the greatest triumphs of Platonism, to 
have arrested time into an unchangeable permanent state and to have 
simultaneously divested matter of that which makes it most repulsive from 
the Platonic perspective, namely the identification of it with incessant 
becoming, which constitutes its essential fallenness in a Platonistic 
cosmos. 
We can only begin to interrupt the Platonic trajectory which occupies 
such a central role in the Kantian text, if we realise not only its 
impetus, that is to say the values which organise it, but also the 
mechanisms by which these values are played out and through which they 
appear self-naturalising. 
The impetus behind these operations is clearly fear and hatred of time, 
of change and of the unpredictable nature of matter as long as it remains 
unfixed by the type of terms which Kant associates with necessity and 
universality, viz. apriority, and which alone are considered guarantors of 
the possibility of knowledge - where the desirability of knowledge, or at 
least of the type of knowledge in which correspondence of cognition and 
object is demanded, remains unquestioned. 
Of the mechanisms which perpetuate that series of values, the most 
important one is the division of becoming into the object which becomes, or 
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rather ceases to truly become as a result of this move, and the time of its 
becoming, now reduced to change and lineally conceived time. This means 
nothing other than the separation of becoming from itself and it is 
effected precisely by the imposition of an object (of knowledge) which 
changes or, which amounts to the same thing, of a subject of change upon a 
"pure' process, a process which does not know of the division of matter 
into distinct entities and for which that which we refer to as 'time' only 
exists as the rate of its self-overcoming. 
It should perhaps be emphasised that this non-Platonic conception of 
becoming, which is freed from division into an object and the time in which 
it exists and changes, cannot be approached gradually, cannot be learnt or 
otherwise assimilated over time. It is rather a matter of a sudden and 
momentous leap or lapse in which a previously self-possessed consciousness 
- without being prepared for it - forgets itself. 
In other words, a proposition which approximated to such a lapse could 
never be a merely analytic proposition. Instead it would repeat the formal 
requirements of a synthetic, or expansive judgement (Erweiterungsurteil 
KrV/CPR A7, BID in that in it the ground for the relation of subject and 
predicate would not be the law of identity (as is the case in analytic 
judgements, cf. KrV/CPR loc. cit. ). Instead, another unknown (but here 
unknowable) =X (as Kant calls it, KrV/CPR B13) may be projected and sought 
in what is no more than a playful repetition of the quest central to the 
first Critique, namely the search for the a priori conditions of 
possibility of synthetic a priori judgements. 
Apart from such formal requirements, though, the perspective in which 
such a non-Platonic conception of becoming opens up can be approached 




"Zu begreifen: Daß alle Art Verfall und Erkrankung fortwährend an den 
Gesamt-Werturteilen mitgearbeitet hat: daß in den herrschend 
gewordenen Werturteilen decadence sogar zum Übergewicht gekommen ist: 
daß wir nicht nur gegen die Folgezustände alles gegenwärtigen Elends von 
Entartung zu kämpfen haben, sondern alle bisherige decadence rückständig 
d. h. lebendig geblieben ist. Eine solche Gesamt-Abirrung der Menschheit 
von ihren Grundinstinkten, eine solche Gesamt-Decadence des 
Werturteils ist das Fragezeichen par excellence, das eigentliche 
Rätsel, das das Tier 'Mensch' dem Philosophen aufgibt -" 
"To be comprehended: that every kind of decay and disease has continually 
cooperated in the comprehensive value judgements: that in the value 
judgements that have become the ruling ones decadence has even gained 
predominance: that we not only have to fight against the consequences 
of all present misery of degeneration, but that all decadence hitherto 
has remained residual, has remained alive. Such a comprehensive 
aberration of humanity from its basic instincts, such a comprehensive 
decadence of the value Judgement is the question mark par excellence, 
the essential riddle that the human animal poses for the philosopher. " 
(KSA 13,11 12271, WM/WP no. 39, t. m. ) 
Here the site from which this riddle can even be perceived to exercise 
philosophy is clearly very far removed from the site of any Platonistic 
preoccupations. The question arises at the instant of the lapse of 
10 
consciousness and, furthermore, it is formulated in terms of physiological 
occurrences, those of decay and disease. The significance of these two 
aspects of this passage can not yet be drawn out without anticipating 
unduly the results of reading the relevant parts of the first Critique - in 
light of this, and other remarks of Nietzsche' s like it. 
But for the moment it must suffice to say that only through such an 
instant of consciousness's lapsing from itself can the vision of the 
consummation of becoming by itself be opened up. This vision, which is 
here 
designated by the title of 'physiology', is preoccupied by the processes of 
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generation and corruption in an entirely different manner from the Kantian 
treatment of these terms. The latter, following the philosophical 
tradition, starts from the assumption that there are distinct beings and, 
although in vastly more sophisticated terms than was ever done before, 
gives an account of, ultimately, the principle of sufficient reason 
('nothing is without ground'). But this critically reinscribed ontology is 
still, as we have seen, utterly dependent upon the representation of 
empirical time as linear (even as it implicitly admits the status of this 
representation as somewhat of a necessary fiction) and of transcendental 
time as permanent and unchangeable. According to these assumptions a thing 
comes to be, exists for a time and passes away, while time and matter 
persist and do not change. Thus the commonsensical view of time finds its 
rational articulation in which the originary status of being is preserved. 
But there is no immediately obvious reason why existence should be viewed 
from the point of view of the preservation of distinct entities rather than 
from the point of view of the perpetual transformations of matter. To 
prefer the former is, on one level, nothing but a habit and a prejudice of 
a metaphysically biased reason: 
""Dinge, die eine Beschaffenheit an sich haben" - eine dogmatische 
Vorstellung, mit der man absolut brechen muß". 
""Things that have a constitution in themselves" -a dogmatic idea with 
which one has to break absolutely". (KSA 13,11 11341, WM/WP no. 559) 
As opposed to such a dogmatic view the experiment of a philosophical 
physiology promises the possibility of viewing time and matter as 
indivisible and as such equally unfettered by idealist impositions. 
In this physiological thought corruption -a term which is deeply 
symptomatic of Platonistic orientations because of the manner in which it 
fuses a moral and a physiological register - is no longer posited in 
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opposition to and in dependence of generation because this thought does not 
seek to divide essentially continuous, primary, physiological processes 
into oppositional schemas whose sole purpose is to impose morality upon 
nature. Instead, in physiology there is celebrated the self-overcoming 
nature of matter (beyond the narrow conceptual confines of oppositionally 
related terms), its revelling in self-expenditure for which corruption now 
merely signifies the generation of self-overcoming in which 'distinct 
entities' flare up and explode again with the speed of lightning. 
Kant himself had an intimation that this would be the - for him 
catastrophic - effect of the abolition of a non-transitory substratum when 
he remarked that "... in mere succession [without the substrate of time as 
permanent substance] existence is always vanishing and commencing and never 
has the least magnitude [ extension in time]" (KrV/CPR A183, B226, t. m. , my 
insertions). 
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II. The Transcendental Idea of Substantiality 
In the previous section we saw how, in the domain of knowledge (briefly, 
in the actus of subsumption of the manifold of intuition under categories), 
Kant demonstrates the universality and necessity of the concept of 
substance and how it leads to the assumption of time as permanent substance 
when the pure concept of the understanding is activated in the pure form of 
inner sense. Thus the transcendentality of the concept of substance is, for 
Kant, a proven fact of the understanding, that is to say of that faculty 
which (in its application to sensibility) is central to the formation of 
judgements of knowledge. 
When the separation of becoming from itself was on the one hand described 
as the imposition of a subject (of change) upon a' pure' process of 
becoming (above, sec. D, this thought was in fact formally derived from the 
first Critique itself, namely from Kant's characterisation of the dual 
nature of reason. For without claiming to circumscribe the entire domain of 
reason, it can at least preliminarily be said that 'reason' designates two 
impulses within such a faculty which are in mutual conflict to such an 
extent that they would effectively cancel each other out if they were to 
dominate that faculty at one and the same time. 
Reason, which is variously described as the faculty of principles 
(KrV/CPR A299, B356), contains in such a principle a "... subjective law for 
the orderly economising with the provisions of our understanding, that by 
comparison of its concepts it may reduce them to the smallest possible 
number; 11 (KrV/CPR A306, B362, t. in. ). This ' economising' takes place by means 
of the syllogisms, knowledge of the operations of which is peculiar to 
reason. And whilst "... all pure concepts in general (here those of the 
understanding] are concerned with the synthetic unity of 
representations... ", only "... concepts of pure reason (transcendental 
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ideas) are concerned with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all 
conditions in general. " (KrV/CPR A334, B391, my italics and insertion in 
square brackets). And since in the case of the ideas of reason, as much as 
in the case of the concepts of the pure understanding, they are 
investigated in their transcendental, and not merely in their logical 
employment, the apriority of either group of concepts is to be proven. 
The Transcendental Analytic set itself this task as regards the 
categories. The possibility of synthetic a priori judgements could in 
principle be shown by demonstrating that a universal and necessary 
synthetic judgement can never be derived from concepts alone but that it 
needs recourse to the (equally a priori) forms of intuition in order to go 
beyond the mere concept of the object and to associate with it, in the 
formation of experience, predicates which are not merely contained in that 
concept of the object. An analogous question is posed as regards reason, 
namely, does it "... contain a priori synthetic principles... and in what may 
these principles consist? " (KrV/CPR A306, B363). 
Now the dual nature of reason resides in the fact that (like the 
understanding) it believes itself to be in possession of such principles 
(equally, with respect to experience! ) but - and this is what the 
Transcendental Dialectic must show - that this belief is erroneous. The 
understanding can legitimately claim transcendental status for its pure 
concepts because it is directed to objects of experience or appearances. 
But the transcendentality of the concepts of pure reason, or transcendental 
ideas, is illusory because there cannot be anything in experience which 
corresponds to them or, to put it yet another way, they do not contribute 
anything to and are not constitutive of knowledge but should only organise 
the judgements of knowledge derived from the understanding and act 
regulatively upon them. 
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The three concepts of reason are derived from the three categories of 
relation, which in turn are deduced by Kant from the table of judgements. 
He explains how he sees reason arriving at its ideas: 
"So viel Arten des Verhältnisses es nun gibt, die der Verstand 
vermittelst der Kategorien sich vorstellt, so vielerlei reine Vernunft- 
begriffe wird es auch geben, und es wird also erstlich ein Unbedingtes 
der kategorischen Synthesis in einem Subjekt, zweitens der hypothetischen 
Synthesis der Glieder einer Reihe, drittens der dlsjunktiven Synthesis 
der Teile in einem System zu suchen sein. " 
"As many kinds of relation there are which the understanding represents 
to itself by means of the categories, so many pure concepts of reason 
there will also be and hence, firstly there will have to be sought an 
unconditioned of the categorical synthesis in a subject, secondly of the 
hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series, thirdly of the 
disjunctive synthesis of the parts in a system " (KrV/CPR A323, B379, t. m. ) 
The initial contribution of reason towards the syllogism lies in its 
formation of the inference or conclusion from the relation between the 
major premise, given through the understanding, and the minor premise, 
brought about through the operation of subsumption in the faculty of 
judgement (Urteilskraft) (KrV/CPR A304, B360f). But, Kant claims, it is in 
the nature of reason to attempt to unify and reduce in number the 
judgements of the undertanding by inquiring whether the condition (of the 
syllogism), represented in the rule which constitutes the major premise, 
is 
itself conditioned, that is to say whether it is itself the conclusion of a 
prior syllogism (prosyllogism). 
Thus, and this constitutes one of the two impulses of reason mentioned 
above, reason searches and surges 'upwards' through the syllogism(s) 
towards the unconditioned of the entire series (cf. for example 
KrV/CPR 
A336, B394). In this respect we may say of reason that it indulges and 
enjoys its own prowess without finally considering the 
demands of critique 
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that knowledge be strictly applicable only to objects of experience; for 
the unconditioned cannot constitute an object of experience in Kant's 
definition of such an object precisely as constituted and conditioned by 
sensibility and understanding. But a corollary of this 'upsurge' of reason 
is the eventual imposition of an actual unconditioned (an idea of reason) 
upon this self-assertive process and this imposition constitutes the other, 
contradictory impulse inherent in reason. Their mutually cancelling effect 
is obvious because the imposition of an idea upon the process of the 
search/surge for it brings that movement to an end and, conversely, as long 
as the search/surge carries on no actual idea can have been found. Thus, if 
this dual nature be admitted, the implication is that reason must always 
turn against itself in order to act in accordance with its own nature or, 
to put it another way, because it is impossible to fulfill two mutually 
contradictory demands at the same time, it is in the nature of reason to be 
entrapped in a schizophrenic scenario. 
Kant makes this point explicitly but plays down its psychotic character 
considerably when he writes: 
"Es gibt also eine natürliche und unvermeidliche Dialektik der reinen 
Vernunft, nicht eine, in die sich etwa ein Stümper, durch Mangel an 
Kenntnissen, selbst verwickelt, oder die irgend ein Sophist, um 
vernünftige Leute zu verwirren, künstlich ersonnen hat, sondern die der 
menschlichen Vernunft unhintertreiblich anhängt, und selbst, nachdem wir 
ihr Blendwerk aufgedeckt haben, dennoch nicht aufhören wird, ihr 
vorzugaukeln, und sie unablässig in augenblickliche Verirrungen zu 
stoßen, die jederzeit gehoben zu werden bedürfen. " 
"There exists thus a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason, 
not one in which for instance a bungler entangles himself through 
lack of 
knowledge, or which some sophist has artificially conceived to confuse 
reasonable people, but one which adheres to human reason unalterably and 
even after we have exposed its deception it still will not cease 
to 
mislead reason and to throw it incessantly into momentary errors which 
need to be lifted at all times. " (KrV/CPR A298, 'ß354f, t. m. ) 
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This observation concerning the nature of reason must, for the time 
being, stand alone and as if out of context. But it is taken up below and 
integrated into this ongoing reading of Kant' s treatment of the concept of 
substance throughout the first Critique. 
But returning to our overarching question of Nietzsche's materialism and 
the role of physiology in it, we must now turn to the 'Paralogisms of Pure 
Reason' and ask what significance the critique of the concept of substance 
in the domain of reason, carried out in that chapter of the first Critique, 
has for the current project of delineating Nietzsche's philosophical 
physiology. 
Here we must remind ourselves that the question which exercises the first 
Critique is that of the possibility, in principle, of knowledge. And as we 
know, Kant systematically investigates the constituents, as he sees them, 
of the processes whereby knowledge becomes possible. Just as reason in its 
finite employment, namely as the understanding acting in conjunction with 
intuition, positively contributes to the enquiry into the conditions of 
possibility of knowledge, so reason in its aspirations towards the 
infinite, namely unfettered by the essentially finite forms of intuition, 
contributes, as it were, negatively (cf, for instance Kant' s remark, 
KrV/CPR A382) to this enquiry and forms the subject proper of critique, 
'critique' here taken in the narrow sense of setting the circumference 
within which reason operates legitimately, given that the goal is to 
establish knowability in general. 
In the sections on the 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason', Kant seeks to 
demonstrate in detail which unfounded syllogistic figures ensue when 
reason, in its historical manifestation as metaphysics, that is as yet 
unchecked by critique, falsely attributes various forms of knowability 
to 
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pure concepts which are not founded in intuition: 
"Wir haben... gezeigt: daß reine Kategorien... an sich selbst gar keine 
objektive Bedeutung haben, wo ihnen nicht eine Anschauung unterlegt ist. " 
"... we have shown that pure categories... in themselves have no objective 
meaning where no intuition supports them.. " (KrV/CPR A348f, t. m. , my 
omissions). 
In particular, paralogisms of pure reason are the unavoidable corollary 
of applying the pure concept of substance in this 'illegitimate' manner to 
the proposition 'I think'. The branch of traditional metaphysics which 
necessarily falls into this trap Kant designates as rational psychology. 
Its sole text, he maintains (KrV/CPR A343, B401), is the 'I think' which 
appears in the first Critique only as the transcendental unity of 
apperception. 
Whilst it seems to be universally accepted that the section on the 
paralogisms is chiefly a response to Descartes (who is of course mentioned, 
for instance at A355) and the cogito ergo sum, it is much more important 
for our purposes here to draw out the ways in which this part of Kant's 
text is in, at least implicit, dialogue with Platonism such as it manifests 
itself most clearly in the Phaedo, the dialogue charting the death of 
Socrates and celebrating the eternal life of the soul. 
This issue arises for instance in the following remark from the 'Critique 
of the First Paralogism of Pure Psychology': 
"Was soll ich aber nun von diesem Begriffe einer Substanz vor einen 
Gebrauch machen. Daß ich, als ein denkend Wesen, vor mich selbst 
fortdaure, natürlicher Weise weder entstehe noch vergehe, das kann ich 
daraus keineswegs schließen und dazu allein kann mir doch der Begriff der 
Substantialität meines denkenden Subjekts nutzen... " 
"But what use am I to make of this concept of a substance? That I, as a 
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thinking being, persist for myself, and do not in any natural manner 
either come to be or pass away, I can by no means deduce from it and yet 
that is the only use to which I can put the concept of the substantiality 
of my thinking subject. " (KrV/CPR A349, t. m. ) 
It is precisely the 'use' mentioned here to which the concept of 
substance is put in the Phaedo, namely to found the belief that it is the 
substantiality of the soul which is the guarantor of its purity and its 
adequacy to the realm of the forms, and ultimately of course of its 
immortality. 
Equally, in the 'Critique of the Second Paralogism of Transcendental 
Psychology' in which the metaphysical inference from the 'I think' to the 
simple or incomposite nature of the soul is shown as not in fact 
contributing to the knowledge of my thinking being, Kant again very plainly 
states the 'use' of this metaphysical inference: 
"Jedermann muß gestehen: daß die Behauptung von der einfachen Natur der 
Seele nur so fern von einigem Werte sei, als ich dadurch dieses Subjekt 
von aller Materie unterscheiden und sie folglich von der Hinfälligkeit 
ausnehmen kann, der diese jederzeit unterworfen ist... obiger Satz... 
daher er auch ... so ausgedrückt wird: 
die Seele ist nicht körperlich. " 
"Everyone must admit that the assertion of the simple nature of the soul 
is of any value only insofar as thereby I can distinguish this subject 
from all matter and consequently can exempt it from the dissolution to 
which the latter is always subjected... the above proposition is 
frequently expressed as: the soul is not corporeal. " (KrVICPR A356, t. m. , 
my omissions). 
In other words, this aspect of 'the sole text of rational psychology' 
too 
has no other (implicit) purpose than to establish the immortality of 
the 
soul. 
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This same purpose is entirely apparent and even openly declared in the 
Phaedo and it is this open declaration of intent which makes this dialogue 
such a suitable focal point for our discussion here. 
The significance of death as the starting point for this platonic text 
cannot possibly be overemphasised. The narrative itself is set in motion by 
the imminent execution of Socrates; the discussions which make up the 
central parts are set during the last day of his life. But death is also 
the motor for this dialogue in another sense, insofar as Socrates claims 
that "... a man who has really devoted his life to philosophy should be 
cheerful in the face of death" (63e) and "... those who really apply 
themselves in the right way to philosophy are directly and of their own 
accord preparing themselves for dying and death. " (64a). The Socratic 
project, the triumph of the dialectic, finds its consummation in death. 
This could be taken in a number of ways and it is absolutely crucial to 
draw out the predominant one here. 
To say that the sense of philosophy lies in its preparation for death 
could, first of all, be a reminder of the finitude of human existence, both 
as mortality of the individual and as limitation of its faculties or 
capabilities - much in the way that the first Critique displays the 
reiteration of human finitude as one of its most predominant strands, most 
notably in emphasising throughout the crucial significance of the finite 
nature of sensibility. In this sense philosophy could be considered the art 
which gives a conceptual space to this fundamental truth. But this can 
clearly not be the case since the Phaedo is so centrally concerned with 
'proving' the immortality of the soul, which means that it constitutes 
precisely a concerted disavowal of human finitude. 
A second, and much more glorious, possibility for reading the claims 
which Socrates makes for philosophy would be to take them as a celebration 
of the - ardently anticipated - dissolution of individuated existence, a 
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celebration of the C'self'-)expenditure in which matter likes to indulge. 
But Socrates, on the contrary, seeks to disprove this trait of matter by 
seeking to demonstrate the immortality of the soul. 
The significance of philosophy as preparation for death centres on the 
description or definition of death as the separation of body from soul. All 
parties to the argument are united in the unquestioned belief in this 
duality although each one, Socrates, Simmias and Cebes, defines the 
relation between body and soul differently. 
It is this division which centrally organises this dialogue and which is 
the Western metaphysical schema to have dominated philosophy for over two 
thousand years. The absolute separation and subsequent binary opposition of 
body and soul spawns the two series (throughout the Phaedo, throughout 
philosophy), the 'two worlds' which have become synonymous with Platonism: 
matter, mortality, impurity, illusion, unreason, secondary status/copy, 
becoming, difference, compositeness; as opposed to ideality, immortality, 
purity, truth, reason, originary status, being, identity, incompositeness/ 
simplicity. Needless to say, philosophy in Socrates' projection inhabits - 
or at least seeks to inhabit - the second series only and the burden of 
proof which falls to Plato, in this case concerning the immortality of the 
soul4, is to found the second series as originary and, conversely, to show 
the dependence of the former series, which, needless to say, is taken to 
encompass all that is low, abject and reprehensible, on the latter one. 
From a less metaphysically biased standpoint it is clear that this 
constitutes one of the most gigantic perversities ever to have 
been 
committed and that only an insanely arrogant life form could claim 
for 
itself the right and the voice to sit in judgement over life 
itself and to 
find it wanting. For that is obviously the implication, namely 
that life 
itself in one of its aspects (such as were outlined in 
the former series, 
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above) is deficient, that the body is of a far lesser status than the mind 
which is, for Plato, the only rightful place from which to aspire to truth 
and knowledge. This mania is very accurately portrayed in the following 
passage from Nietzsche: 
"Über das Leben haben zu allen Zeiten die Weisesten gleich geurteilt: es 
taugt nichts... Immer und überall hat man aus ihrem Munde denselben Klang 
gehört, - einen Klang voll Zweifel, voll Schwermut, voll Müdigkeit am 
Leben, voll Widerstand gegen das Leben. Selbst Sokrates sagte, als er 
starb: "leben - das heißt lange krank sein. " 
"On life the wisest have Judged identically at all times: it is useless.. 
Always and everywhere one has heard from their mouth the same tone -a 
tone full of doubt, full of melancholy, full of weariness with life, full 
of resistance against life. Even Socrates said as he died: "to live - 
that means to be sick for a long time... 11 (KSA 6, GD/TI, II, 1, t. m. ) 
In a symptomatic reading of this central Platonic text, the Phaedo, what 
emerges most distinctly is that the chief characteristic of Platonism is 
its foundation on an ontology of lack and absence for in it the realm in 
which the human animal moves is identified by insufficiency and whatever 
plenitude there can be resides in another realm, in that of the forms, 
access to which is always mediated (by philosophy). All of a sudden, the 
earth has become a barren place in which each thing and every being is so 
utterly devoid of any intrinsic meaning (which is reserved for the world of 
the forms), so suspended in the overwhelming experience of its own 
inadequacy, all it finally does is to anticipate its consummation in death 
- hence Socrates' ghoulish cheerfulness throughout the Phaedo. 
To sum up this point, the sense of designating philosophy as preparation 
for death lies in projecting this type of philosophy as complementary 
to an 
image of life as fundamentally deficient and we also saw 
how the opposition 
of body to soul acted as the vehicle of this denigrating view of 
life. 
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Having established the most significant implications of the division of 
body and soul, which is itself of course the precondition of any proof for 
the immortality of the latter, we must return to the Paralogisms and expose 
their Janus-headed position, on the one side casting slyly longing glances 
towards these Platonic structures while the abyssal ruminations of 
Nietzsche loom on the other side. 
Kant clearly states the three dialectical (that is to say, illusory, cf. 
for instance KrV/CPR A339, B397) questions which exercise rational 
psychology, and does so in a manner which precisely mirrors the structure 
of 'proof' in the Phaedo(69a-84b). In the section which concludes the 
Paralogisms in A, entitled 'Observation on the Sum of Pure Psychology, in 
Consequence of these Paralogisms' ('Betrachtung über die Summe der reinen 
Seelenlehre, zu Folge diesen Paralogismen', KrV/CPR A381ff, t. m. ), he names 
firstly the question concerning the commerce between body and soul, 
secondly the question concerning the existence of soul before birth, and 
thirdly that concerning the continued existence of soul after death. 
But of course the task which the chapter on the Paralogisms sets itself 
is to curb the speculative employment of reason when it attempts to extend 
knowledge concerning the 'I think' from concepts of reason alone, however 
innate this attempt to thus extend its knowledge is to reason, and thereby 
to prove these questions of rational psychology as unfounded, to exile them 
from the domain of objectively constitutive transcendental philosophy. 
Insofar as these questions of rational psychology are predicated on a 
rigorously adhered to Platonistic two-world theory, one might at this point 
be tempted to infer that Kant' s banishment of them has the effect of 
breaking up the mind-body dualism, of liberating matter into the divinity 
which only spirituality is accorded within Platonism. But, predictably 
enough, the chapter on paralogisms does not finally liberate the space of 
transcendental philosophy from the Platonistic legacy which tends to 
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accompany any enquiry into the nature of the thinking self, be it under the 
name of ' soul' or under that of 'transcendental unity of apperception' , 
however much Kant seeks to distance his critical method from mere dogmatic 
assertions (KrV/CPR A388-A395). 
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III. The Transcendental Deduction (I) 
We saw that the proclaimed task of the chapter on the paralogisms in the 
first Critique was to strip speculative metaphysics of any claims to 
knowledge concerning the nature of the thinking self. The most obvious side 
effect of this curbing of reason beyond its legitimate sphere of influence 
is to anchor all the more firmly the only notion approximating to the 
traditional concept of soul that remains valid within the first Critique, 
namely the transcendental unity of apperception. Kant claims that, having 
applied a critique of reason to one of its most central tenets (the 
founding nature of the 'I think'), this concept or proposition may reclaim 
its central space in its now reconstituted form, namely under the condition 
that no positive knowledge may be derived from it alone. 
What, then, is the role of the transcendental unity of apperception in 
the first Critique? Kant, in proposing the Copernican turn, redirects the 
question of knowability to the knowing subject, to the one who says 'I 
think... such and such'. But in doing so he forecloses the question of who 
or what it is that says 'I think', and he does so not just as concerns the 
parameters of traditional metaphysics but, more importantly, for critical 
philosophy itself. And yet critique, the method invented by Kant against 
the inflated claims of speculative - fundamentally Christian - metaphysics, 
does not finally admit of any immovable fundaments like the (in the last 
instance) absolute nature of the 'I think' which has more of the functional 
structure of an old-style Christian belief than the invincibly moving 
force 
that critique displays at its best. 
It certainly is a very clever move to rule out all inferences 
from the 'I 
think', especially when they are presented as taking their cue solely 
from 
the unrealisable project of rational psychology (unrealisable 
because it 
seeks to provide synthetic a priori judgements of knowledge 
from concepts 
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alone). But although Kant claims not to know anything about the unity of 
apperception, and claims that it can never aid in expanding knowledge of my 
thinking self, neither can he allow any space to the question of the whence 
of the 'I think`, a very un-critical restriction. In other words, the very 
incisive question of use, which Kant addresses to the ideas of reason that 
emanate from the paralogisms (cf. p. 21 above), must not, according to him, 
be carried over to the transcendental unity of apperception, lest we 
disturb the sleep of reason which hovers about it. 
But we know that the human animal has not yet been fixated ("Der Mensch 
[ist] das noch nicht festgestellte Tier" KSA 5, SGB/BGE, III, 62), and must 
raise the question of the implications of assuming an 'I think' necessarily 
able to accompany all 'my' representations ("Das: Ich denke, muß alle meine 
Vorstellungen begleiten kdnnen" KrV/CPR B131, Kant's own emphasis). 
In the 'Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding', Kant seeks 
to demonstrate the objective validity of the pure a priori concepts he 
listed in the Table of Categories. In order to show how such concepts can 
relate to intuitions, thereby producing knowledge (experience), he imagines 
both of these elements (categories and intuitions), as well as the result 
of their combination (experience), to be constituted in a synthesis. 
Firstly, empirical intuition is produced in a 'synthesis of apprehension in 
intuition'(KrV/CPR A98 - A100); secondly, the function mediating between 
intuition and concept resides in imagination C' synthesis of reproduction in 
imagination' KrV/CPR A100 - A102); thirdly, the provision of the concept 
to 
an otherwise pre-intellectual process occurs in the 'synthesis of 
recognition in a concept' (KrV/CPR A103 - A104). 
The momentous thought which occurs here for the first time with any 
degree of explicitness is that all the elements which, when operating 
in 
concert, are constitutive of knowledge, are themselves produced 
by a series 
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of pure synthetic processes. Of course Kant immediately seeks to 
counterbalance this immensely radical thought by attributing these 
syntheses to a number of ' founts of knowledge' (Erkenntnisquellen), namely 
sense, imagination and apperception respectively (KrV/CPR A115) and thereby 
seeks to, as it were, anchor inherently unfounded, sheer processes within 
quasi-stable domains, namely the faculties. But with this conception of 
'pure' production he unwittingly unleashes the thought of a production 
without producer and thereby, for the first time in millenia, even if only 
within the space of transcendental philosophy, liberates nature from the 
impositions of theistic or anthropomorphic delusion'. 
A concomitant effect of this thought of synthesis concerns critical 
method. As Kant explains by way of contrast with dogmatic assertions: 
"Der dogmatische Einwurf ist, der wider einen Satz, der kritische, der 
wider den Beweis eines Satzes gerichtet ist. Der erstere bedarf einer 
Einsicht in die Beschaffenheit der Natur des Gegenstandes, um das 
Gegenteil von demjenigen behaupten zu können, was der Satz von diesem 
Gegenstande vorgibt, er ist daher selbst dogmatisch und gibt vor, die 
Beschaffenheit, von der die Rede ist, besser zu kennen, als der 
Gegenteil. Der kritische Einwurf, weil er den Satz in seinem Werte 
oder Unwerte unangetastet läßt, und nur den Beweis anficht, bedarf gar 
nicht, den Gegenstand besser zu kennen...; er zeigt nur, daß die 
Behauptung grundlos, nicht, daß sie unrichtig sei. " 
"A dogmatic objection is directed against a proposition, a critical 
objection against the proof of a proposition. The former requires an 
insight into the constitution of the nature of the object so that 
the 
opposite of what the proposition supposed about this object can 
be 
claimed, thus it is itself dogmatic and supposes to know the constitution 
concerned better than the opposite. A critical objection, since 
it leaves 
the proposition in its validity or invalidity untouched and only assails 
the proof, does not need to know the object any better...; 
it only shows 
the claim to be unfounded and not to be wrong. 11 
(KrV/CPR A388, t. m. , my 
omissions) 
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It is clear from this, as well as from our first brush with the 
Transcendental Deduction above, that both as concerns its object 
(knowledge) and, even more importantly, its method, critique concentrates 
on their status as productions, on their nature as produced. 
But Kant ("a cunning Christian to the last" KSA 6, GD/TI, IV, 6) throttles 
a series of otherwise uninhibited syntheses he had discovered by a number 
of devices. 
Foremost among these is the transcendental unity of apperception. It is 
of course possible to be extremely generous to Kant and to say that 
whenever he says ' unity of apperception' he implies the constituted, 
unified nature of apperception'-. But if this were the case, he could easily 
have used a whole range of German words which even in their nominal form 
retain a strong verbal sense, such as, above all, Vereinigung or even 
Einigkeit, thereby indicating unity as the effect of unification rather 
than as pre-given. But throughout the Transcendental Deduction the word he 
uses is Einheit. 
A further, obvious point which needs to be made about the transcendental 
apperception concerns the imputation of unity to it, which is of course the 
first category in the group headed 'quantity' in the Table of Categories 
(KrV/CPR A80, B106). As we saw in the discussion of the chapter on the 
paralogisms, the chief fallacy within rational psychology is derived from 
attributing to the 'I think' certain characteristics derived from pure a 
priori concepts alone. But Kant himself incessantly attributes the category 
of unity to the 'T think', thereby applying a category to that which 
elsewhere he simply calls "the vehicle of all... transcendental concepts" 
which is, furthermore, "always included in the conceiving of these 
[concepts]" and which "serves only to perform [aufführen] all our 
thought, 
as belonging to consciousness" (KrV/CPR A341, B399f, t. m. , my omissions and 
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insertions). Kant can of course say that there is consciousness but, as he 
himself goes on to show in the Paralogisms, no categorically derived 
statements concerning the nature of that purely formal consciousness, or 
transcendental apperception, may be made7. 
A third point concerns not so much the result of Kant' s inadmissible 
inferences about transcendental apperception but the manner in which he 
arrives at them. He writes: 
"Aller Notwendigkeit liegt jederzeit eine transzendentale Bedingung zum 
Grunde. Also muß ein transzendentaler Grund der Einheit des Bewußtseins, 
in der Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen aller unserer Anschauungen, mithin 
auch der Begriffe der Objekte überhaupt, folglich auch aller Gegenstände 
der Erfahrung, angetroffen werden, ohne welchen es unmöglich wäre, zu 
unsern Anschauungen irgend einen Gegenstand zu denken... " 
"All necessity is at all times grounded in a transcendental condition. 
There must therefore be a transcendental ground of the unity of 
consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, 
and consequently also of the concepts of objects in general, and so of 
all objects of experience, a ground without which it would be impossible 
to think any object for our intuitions... " (KrV/CPR A106, t. m. ) 
In keeping with his method throughout the first Critique, the only 
transcendentality Kant could legitimately attribute to consciousness is the 
transcendentality of the conditions of its production, namely the synthesis 
in imagination or pure, transcendental imagination, as indeed he does when 
he writes: 
"Diese synthetische Einheit (der reinen Apperzeption] setzt aber eine 
Synthesis voraus, oder schließt sie ein... und soll jene a priori 
notwendig sein, so muß letztere auch eine Synthesis a priori sein. 
Also 
beziehet sich die transzendentale Einheit der Apperzeption auf 
die reine 
Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, als eine Bedingung a priori der 
Möglichkeit aller Zusammensetzung des Mannigfaltigen in einer 
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Erkenntnis. " 
"This synthetic unity (of pure apperception) presupposes or includes a 
synthesis, and if the former is to be a priori necessary, the synthesis 
must also be a priori. The transcendental unity of apperception thus 
relates to the pure synthesis of imagination, as an a priori condition of 
the possibility of all combination of the manifold in one knowledge. " 
(KrV/CPR A118, my insertion and italics). 
It is in accordance with his own critical thought for Kant to say that a 
synthetically produced unity presupposes an a priori synthesis - in fact 
this could almost serve as a definition of the critical project insofar as 
it enquires into the possibility of unified experience through synthetic a 
priori judgements. But cutting across this coherent and definitionally 
correct inferential operation is the imposition of unity when there is 
simply no place for this pure concept of the understanding in this key 
critical operation, the Transcendental Deduction. 
The tensions which the Kantian text suffers at this point are marked by 
italics in the above quote. In order not to fragment itself beyond all 
recognition it has to say what it does about the necessary movement of the 
deduction but it so yearns for a stable ground to the unpredictable 
maelstrom of pure synthetic activity that it loses itself in the feeble 
ambiguities I have indicated in the above passage. 
So, to sum up these points, to speak of the transcendental unity of 
apperception betrays the effects of a wrongful syllogism just as much as 
does the paralogistic imputation of substantiality to transcendental 
apperception, Kant wishes for a transcendental subjectivity whose chief 
characteristic is self-identity. But this reactive desire of his is left 
behind by the inevitable flux of his own thought. 
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A further - Nietzsche derived and by now rather cliched - point which 
needs to be made about transcendental apperception concerns the relation of 
grammar and thought. Only because the conjunction of grammatical subject 
and predicate in a proposition is identified as the form of a coherent 
judgement, there is no reason to attribute any truth beyond that of 
grammatical validity to it. And yet that is precisely what Kant does when 
he claims that the 'I think' is the vehicle of all concepts (KrV/CPR 
A341, B399) or even that "the abiding and unchanging 'I' (pure apperception) 
forms the correlate of all our representations in so far as it is to be at 
all possible that we should become conscious of them" (KrV/CPR A123). What 
is initially claimed here is merely that knowledge must always be 
articulated in accordance with the rules of grammar. But beyond that it 
hypostatises what is merely an event of thinking into an entirely 
indefensible unity of subjectivity, thereby betraying what is no more than 
an unfounded prejudice, namely that knowledge should always be on the side 
of such allegedly unified consciousness. 
A key to the understanding of this wholly irrational move on Kants part 
is provided by the following passage from the notebooks of Nietzsche, who 
clearly smelt the pungent odour of repression in Kant's first Critique: 
"Die logisch-metaphysischen Postulate, der Glaube an Substanz, Accidens, 
Attribut usw. hat seine Überzeugungskraft in der Gewohnheit, all unser 
Thun als Folge unseres Willens zu betrachten: - so daß das Ich, als 
Substanz, nicht eingeht in die Vielheit der Veränderung. " 
"The logico-metaphysical postulates, the belief in substance, accidens, 
attribute etc, has its convincing force in the habit of viewing all our 
actions as consequences of our will: - so that the I, as substance, 
does 




That is to say that the clandestine, essentially idealist and 
fundamentally Platonistic hidden agenda in Kant's assumption of the 
transcendental unity of apperception is to assure the stability of 
subjectivity, to have at least one 'safe' point exempted from the multiple 
becomings which he elsewhere thematises under the heading of 'synthesis'. 
Kant even states this explicitly when he recapitulates the first Analogy's 
findings prior to, and in the section on, the proof of the second Analogy, 
where he writes that: 
"Das Entstehen oder Vergehen der Substanz selbst [findet] nicht statt. " 
"The coming to be or passing away of substance itself does not take 
place" (KrV/CPR B233 , t. m. ) 
Kant thematises becoming under the names of coming to be and passing away 
but whatever is thought as substance is exempted from these changes. 
However much Kant would on the one hand like to distance himself from 
dogmatic metaphysics, he cannot, on the other hand, accept the perilous 
unpredictability of thought or thinking without a subject. Inasmuch as he 
attempts to prove the need for a unified transcendental subjectivity within 
the critical system, Kant remains in the vicinity of Plato when he feels 
the need to 'prove' the immortality of the soul. 
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IV. Physiology Inchoate 
We are now in a position to show the connection between two points made 
earlier in artificial isolation. At the beginning of section two above, the 
inherently schizophrenic nature of reason was briefly mentioned. In the 
context of the first Critique it is - to a very limited extent - in Kants 
interest to discredit the speculative use of reason which - in an infinite 
employment - claims to contribute to knowledge. Theoretical reason which 
goes beyond the subsumption of intuitions and concepts under each other 
exceeds the bounds of the operation which for Kant is productive of finite 
human knowledge. But as I hope to have already shown at the end of the 
penultimate section and again just now, Kant to varying degrees makes 
claims for the understanding which entangle it in similarly incompatible 
demands within the critical context. 
Of reason Kant says without too much hesitation that it is perpetually 
and unavoidably involved in a dialectic concerning its own nature (KrV/CPR 
A298, B354, quoted and discussed above). This I take to mean that Kant 
admits that reason has to impose an absolute (the idea), on its own, 
otherwise uninhibited, surging process. 
But in section I, entitled 'The Principle of Substance', I hope to have 
shown that this is comparable to the effect of imposing an, as it were, 
(de-)temporalised substance (permanence) on otherwise unceasing processes 
of becoming which are, furthermore, reduced to linear temporality 
in this 
metaphysical constriction of them. 
Or again, as we saw in the discussion of transcendental apperception 
(the 
very guarantor of the imposition of conceptual order upon 
the chaos of 
perception), Kant' s unfounded attribution of the concept of unity 
to it is 
finally incompatible with the critical sweep which arises virtually 
in the 
same gesture in the Transcendental Deduction. 
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It is therefore possible to say that whenever Kant militates against his 
own (better) insights, these reactive rebellions are formally extremely 
similar. Whether in the infinite employment of reason or (under the name of 
'understanding') in its finite employment, reason makes itself impossible 
by imposing critically untenable identities (of the idea, of time, of 
consciousness) upon synthetic time-flows which are prior to them. 
The significance of these identities within the critical system is that 
Kant wants them to act as guarantors of knowledge - prejudicially defined 
as unified experience. But, and this is what I hope to have shown, a 
properly critical project would have to abandon such metaphysically and 
dogmatically infused barriers to sheer synthesis in order to truly abandon 
itself to the search for the synthetic a priori elements of experience. 
A more radical, that is to say a more truly critical meaning can be given 
to the notion of the transcendentality of experience if these 'logico- 
metaphysical postulates' are supplanted by a more appropriate embodiment - 
and methodological starting point - of perpetual production, as Nietzsche 
does when he writes: 
"Gibt es eine gefährlichere Verirrung, als die Verachtung des Leibes? 
Als ob nicht mit ihr die ganze Geistigkeit verurteilt wäre krankhaft zu 
werden, zu den vapeurs des 'Idealismus'. Es hat Alles nicht Hand und Fuß, 
was von Christen und Idealisten ausgedacht worden ist: wir sind 
radikaler. " 
"Is there a more dangerous aberration than contempt for the body? As if 
it did not condemn all spirituality to become sickly - to the vapeurs of 
'idealism'. There is nothing solid to whatever was made up by Christians 
and idealists: we are more radical. " (KSA 13,14 1371, WM/WP no. 1016, t. m. ) 
And for the following reasons he suggests that the body and physiology 
provide this radical impetus: 
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"Alles, was als 'Einheit' ins Bewußtsein tritt, ist bereits ungeheuer 
compliziert: wir haben immer nur einen Anschein von Einheit. Das Phänomen 
des Leibes Ist das reichere, deutlichere, faßbarere Phänomen: methodisch 
voranzustellen, ohne etwas auszumachen Über seine letzte Bedeutung. " 
"Everything which enters consciousness as 'unity' is already tremendously 
complicated: we always only have a semblance of unity. The phenomenon 
of the body is the richer, clearer, more graspable phenomenon: 
methodologically to be placed first without deciding anything about its 
ultimate significance. " (KSA 12,5 1561, WM/WP no. 489, t. m. ) 
So the body is to be made the methodological starting point without 
hypostatising it into a new 'ground' or a final explanatory principle and 
it will have to be thought in a non-substantial manner so as, minimally, 
not to repeat the metaphysical investments carried by the Kantian guarantor 
of knowledge, the transcendental unity of apperception. There are three 
closely related and equally important reasons why the substitution of body 
for 'soul' (transcendental subjectivity) is a crucial strategic move for 
Nietzsche. 
Firstly, this obviously constitutes a forceful antidote to the anti- 
materialist agency which is projected (or rather 'invented') in the 
Platonic dialogues and which is constitutive of Platonistic philosophies, 
or simply Western metaphysics. 
More subtle minds might object that this means nothing but a simple 
reversal of terms which leaves the fundamental oppositional structure of 
Platonism and its insidious effects intact. But this would only 
be a valid 
point if the body of Nietzschean physiology were an exact complement to the 
Platonic notion of soul. It remains for the following chapters 
to show that 
this is not the case. 
Secondly, it is obvious that a very different type of knowledge must 
ensue from this central shift of method. For if it is no 
longer a self- 
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identical, quasi-idealist subject to which an equally unified object must 
correspond with absolute necessity, if this version of the correspondence 
theory of truth - and with it any naive notions of truth itself - is 
overcome, knowledge gives way to what Nietzsche calls 'unknowing' 
(Nichtwissen or Unwissenheit), a knowing beyond the confines of 
representational thought. At the same time the unsustainable fiction of a 
self-coincident, self-possessed mind as the appropriate site of this (un-) 
knowing gives way to the 'richer', excessive productions of the body. As 
Nietzsche explains: 
"Ausgangspunkt vom Leibe und der Physiologie: warum? - Wir gewinnen die 
richtige Vorstellung von der Art unsrer Subjekt-Einheit, nämlich als 
Regenten an der Spitze eines Gemeinwesens, nicht als 'Seelen'..., 
insgleichen von der Abhängigkeit dieser Regenten von den Regierten und 
den Bedingungen der Rangordnung und Arbeitsteilung als Ermöglichung 
zugleich der Einzelnen und des Ganzen. Ebenso wie fortwährend die 
lebendigen Einheiten entstehen und sterben und wie zum 'Subjekt' nicht 
Ewigkeit gehört... Die gewisse Unwissenheit, in der der Regent gehalten 
wird über die einzelnen Verrichtungen... des Gemeinwesens, gehört mit zu 
den Bedingungen, unter denen regiert werden kann. Kurz, wir gewinnen eine 
Schätzung auch für das Nichtwissen, das im Großen-und-Groben-Sehen, das 
Vereinfachen und Fälschen, das Perspektivische. Das Wichtigste Ist aber; 
daß wir den Beherrscher und seine Untertanen als gleicher Art verstehn, 
alle fühlend, wollend, denkend. " 
"The body and physiology starting point: why? - We gain the right idea of 
the nature of our subject-unity, namely as regents at the head of a 
community, not as 'souls' ... as well as of the 
dependence of these 
regents on the ruled and of the conditions of order of rank and division 
of labour as making possible the individual and the whole at the same 
time. In the same way as living unities continually come to be and die 
and as eternity does not belong to the 'subject' ... The certain 
ignorance 
about the individual tasks... of the community in which the regent is 
kept also belongs to the conditions under which it is possible 
to rule. 
In short, we gain an estimation for unknowing too, for rough and ready 
viewing, for simplifying and falsifying, for the perspectival. 
But most 
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important is that we understand the ruler and his subjects to be of the 
same nature, all feeling, willing, thinking. " (KSA 11,40 1211, WM/Wp 
no. 492, t. m. , my omissions) 
One of the predicted effects of this shift of attention from soul to body 
as the corollary of a different type of knowing is the restructuring of the 
relation between the two and, most remarkably given the hostility of 
metaphysics towards the body, the abolition of their oppositionality well 
beyond the anaemic idealist conception of both as 'thing', res cogitans and 
res extensa. 
Thirdly, the time of the body is an entirely different time from that of 
consciousness. We saw Kant expounding the latter time as permanent and 
unilinear in its transcendental and empirical constitution, respectively. 
In doing so (chiefly in the first Analogy) we saw him translating the law 
of contradiction into temporal relations. But, given the transcendentally 
ideal nature of time and the cohesive demands of the Transcendental 
Deduction, the identity of consciousness and the identity of time (of that 
same consciousness) posited by Kant are not in any significant respect 
distinguishable. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the supercession 
of the former by a multiplicity of processes will entail a comparable 
dispersion of the latter. Nietzsche exposes the connection between the 
conception of time and the notion of truth when he contrasts the values 
with which Platonic thought and his own thought infuses their relation: 
"Wert der Vergänglichkeit: etwas, das keine Dauer hat, das sich 
widerspricht, hat wenig Werth. Aber die Dinge, an welche wir glauben als 
dauerhaft, sind als solche reine Fiktionen. Wenn Alles fließt, so 
ist die 
Vergänglichkeit eine Qualität (die 'Wahrheit') und die Dauer und 
Unvergänglichkeit bloß ein Schein. " 
"Value of transitoriness: something that has no permanence, 
that 
contradicts itself, has little value. But the things in which we 
believe 
as permanent are pure fictions as such. If everything 
flows 
-61- 
transitoriness is a quality (the 'truth') and permanence and 
lntransitoriness merely an appearance. " (KSA 13,11 ( 981, m. t. ) 
The significance of this development will be brought out in chapter four, 
below. 
Having thus demonstrated the critical necessity for a physiological 
method, and the untenability of the concept of substance as a way of 
thinking physiology, it becomes necessary to pursue the implications of 
this strategic shift further by asking whether causality, as the 
traditionally dominant explanatory concept of the productions of nature, is 
appropriate for thinking the will to power as physiology. 
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TUMULTUOUS BODIES 
"... wir suchen nach einem Täter zu jedem Geschehen.. . was haben wir 
gemacht? wir haben ein Gefühl von Kraft, Anspannung, Widerstand 
ein Muskelgefühl, das schon der Beginn der Handlung ist, als Ursache 
mißverstanden - oder den Willen, das und das zu tun, weil auf ihn 
die Aktion folgt, als Ursache verstanden. " 
"... we seek a doer for every occurrence... What have we done? 
we have misunderstood a feeling of force, tension, resistance, 
a muscular feeling, which is already the beginning of the act, 
as the cause - or we have taken the will to do such and such for a 
cause, because upon it the action follows. " (KSA 13,14 1981, WM/WP 
no. 551, t. m. )' 
I. The Principle of Causality 
The part of the Principles which is occupied by the second Analogy is 
entitled 'Principle of Succession in Time, in accordance with the Law of 
Causality' in the second edition, although in the first edition it is 
formulated more succinctly as 'Principle of Production' and it is to some 
extent from this latter title that the present chapter will take its cue. 
We must briefly remind ourselves that the general section on the Analogies 
of Experience states that 'Experience is only possible through the 
representation of a necessary connection of perceptions' (KrV/CPR 
A17&, 8218) and that the central point here is that this connection is 
always only a connection of appearances in terms of time. So that in this, 
as much as in the other two Analogies, the burden of proof which falls to 
Kant concerns the necessary and universal, that is, the a priori nature of 
the particular temporal relation which the Analogy has to demonstrate. And 
although causality is of course one of the categories, and its rightful 
claim to feature in the Table of Categories needs to be established in 
detail here, it must be emphasised that the hypothetical judgement which 
spreads this concept over a statement (and from which judgement Kant claims 
the category to be derived) is the product of relations (between 
appearances) in time being organised in accordance with the pure concept of 
causality. 
The second Analogy, though, derives its particular importance in the text 
from its place in the genesis of the whole critical project. For it was the 
question of the apriority of the concept of causality, as raised by 
Hume, 
which first provoked Kant to re-examine the entire issue of the claims of 




"Die Erinnerung des David Hume war eben dasjenige, was mir- vor vielen 
Jahren zuerst den dogmatischen Schlummer unterbrach und meinen 
Untersuchungen im Felde der spekulativen Philosophie eine ganz andere 
Richtung gab. " 
"The recollection of David Hume was that which many years ago for the 
first time interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations 
in the field of speculative philosophy a wholly different direction. 
(Prol/P 260, t-m-)1. 
Kant outlines the process which took him from the reappraisal of Hume's 
objections concerning the claims of reason that it possessed such a priori 
concepts as causality, to the 'discovery' of all a priori concepts of the 
understanding and the possiblity of their deduction (Prol/P 260). And he 
even implies that the first Critique, considered in extremis, does nothing 
but to work out the problem as posed by Hume: 
"... Ausführung des Humeschen Problems in seiner möglich größten 
Erweiterung (nämlich der Kritik der reinen Vernunft)" 
".., execution of the Humean problem in its greatest possible extension 
(namely the Critique of Pure Reason)" (Prol/P 261, t. m. ) 
Given the fact that Kant here apparently claims nothing less than the 
inception of the first Critique from the solution to the problem of the 
doubtful apriority of causality, it seems justified to expect its treatment 
in his text to be the most astonishingly coherent, minutely worked out and 
generally flawless account imaginable. Instead of which the second Analogy 
is full of false starts, inconclusive trains of thought and a 
'solution' to 
the problems it poses which is clouded in obscurity. For instance, 
the 
proposition which is to form the major premise in Kant's 
intended 
syllogistic proof of the apriority of causality, namely 
that "... the 
apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive" 
(KrV/CPR 
A189, B234), appears in only slightly modified 
formulations no less than 
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three more times throughout the chapter as: (in perception) "appearances 
follow one another" (KrV/CPR B233); "In the synthesis of appearances the 
manifold of representations is always successive" (KrV/CPR A198, B243); "To 
all empirical knowledge there belongs the synthesis of the manifold by 
imagination which [synthesis] is always successive" (KrV/CPR A201, B246, 
t. m. , my insertion). In none of these cases does he, to my mind at least, 
satisfactorily carry out the intended proof. And although this is not the 
place to carry out the thorough and detailed reading which this strange 
chapter deserves, some of the more obvious hiatuses in the overall argument 
need to be discussed. All the more so since they point the way for a 
reconsideration of these issues in light of Nietzsche's thoughts on the 
topic of production. 
Kant's own claims for the significance of the material which is covered 
by the chapter on the second Analogy aside, the issue of causality would 
naturally dominate his metaphysics of experience since the law of causality 
has traditionally been considered the very paradigm of the condition of 
possibility of regulated experience and that has historically meant, of 
knowledge as science. If, as Hume found it to be the case, causality was 
not an a priori concept and thus not the guarantor of the predictability of 
natural processes occurring with any degree of regularity, science would be 
entirely reduced to empirical procedures and philosophy would do nothing 
but summarise its findings after the event. So in order to demonstrate that 
science is more than the organisation into coherent discourses of details 
of knowledge derived from experience and thus, by extension, to prove the 
role of philosophy as the sole discipline which can in principle explain 
this possibility of science, Kant needs to return to causality the right to 
claim apriority for itself. Of course he needs to do this for all the pure 
concepts of the understanding, but no other category can quite claim the 
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position of cornerstone to the foundation of a rational science in the way 
that causality can. 
And it is, in short, for this reason that the 'success' of the entire 
critical project can be gauged by the success of the proof of the apriority 
of causality which Kant undertakes in the second Analogy. This outlines the 
task of the second Analogy in general. We can now turn to the first of the 
more detailed technical problems encountered in that chapter. 
The beginning of the section, entitled `proof`, in the first edition 
states with characteristic concision that "the apprehension of the manifold 
of appearance is always successive. " (KrV/CPR A189, B234). In other words, 
"the representations of the parts [of an appearance] follow upon one 
another" (ibid., my insertion). These two statements taken together 
represent no more than a reiteration or a reminder of the material of the 
'Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition' which appears in the first version 
of the Transcendental Deduction (KrV/CPR A98f) and in rather more explicit 
terms in the second edition (KrV/CPR B162). This is naturally the case 
since each of the Principles repeats - in terms of the particular category 
or group of categories which determines each individual Principle - the 
structure of the three interrelated syntheses given only in purely formal 
terms in the Transcendental Deduction (in A). In that chapter the process 
in general is outlined without any one of the determinate concepts, the 
imposition of which on the synthetic processes creates the need for the 
Principles in the first place. In the Transcendental Deduction (in B) Kant 
states explicitly that "... the synthesis in apprehension... 
is empirical" 
(KrV/CPR B162) and in the previous chapter we saw that empirical 
time is 
always linear or successive for Kant. The quote from the second 
Analogy 
given above could thus be slightly reformulated to say 
that the 
apprehension of the manifold, insofar as it is always 
the product of an 
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empirical synthesis, is always successive. But this necessary initial 
ordering of representations in time into the succession which is said to 
correspond to the alleged nature of the pure form of inner sense, does not 
yet provide any knowledge of the temporal organisation of the object of 
representation 'itself', or of the temporal relations between these objects 
of representation. Consequently, what Kant needs to do here is to establish 
the difference between the necessary and universal but, insofar as its 
apriority derives only from that of the pure form of inner sense, merely 
subjective succession in apprehension (post hoc) and the necessary and 
universal succession in the object (propter hoc) which designates the 
causal nexus proper. And in order to establish this difference he needs to, 
as it were, drive a wedge between merely subjective representations which 
lack objective necessity and the objectively valid representations (of an 
object) in accordance with temporal orderings of a necessary succession. As 
he puts it: 
94 .., so soll ich anzeigen, was dem Mannigfaltigen an den Erscheinungen 
selbst für eine Verbindung in der Zeit zukomme, indessen, daß die 
Vorstellung desselben in der Apprehension jederzeit sukzessiv ist. " 
"... I have to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the 
manifold of appearances themselves inspite of the fact that the 
representation of it in apprehension is at all times successive. " 
(KrV/CPR A190, B235, t. m. , my emphasis) 
Needless to say, in the final instance the form which the argument takes 
is well known and thoroughly predictable. The question 'how do we know that 
causality is an a priori concept? ' (that is to say, an objectively valid 
term whose status as preceding and formative of experience can be 
demonstrated without relying solely on experience for this proof) Kant 
answers in typically circular manner by saying 'because we have an a priori 
faculty which provides this concept' 3. 
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But that is not to say very much, for he. could have answered his 
" 
overarching question of . 'how are synthetic a priori judgements possible? ' 
by merely saying 'because we have faculties which interact in such a manner 
as to make them possible' instead of writing the first Critique which gives 
substance to that thought. And although that, in the final analysis, is 
indeed the answer which the first Critique gives to its organising 
question, it cannot stand in lieu of the individual arguments for the 
transcendental organisation of the faculties of knowledge Kant needs to 
produce throughout. And so in the context of the argument for the apriority 
of causality, too, the general answer to the problem must be put aside for 
the moment and the minutiae must be examined. 
Picking up again the thread which the structure of the three combined 
syntheses provides for the reading of the second Analogy, and with 
reference to the second synthesis in the Transcendental Deduction 
('Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination', KrV/CPR A100 - 102), Kant, 
after having reminded his readers that a causal connection means that "... I 
am... connecting two perceptions in time" goes on to say that "... connection 
is... the product of a synthetic faculty of imagination which determines 
inner sense in respect of the time relation". But, and this is of enormous 
significance, in the same place Kant writes: 
"Diese [die Einbildungskraft] kann aber gedachte zwei Zustände auf 
zweierlei Art verbinden, so, daß der eine oder der andere in 
der Zeit 
vorausgehe... Ich bin mir also nur bewußt, daß meine Imagination eines 
vorher, das andere nachher setze, nicht daß im Objekte der eine 
Zustand 
vor dem anderen vorhergehe... " 
"But imagination can connect these two conveived states in 
two different 
ways, so that the one or the other precedes in time... 
Thus I am only 
conscious that my imagination places one before, the other after, not 
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that the one state precedes the other in the object. .. "(KrV/CPR B233, 
t. m. , my omissions) 
The synthesis of the manifold in apprehension derives its peculiar 
temporal structuring from the nature of empirical time as linear (or, more 
accurately, as representable only in terms of linearity). The synthesis in 
imagination - which is not only an empirical synthesis - is that act us 
which in principle enables the combination of intuitions and concepts, in 
other words it is that which provides the 'ground' or possibility for the 
temporalisation of concepts or, conversely, for the temporal determination, 
according to categories, of the manifold of intuition. Imagination is that 
faculty (reservoir of connective capabilities) which primarily allows 
synthesis to occur. It does not itself, however latently, contain a 
necessary temporal relation or, more specifically succession, which it 
could impose on the material which it synthesises. The imagination makes 
connections, it does not determine what these connections are. The 
imagination only synthesises, but linear time is not itself the product of 
this pure synthesis. Hence the imagination 'connects two perceptions' and 
this connect ion is always ' connect ion in time' (cf. previous page) . But 
whether, of two states a and b, it is a which precedes b or vice versa, it 
is not for the imagination to decide. 
That which does determine their relation in time is the concept which 
enters the synthesising processes in the third synthesis (`Synthesis of 
Recognition in the Concept') at which point the understanding, in other 
words consciousness, comes into these otherwise pre-conscious processes. 
Thus far Kant merely fills in the formal structures sketched 
in the 
Transcendental Deduction (in A). What is required at this point is that the 
difference between ".. subjective succession of apprehension 
land].. objective succession of appearances" (KrV/CPR A193, 
B238) be 
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generated, which Kant proposes to do, after restating the problem (cited 
p. 45f, above, in a quote from A190, B235) in the following manner: 
"' .. was verstehe 
ich also unter der Frage: wie das Mannigfaltige in der 
Erscheinung selbst... verbunden sein möge? Hier wird das, was in der 
sukzessiven Apprehension liegt, als Vorstellung, die Erscheinung aber, 
die mir [durch diese Vorstellungen] gegeben ist, ohnerachtet sie nichts 
weiter als ein Inbegriff dieser Vorstellungen ist, als der Gegenstand 
derselben betrachtet, mit welchem mein Begriff, den ich aus den 
Vorstellungen der Apprehension ziehe, zusammenstimmen soll. " 
""... what then am I to understand by the question: how the manifold in the 
appearance itself... may be connected? Here that which lies in the 
successive apprehension is viewed as representation but the appearance, 
which is given me [by these representations], notwithstanding that it is 
nothing more than the epitome of these representations, is viewed as 
their object to which my concept, which I derive from the representations 
of the apprehension, has to correspond. " (KrV/CPR A191, B236, t. m. , my 
omissions and insertion) 
Kant obviously wants to locate the difference between subjective and 
objective succession in the fissure he opens up between 'the appearance 
itself' and the representations which make up this appearance. Furthermore, 
he introduces a distinction between appearances and objects, the former of 
which merely 'designate' (bezeichnen) the latter (KrV/CPR A189f, B234f). But 
both distinctions seem rather forced and unconvincing. 
As concerns the first, no point (in consciousness) is imaginable from 
which the difference between representations and appearances could actually 
be realised. To do so would require absolute control over the entire 
process of perception and, since this process is characterised by 
receptivity and passivity, and hence is a completely involuntary process 
(e. g. KrV/CPR A19f, B33f), it is not at all clear how this distinction 
could become operative in practice. As concerns the second differentiation, 
it is, if anything, even more spurious. For if the knowable world 
is to be 
_? 1_ 
the correlate of the transcendental subjectivity which formally produces 
it, if the world is to be in that sense intrasubjective - and this is what 
the Copernican turn, without which philosophy slides back into what Kant 
calls empirical idealism, demands - then the only admissible difference 
between appearances and objects must be a heuristic one, not one which 
could substantially affect any arguments. 
The real reason why Kant overloads his terminology here and asks it to do 
much more than it can do, given the parameters he lays out for it 
everywhere else in the first Critique, seems to me to reside in the fact 
that the only way in which he could ultimately thematise the difference 
between subjective and objective temporal orders would be precisely to 
admit that such rivalling temporal orders exist. But it is of course the 
case that he cannot entertain the idea of a fragmentation of (what is for 
him a monolithic) time anymore than he can envisage a fragmented 
subjectivity, its inevitable corollary. 
Given the centrality of time in the first Critique and the way in which 
the whole project in fact hinges on the rethinking of the concept of time 
(namely as empirically real and transcendentally ideal, cf. for example 
KrV/CPR, H6-8 of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' or A369 - 377 of the 
'Paralogisms'>, the realisation, repeatedly provoked by reading the first 
Critique, that Kant does not finally think temporality with any degree of 
conceptual specificity, comes as more than a surprise. By this I mean to 
say that the critical system gives, as it were, a place to time which 
ultimately remains vacant; or, to put it another way, it sets up the 
centrality of time without explicitly rethinking it as the entirely altered 
concept demanded by the more advanced implications of critique itself, and 
specifically by the thought of synthesis. 
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This contention is in fact amply borne out by the examples with which 
Kant seeks to clarify the difference between succession in apprehension and 
succession in appearance. His example for the succession in apprehension, 
which is a merely subjective (albeit equally necessary) succession, he 
locates in the appearance of a house, of which he claims quite confidently 
that the appearance 'itself' is not successive: 
"So ist... die Apprehension des Mannigfaltigen in der Erscheinung eines 
Hauses, das vor mir steht, sukzessiv. Nun ist die Frage: ob das 
Mannigfaltige dieses Hauses selbst auch in sich sukzessiv sei, 
welches freilich niemand zugeben wird. " 
"So... the apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house which 
stands before me is successive. Now the question is: whether the 
manifold of this house itself is also in itself successive which of 
course no one will grant. " (KrV/CPR A190, B236, t. m. , my omissions and 
emphasis) 
On the other hand, the apparently indisputable exemplar of an appearance 
which does 'itself' contain a necessary succession is that of a ship 
drifting down a stream ("Ich sehe z. B. ein Schiff den Strom hinab 
treiben. ") of which he states equally unequivocally: 
"Meine Wahrnehmung, seiner Stelle unterhalb, folgt auf die Wahrnehmung 
der Stelle desselben oberhalb dem Laufe des Flusses, und es Ist 
unmöglich, daß in der Apprehension dieser Erscheinung das Schiff 
zuerst unterhalb, nachher aber oberhalb des Stromes wahrgenommen werden 
sollte. " 
"My perception of its position downstream follows upon the perception of 
its position upstream in the course of the river and it is impossible 
that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship should be perceived 
first downstream but later upstream. " (KrV/CPR A192, B237, t. m. , my emphasis) 
There are three closely related but distinct aspects of 
these examples 
which show them to be rather inappropriate. They are also, 
it must be 
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stressed, especially symptomatic of the central dilemma of Kant's text, 
namely the simultaneous centrality and unthinkability of synthetic a priori 
temporality within the parameters of the critical system, and it is 
obviously for this reason, rather than because they are 'badly chosen', 
that they require close attention here. 
Firstly, as concerns the - according to Kant - indisputably non- 
successive manifold of the appearance of a house, it has to be said that 
the house, and with it the manifold of its appearance, does of course 
extend in time. 
We saw above that the empirical constitution of time is identified with 
succession by Kant, so that succession and extension in time can be taken 
as synonymous as far as appearances are concerned. Conversely, though, 
extension in time is definitional to appearances. If it is further realised 
that appearances cannot be apprehended in isolation from their manifold, it 
becomes obvious that, contrary to what Kant wants to claim for it, the 
manifold of the house is indeed successive. 
But the steady procession through time (in its parts as much as the 
whole) which the house must undergo in order to become an appearance for 
perception at all, is not matched by any obvious large-scale movement in 
space. And it is obviously the fact that the house remains relatively 
constant or settled in space which seduces Kant into thinking that its 
movement through time is similarly curbed. This is no doubt another 
instance in which Kant's tendency to think time in purely spatial 
terms 
(cf. chapter one above) finally prevents him from thinking the specificity 
of time at all, even in order to establish the apriority of certain 
concepts (as, in this case, causality) with regard to temporality. 
Similarly, the only real difference between the house and 
the ship in 
Kant's formulation of these examples is that the latter drifts visibly 
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through space as well as through time. But it is not only his task here to 
prove the possibility of an object's progression through space. Instead, 
Kant set out to thematise the condition of possibility of recognising 
(erkennen) change in nature, of it forming part of experience. (He must 
found the science of metaphysics which can show how the science of nature, 
here qua physics, is in principle possible - because both are based on 
rational precepts (cf. for example KrV/CPR, Preface in B and Introduction 
parts V. - VII. )). But the change in nature which physics theorises is not 
equivalent and reducible to movement in space. The latter is obviously part 
of the former but the theoretical possiblities of the former are not 
exhausted by describing the mechanics of the latter. 
Equally puzzling, though, is the case of a ship drifting down a stream as 
an example of a necessary objective succession. There is a rather sly twist 
to Kant's manipulation of his material in this example, for the following 
reason. Although this is rarely quoted correctly or commented on, Kant does 
in fact speak of a ship drifting down a stream ("Ich sehe z. B. ein Schiff 
den Strom hinabtreiben. "). What is peculiar about this is that a ship would 
only drift if it was out of control or even unmanned; it would then be 
subject to natural forces (the normal activity of ships - in German - is 
fahren or segeln). If the ship was drifting down a stream it would be in, 
yet as object separate from, the movement of the stream, rather like an 
object is in consciousness, according to Kant; (as such this scenario might 
have commended itself to Kant as an analogy, rather than as an example, of 
the type of succession he seeks to demonstrate). In the more usual case of 
a ship going down a stream, the controlled nature of this movement would be 
due to the manipulation of a navigator or a similarly skilled person. 
Hence 
both examples discuss objects which depend on their movement (or perceived 
lack thereof) on the skills of craftspeople or technicians. 
And although 
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the difference between natural and made objects (objects of physis as 
opposed to objects of techne) is of no further relevance for a physics 
which constructs its objects merely in terms of mechanical causality, it is 
nevertheless interesting that Kant exclusively focuses on the latter type 
of object in a discussion which seeks to found what is perhaps the central 
concept of physics -a science which at least began by being the study of 
natural objects. The reason being that Kant might find it more comforting 
to imagine himself moving in a world of made objects, rather than in a 
world of natural objects which remain fundamentally alien, even when 
subsumable to the conceptuality of physics. But by speaking of a ship 
drifting down a stream he has seemingly struck a compromise between the 
forces of nature (which would cause the drifting) and human engineering 
(which produces the ship), 
In all conceivable ways the example of the ship fails to demonstrate 
anything about the necessary temporal succession in the object. It merely 
repeats, on an explicitly spatialised plane, the thought of the necessary 
succession in apprehension (the alleged one-dimensionality of inner sense) 
which all our representations 'drift down'. In this example, too, Kant's 
pre-critical instincts to spatialise all essentially temporal relations are 
given free rein. 
But it is not only in the inappropriate demonstration of the two types of 
(subjective and objective) succession that the second Analogy displays some 
obvious problems. 
At one of the points in the chapter where Kant starts up the syllogistic 
proof of the apriority of the category of causality he begins, as already 
mentioned above, with the reiteration of the one certainty, namely 
that the 
apprehension of the manifold in appearance is always successive. 
Or, 
according to the formulation which he gives his major premise 
here: 
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"In der Synthesis der Erscheinungen folgt das Mannigfaltige der 
Vorstellungen jederzeit nacheinander. " 
"In the synthesis of appearances the manifold of representations is 
at all times successive" (KrV/CPR A198, B243, t. m. ) 
He proceeds - not to the minor premise but to a blatantly incorrect 
statement, and one which is delivered in an uncharacteristically dogmatic 
t one: 
"Hierdurch wird nun gar kein Objekt vorgestellt [sic]; weil durch diese 
Folge, die allen Apprehensionen gemein ist, nichts vom andern 
unterschieden wird. " 
"Now no object is being represented hereby (sic]; since by this 
succession which is common to all apprehensions nothing is being 
distinguished from anything else. " (KrV/CPR ibid., t. m. ) 
Contrary to what Kant claims here, it must of course be the case that an 
object is being represented by the synthesis of apprehension. If this were 
not so then the house, the representation of which comes about as a result 
precisely of that synthesis, would not become an object of perception at 
all (in the example cited and discussed above). The sentence reproduced in 
this last quote from the second Analogy provokes the lingering impression 
that it stands in lieu of, rather than as, the necessary argumentative 
progression from the major premise to the conclusion. 
But it is really this 'conclusion', on which falls the onus to show 
convincingly the necessary and universal status of causality, that contains 
the most conspicuous hiatus which, incidentally, runs through the entire 
chapter. Kant writes: 
"So bald ich aber wahrnehme, oder [besser gesagt) voraus annehme, 
daß in 
dieser Folge eine Beziehung auf den vorhergehenden Zustand sei, aus 
welchem die Vorstellung nach einer Regel folgt: so stelle ich etwas vor 
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als Begebenheit..., d. i. ich erkenne einen Gegenstand, den ich in der 
Zeit auf eine gewisse bestimmte Stelle setzen muß, die ihm, nach dem 
vorhergehenden Zustande, nicht anders erteilt werden kann. " 
"But as soon as I perceive or (rather] assume beforehand that in this 
succession there is a relation to the preceding state from which the 
representation follows according to a rule: so I represent something as 
an event... that is, I come to know an object which I have to put at a 
certain determinate place in time which, after the preceding state, 
cannot be allotted to it differently. " (KrV/CPR ibid. , t. m. my insertion 
and omissions) 
Whilst this is unproblematic as a description of how the concept of 
causality is applied to appearances (of the mechanics of that operation), 
it nonetheless begs the question, here averted and unanswered, why it is 
that I perceive (wahrnehme) or assume beforehand (voraus annehme) that this 
type of relation should be applied to these appearances in the first place 
- when a detailed account of the grounds for applying each pure concept of 
the understanding in turn to intuitions is precisely what the Principles 
must provide. Thus the chapter on the second Analogy should be able to 
explain the reasons why, in any given case, representations should be 
connected according to the concept of causality. And although Kant, 
throughout this chapter, obviously operates with the differentiation 
between subjective and objective succession, nowhere in this chapter does 
he actually convincingly establish the ground for their differentiation, or 
say which are the criteria by means of which it can be realised that this 
succession is merely subjective whereas that succession does take place in 
the obJects. 
Instead of countenancing these questions, Kant paints what is for him the 
nightmare scenario of a world without regularity and that means first and 
foremost a world devoid of causality, without which the possibility of 
knowledge disappears altogether for him: 
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"Man setze, es gehe vor einer Begebenheit nichts vorher, worauf dieselbe 
nach einer Regel folgen müßte, so wäre alle Folge der Wahrnehmung nur 
lediglich in der Apprehension, d. i. bloß subjektiv... Wir würden auf 
solche Weise nur ein Spiel der Vorstellungen haben, das sich auf gar kein 
Objekt bezöge... mithin gar nicht vor Erkenntnis irgend eines Gegenstandes 
... gelten kann. " 
"Let us suppose nothing preceded an event upon which it had to follow 
according to a rule, so all succession of perception would only be in 
apprehension, that is, merely subjective... In this way we would only have 
a play of representations which would not relate to any object... and 
thus cannot count for the knowledge of any object. " (KrV/CPR A194f, 
B239f, t. m. , my omissions and italics) 
And as if the thought of being at the mercy of such an unpredictable 
farrago as a mere 'play of representations' was not enough to shock all 
lovers of knowledge into the realisation that causality must be primordial, 
Kant reiterates the point more sternly when he writes: 
"Widrigenfalls, wenn ich das Vorhergehende setze, und die Begebenheit 
folgte nicht darauf notwendig, so würde ich sie nur für ein subjektives 
Spiel meiner Einbildungen halten müssen, und stellete ich mir darunter 
doch etwas Objektives vor, sie einen bloßen Traum nennen. " 
"Otherwise, if I posit the preceding and the event would not 
necessarily follow upon it, I would merely have to regard it as a 
subjective play of my imaginings and if I yet represented it as something 
objective to myself, I would have to call it a mere dream "(KrV/CPR A201f 
8247, t. m. , my italics) 
Unless the objective validity of the pure concept of causality as an a 
priori concept is admitted, we condemn ourselves to a merely subjective 
play of imagination or illusion and to a dream. So objectivity, here of 
course understood as the prevalence of the understanding and its continuous 
formation of a world which corresponds to the structures of consciousness, 
_7g_ 
is the only guarantor of the possibility of transcending the unpredictable, 
irregular and incommunicable realm of the 'merely subjective', of 
sensibility and imagination. The fact that Kant here equates transcendence 
and objectivity becomes quite clear when he restates the question which 
runs through the second Analogy in the following formulation: 
"... wie geht diese Vorstellung wiederum aus sich selbst heraus, und 
bekommt objektive Bedeutung...? " 
11 .. how does this representation in turn go out beyond itself and 
acquire objective meaning... ?" (KrV/CPR A197, B242, t. m. ) 
The conjunction here appears to have the function of 'that is to say`, 
thereby implying that Kant here wants to locate transcendence in 
objectivity. We have already seen how this reductive representational 
schema, for instance in its tendency to deny the non-spatial specificity of 
a temporality in need of re-thinking according to the demands of critique, 
produces seemingly insurmountable problems for the critical system. The 
limitations imposed on Kant by his absolute insistence on the primacy of 
the understanding (and the allegedly rational structures according to which 
it is said to organise experience) surface again with great clarity in his 
discussion of causality. The chief obstacle, as I hope to have indicated, 
once more lies in the essential unrepresentability of time `itself` which 
leads Kant to claim that, in the last instance, an object which does not 
move in space is not in time at all (his example of the house, cf. my 
discussion above) and that an object which drifts down a unilinear 
trajectory has causal necessity due to this movement. 
In these examples it is essentially the understanding's incapacity 
to 
realise the specific properties of non-linear, non-rational, pre-conscious 
time (the temporality which can be associated with the imagination, 
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according to Kant's own characterisation of it in this Analogy as well as 
in the Transcendental Deduction) which leads to the breakdown of the 
argument, insofar as Kant cannot finally theorise the ruptures between that 
type of temporality and a merely subjective progression due to the nature 
of ýý-mpirical time and the apprehension of the object it necessitates, nor 
those between that subjective progression and an objective progression, due 
to a causal nexus in or affecting the object. The reason for this crucial 
inability would again appear to be related to the irresolvable tensions 
between Kant's explicit project - namely to found the claims to knowledge 
of the rational sciences by delimiting the domain of synthetic a priori 
Judgements - and his unstoppable slide into a (very much implicit) theory 
of unconscious production which emerges at precisely that point where the 
possibilities of his avowed project exhaust themselves. 
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II. The Containment of Matter 
Throughout the Analogies, as throughout the Analytic, Kant's aim is of 
course to deal with temporal relations or relations in the realm of 
appearances only. Thus the question need never arise whether things in 
themselves, in theoretical isolation from our modes of perception and 
conceptualisation, are organised and connected in terms of causality. 
Obviously, the only question which Kant needs to address is whether 
causality is one of the a priori concepts according to which experience is 
always necessarily structured, not whether things in themselves undergo 
change or whether events in themselves Cevent' being Kant' s name for 
causal succession in the object) occur due to causality. Thus in reading 
the second Analogy, a repetition of the error of which Kant accuses Hume's 
detractors is to be avoided, namely to misunderstand the claims being made 
for causality: 
"Man kann es, ohne eine gewisse Pein zu empfinden, nicht ansehen, wie so 
ganz und gar seine Gegner... den Punkt seiner Aufgabe verfehlten und 
... immer das als zugestanden annahmen, was er eben 
bezweifelte, 
dagegen aber mit Heftigkeit... dasjenige bewiesen, was ihm niemals zu 
bezweifeln in den Sinn gekommen war... " 
"One cannot observe, without feeling a certain pain, how entirely his 
opponents... missed the point of his task and... always assumed that as 
given which he doubted and conversely proved with vigour that which he 
would never have dreamt of doubting. " (Prol/P 258, t. m. , my omissions) 
It is clear that Kant's theory of the production of knowledge for and 
by 
the natural sciences, insofar as it claims that this knowledge is produced 
according to causality, is adequate. The issue, though, which remains 
entirely unquestioned in this is what type of knowledge 
(Wissen) or science 
(Wissenschaft) ensue when causality is the fundamental organising principle 
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and whether this is the most desirable way of thinking the productions of 
nature. In short, Kant's adherence to causality as the chief Principle 
(here in the technical sense of that word) of production needs to be 
considered from the point of view of value. 
First of all the, perhaps rather obvious, point needs to be reiterated 
that critique, which is based on the central proviso that no knowledge 
concerning the nature of things in themselves is possible but that the 
investigation is confined to a theory of how appearances are produced, 
carries with it no less hidden assumptions and prejudices concerning the 
nature of the (now exclusively phenomenal) world than any other ontology. 
That is to say that Kant's critically reinscribed ontology is imbued with 
unrealised values which it is the task of the 'physician', in the mode of 
Nietzsche, to diagnose and thereby to determine what kind of physiology 
asserts itself in these writings, what type of will to power dominates in 
t hem. 
Before attempting such a diagnosis, some preliminary comments concerning 
Nietzsche' s thinking on the matter of value need to be made6. Its most 
significant aspect undoubtedly lies in its revaluation of the proprietary 
relation which exists between values and human being. 
From Protagoras to Kant, the principle of homo mensura, whether 
explicitly formulated or cloaked in the language of a man-made theology, 
runs through philosophy as one of its chief truths. With regard to values 
this belief quite naturally leads to the assumption of human being as the 
originator of values, whereby the representational framework of a (for this 
type of thinking) fundamentally unproblematic subject-object relation 
within which epistemological issues are raised, remains entirely 
undisturbed. As opposed to both this and a positivistic scientism which 
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throws up the fact-value distinction, Nietzsche's re-thinking of the 
relation between values and human being reverses the order of origin, so 
that it is no longer human being which deliberately 'uses' or regrettably 
'has' values in its dealings with the 'external', factual world. 
By the time Nietzsche's understanding of their relation emerges, any 
voluntaristic notions, according to which values could be manipulated by a 
self-possessed human subject, have been Jettisoned. Instead, and in keeping 
with the primacy of will to power as productive 'principle', will to power 
itself produces values. So much so that it is even entirely misleading - 
although inevitable due to the rules of grammar structured around subject- 
object relations - to distinguish between will to power and the production 
of values, for that is what will to power does exclusively. That human 
being features as one of the instruments through which values are played 
out should not give rise to the misunderstanding of human being as 
originary of them (although this misapprehension has of course 
traditionally been predominant). And - since to do otherwise would be to 
underwrite the divisions, classifications and categorisations imposed upon 
the flows of nature by humanistic self-interest - Nietzsche never loses 
sight of the fact that the will to power as articulation of values - which 
is what is meant by 'interpretation' - is not even confined to (organic) 
life ("Leben ist bloß ein Einzelfall des Willens zur Macht"; "Life is only 
a special case of the will to power" KSA 13,14 11211; WM/WP no. 692), nor 
does it solely operate by means of human being but is equally at work 
in 
all other organisms: 
"Der Wille zur Macht interpretiert: bei der Bildung eines 
Organs handelt 
es sich um eine Interpretation; er grenzt ab, bestimmt 
Grade, 
Machtverschiedenheiten. Bloße Machtverschiedenheiten könnten sich noch 
nicht als solche empfinden: es muß ein wachsen-wollendes 
Etwas da sein, 
das jedes andere wachsen-wollende Etwas auf seinen 
Wert hin 
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interpretiert. Darin gleich - In Wahrheit ist Interpretation ein Mittel 
selbst, um Herr Liber etwas zu werden. (Der organische Prozeß setzt 
fortwährendes Interpretieren voraus). " 
"The will to power interprets the formation of an organ is a question 
of interpretation; it delimits, determines degrees, differentials of 
power. Mere differentials of power could not yet sense themselves as 
such: a something that wills-to-grow must be there, that interprets every 
other something that wills-to-grow according to its value. Therein equal 
- In truth Interpretation is itself a means of becoming master over 
something. (The organic process presupposes continual interpreting). " 
(KSA 12,2 11481, WM/WP no. 643, t. m. ) 
It should be clear that the mastery ("Herr über etwas werden") mentioned 
in this note does not refer to any human individual becoming master over 
something or someone. It is, if anything, rather human being which is 
mastered by the interpretation, that is to say by the will to power 
positing values. Two instances or levels of values, therefore, have to be 
distinguished: those of primary, originary status which Nietzsche discusses 
(for instance in the passage cited above), which determine each particular 
physiology they shape and inhabit in a very immediate sense and which may 
therefore be called physiological values; as opposed to the anthropomorphic 
values of any traditional - philosophical, ethical, scientific etc. - 
system of which human being flatters itself to be the source and according 
to which it in turn interprets its environment. The relation between the 
two classes of values is made particularly clear in this passage 
from 
Götzen-Dämmerung: 
"Wenn wir von Werten reden, reden wir unter der Inspiration, unter 
der 
Optik des Lebens: das Leben selbst zwingt uns Werte anzusetzen, das Leben 
selbst wertet durch uns, wenn wir Werte ansetzen. 
" 
"When we speak of values we speak under the inspiration, under 
the 
perspective of life: life itself forces us to posit values, 
life itself 
values through us when we posit values. " (KSA 6, GD/TI, 
V, 6,5, t. m. ) 
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It is well known that the Nietzschean diagnosis seeks to discover whether 
the life form, phenomenon, occurrence, or whatever else the pulse on which 
it puts its finger belongs to, is discharging itself in an uninhibited way 
or whether its capacity for (self-)expenditure is in any way interrupted - 
typically by the idealist impositions of speculative reason (whether as 
Platonism or Christianity): 
"Welche Vorteile bot die christliche Moral-Hypothese? Sie verlieh dem 
Menschen einen absoluten Wert, im Gegensatz zu seiner Kleinheit und 
Zufälligkeit im Strom des Werdens und Vergehens. " 
"Which advantages did the Christian moral hypothesis offer? It lent 
human being an absolute value, as opposed to its smallness and 
contingency in the stream of becoming and passing away"(KSA 12,5 [71), 
WM/WP no. 4, t. in. ) 
This state of affairs, this incapacity for expenditure, is indicative of 
the exhaustion which Nietzsche terms decadence. Thus for instance the 
following passage provides a vale mecum for the practitioner of such 
diagnoses: 
"Es gibt einen Begriff, der anscheinend keine Verwechslung, keine 
Zweideutigkeit zuläßt: das ist der der Erschöpfung. Diese kann erworben 
sein; sie kann vererbt sein - In jedem Falle verändert sie den Aspekt 
der Dinge, den Wert der Dinge.. Im Gegensatz zu dem, der, aus der Fülle, 
welche er darstellt und fühlt, unfreiwillig abgibt an die Dinge, sie 
voller, mächtiger, zukunftsreicher sieht - der jedenfalls schenken kann, 
verkleinert und verhunzt der Erschöpfte alles was er sieht, - er verarmt 
den Wert: er ist schädlich... Der Arme an Leben der Schwache verarmt noch 
das Leben: der Reiche an Leben der Starke bereichert es. Der Erste ist 
dessen Parasit; der Zweite ein Hinzuschenkender... " 
"There is a concept which apparently admits of no confusion, no 
ambiguity: that of exhaustion. This can be acquired, it can 
be 
inherited - in each case it changes the aspect of 
things, the value of 
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things... In contrast to him who, from out of the fullness which he 
represents and feels, involuntarily gives to things, sees them more 
fully, more powerfully, with a more promising future - who is at any rate 
able to give, the exhausted diminishes and ruins all he sees, - he 
impoverishes the value: he is harmful... The poor of life the weak yet 
impoverishes life: the rich of life the strong enriches it... The first is 
its parasite; t he second adds gifts... " (KSA 13,14 [ 681, WM/ WP no. 48, t. m. ) 
So in either case, unconscious physiological values play themselves out 
via the wholly involuntary comportment of human being. In one case 
depleted, weakened values repeat themselves through human being in such a 
manner that they in turn deplete and weaken the luxurious plenitude of 
life, whereas in another, equally involuntary case, human being expends its 
own physiological wealth into a world which is thereby enriched 7. In the 
passage above, as throughout his ruminations on these issues, Nietzsche 
barely touches upon the question of why one orientation rather than the 
other prevails: ' ... it can be acquired, it can be inherited. .. 
'. But he 
repeatedly warns against assuming causes for a state of affairs which is 
itself nothing but the symptom of a necessary physiological distribution. 
Thus for instance Platonism is not itself the cause of the philosophical 
impoverishment which is referred to as the two-world theory. It is of 
course only the name which describes such a life-negating mechanism. That 
Platonistic two-world thinking could come to the fore at a certain time and 
dominate whole cultures, civilisations and continents for several millenia 
is indicative of an exhausted physiology which must be ready to function as 
host to this parasitic thought because otherwise this thought could not 
have gained such ascendency. 
With the acceptance of the primacy of physiological values 
it becomes 
necessary to re-examine phenomena under the aspect of 
these types of values 
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which have shaped and continue to shape them The question in each case is 
transformed from the previous 'what is it? ' which enquires into, and is 
predicated on the assumption of, the identity of that to which it is 
addressed, to 'which values are productive in this case? ' and thereby turns 
into a question concerning the processes constitutive of its physiology 
("Die Frage der Werte ist fundamentaler als die Frage der Gewißheit"; "The 
question of values is more fundamental than the question of certainty" KSA 
12,7 [49], WM/WP no. 588). It is clear in this that the latter question 
belongs to a radically different philosophical project than the former. 
Because truth and, more importantly, the will to truth, are no longer the 
ultimate measure but have instead become the foremost obstacles for a 
physiologically oriented philosophy, the hitherto central question of the 
possibility of knowledge and the invariably ensuing theory of knowledge 
have lost their allure. Instead of concerning itself with questions of 
knowability, thinking in the wake of Nietzsche's physiological method must 
continue to determine the value of knowledge. As always when it comes to 
doing this, Nietzsche is completely unambiguous. His remarks on the topic 
are innumerable but the following quote sums up the issue succinctly 
enough: 
"Es ist unwahrscheinlich, daß unser 'Erkennen' weiter reichen sollte, als 
es knapp zur Erhaltung des Lebens ausreicht. " 
"It is improbable that our 'knowing' should extend further than is 
scarcely sufficient for the preservation of life. "(KSA 11,36 1 19), 
WM/WP no. 494, t. m. ) 
Whet we call knowledge, knowledge in its present form, is precisely such 
an impoverished way of relating to the world; it is interested in the 
preservation (Erhaltung) of life, it does not promote excess and the 
dissemination of energy. And even in its preservation it is miserly, 
it 
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only scarcely (knapp) allows or admits whatever is sufficient (ausreicht) 
for its preservation. It is improbable, although not known to those who 
question the value of knowledge, that (the current form of) knowledge be 
any more than an instance of this meagre self-preservation. It is not known 
but can be estimated to be the case, judging from its failure to add to the 
(self-)disseminative dimensions of life. 
On the issue of values, too, it is clear that Nietzsche' s thinking is 
structured in terms of an economy which is radically different from that 
inherent in any Platonistic philosophy. As was shown in chapter one above, 
Platonism - and thus the two-world logic of Christianity and of Kantian 
philosophy in its rationalistic aspects - is predicated on a violently 
anti-materialist and, more specifically anti-physiological, reversal based 
on lack. 'This' world (matter, body) is deficient, it is the lesser with 
regard to the other, ' real' world (God, noumenon) of which it is at best a 
copy, a pale imitation (a simulacrums). But this belief is only tenable as 
long as the whence of this form of thinking remains unasked. And this is of 
course precisely the question which Nietzsche addresses to Platonism and to 
any of its later varieties, namely which types of values are productive of 
them, which kinds of physiology sustain them. Because it is only these 
questions which firmly relocate any alleged other-worldly points of origin 
in an unequivocally intra-phenomenal realm. 
To recapitulate, physiological values are not produced by any form of 
human activity, they are - albeit in a difficult sense which stands 
in need 
of elaboration - natural. That is to say they precede, and are 
themselves 
constitutive of, human being and the anthropomorphic values 
it carries 
before it. It follows from this that the examination of, for instance, 
Platonistic structures according to this `theory' of values will 
have to 
retrace the conscious, manifest or anthropomorphic values 
inherent in 
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Platonism to the unconscious, latent or physiological values of which they 
are a necessary elaboration. In the process of this it should become 
apparent which type of physiology is the site of this elaboration. 
Insofar as Platonism is predicated on such an ontology of lack and 
deficiency, it becomes imperative, if this impoverished, parasitic thought 
is to be undone, to declare war on all forms of thinking, all forms of 
life, which sustain it and to overcome them from within with the strategic 
thought of an originary plenitude which is of 'this' world, which is this 
world, to the exclusion of all others9. 
Because nothing is exempt from the diagnostic procedure according to this 
new theory of values, no aspirations to a neutral, 'factual' sphere of 
objectivity, such as Kant continues to dream of, can be sustained any 
longer. In fact the task of this diagnostic is most urgent whenever any 
'eternal truths' or anything purportedly unproduced - and that means 
outside the sphere of the will to power and its value-productions - is 
invoked. 
Thus especially anything which lays claims to the status of 
scientificity, thereby seeking shelter in that alleged bastion of 
objectivity, needs to be exposed to the anti-humanist blasts of the will to 
power: 
"Es gibt eine tiefe und vollkommen unbewußte Wirkung der decadence selbst 
auf die Ideale der Wissenschaft" 
"There is a deep and completely unconscious effect of decadence even on 
the ideals of science" (KSA 13,14 1401; WM/ JP no. 53, t. m. ) 
This forced innocence can only be countered by a 'theory' of values and 
of originary interpretation by the will to power: 
"Gegen den Positivismus, welcher bei dem Phänomen stehnbleibt 
`es gibt 
nur Tatsachen', würde ich sagen: nein, gerade Tatsachen gibt es nicht, 
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nur Interpretationen. Wir können kein Faktum 'an sich' feststellen: 
vielleicht ist es ein Unsinn, so etwas zu wollen. " 
"Against positivism which halts at the phenomenon 'there are only facts', 
I would say: no, there are especially no facts, only interpretations. We 
can determine no fact 'in itself': perhaps it is a nonsense to want 
something like that. " (KSA 12,7 (60], WM/ WP no. 481, t. m. ) 
And so the question as to which values inform them must be taken to the 
sciences and, in the case of the first Critique, to a philosophy which is 
willing to act as the apologist of these ideals. If these discourses 
display the signs of an exhausted physiology, if they support ideals of 
decadence, they will betray themselves by the aspiration to an implicit 
model of preservation - of themselves as of their respective objects. That 
is to say that their objects will be conceived or projected in terms of 
being (preservation) rather than becoming (expenditure). In the latter case 
it does not of course finally make sense to speak of an 'object' anymore. 
If a science of becoming could be envisaged it would turn its attention to, 
and become submerged in, a multiple becoming, a series of processes. It is 
only by believing in a world of being that the formation of an ' object' as 
such can proceed: 
"Eine werdende Welt könnte im strengen Sinne nicht 'begriffen', nicht 
'erkannt' werden: nur insofern der 'begreifende' und 'erkennende' 
Intellekt eine schon geschaffene grobe Welt vorfindet, gezimmert 
aus lauter Scheinbarkeiten, aber fest geworden, insofern diese Art Schein 
das Leben erhalten hat - nur insofern gibt es etwas wie 'Erkenntnis'... 
" 
"A world in becoming could not, in the strict sense, be 'comprehended', 
be 'known' : only insofar as the ' comprehending' and 'knowing' 
intellect 
finds an already created crude world, constructed from mere semblances, 
but become fixed, insofar as this kind of appearance has preserved 
life - 
only insofar is there something like 'knowledge'. .. " (KSA 
11,36 (231, 
WM/WP no. 520, t. m. ) 
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And: 
"Erkenntnis an sich im Werden unmöglich; wie ist also Erkenntnis möglich? 
Als Irrtum fiber sich selbst, als Wille zur Macht, als Wille zur 
Täuschung. " 
"Knowledge in itself impossible in becoming; how then is knowledge 
possible? As error about itself, as will to power, as will to 
deception. " (KSA 12,7 1541, WM/WP no. 617, t. m. ) 
Thus, for example in the case of a metaphysically invested biology, 
Nietzsche warns: 
"Die Physiologen sollten sich besinnen, den Erhaltungstrieb als 
kardinalen Trieb eines organischen Wesens anzusetzen. Vor allem will 
etwas Lebendiges seine Kraft auslassen: die 'Erhaltung' ist nur eine der 
Konsequenzen davon. " 
"Physiologists should think again about positing the drive for 
preservation as the cardinal drive of an organic being. Above all else 
something that is alive wants to expend its force: ' preservation' is only 
one of the consequences of this. " (KSA 12,2 1631, WM/WP no. 650, t. m. ) 
Thus far this most fundamental distinction of Nietzsche's physiological 
thinking, namely that between preservation and expenditure, has only been 
established in outline. But before returning to the discussion of Kant's 
treatment of causality in the first Critique, a brief but important 
digression becomes necessary by which to expand and complicate the account 
given of this Nietzschean economic thought of plenitude and preservation so 
far. The impression which must be prevented from arising concerns the 
interaction which these two types of forces enter into; in short, 
they must 
not be perceived to be in an oppositional relation: 
"Wahrheit': das bezeichnet innerhalb meiner Denkweise nicht notwendig 
einen Gegensatz zum Irrtum, sondern in den grundsätzlichsten 
Fällen nur 
eine Stellung verschiedener Irrtümer zueinander... " 
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"'Truth': within my way of thinking that does not necessarily signify a 
contrast to error, rather, in the most fundamental cases, only a 
position of different errors to each other... " (KSA 11,38 141, WM/WP 
no. 535, t. m. ) 
Furthermore, any simplistic equation of truth as preservation as 
exhaustion and of its apparent mirror image, error as expenditure as 
plenitude, is completely inappropriate for thinking the intensely complex 
relationships between these terms. As is clear from the quote from WM/WP 
no. 520 (penultimate page), to assume that all is in flux (when knowledge as 
conceived by the metaphysical tradition can only arise in approximation to 
a fixed and unchanging realm of truth) inevitably means that (such a 
metaphysically defined) truth is an error in this world at last thought of 
as perpetual becoming: 
"Wahrheit ist die Art von Irrtum, ohne welche eine bestimmte Art von 
lebendigen Wesen nicht leben könnte. " 
"Truth is the kind of error without which a certain kind of living beings 
could not live. " (KSA 11,34 12531 , WM/WP no. 493, t. m. 
) 
The error which is truth is indispensable for the preservation of a 
particular life form, namely human being. Human being has a need for truth 
insofar as this life form is orientated towards preservation. Truth arises 
out of need, truth is the symptom of a fundamental impoverishment. 
But this 
account, plausible though it is, is still insufficient for thinking 
in its 
entirety the relation of life's plenitude and truth. 
Nietzsche's transvaluative thinking is the type of thinking which 
embodies primordial multiple becomings most readily. The truth of 
being and 
of preservation is an error in a world of plenitudinous 
becoming, it is 
directed against 'this' world. But this error does not arise out of a 
lack 
of knowledge or a miscomprehension of the truth, in which case 
it would 
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merely remain an error secondary and supplementary to this metaphysical 
truth. The error which is truth, even this most depleted of phantasms, 
still grows out of the infinite, inexhaustible exuberance of life or will 
to power, as Nietzsche calls it to emphasise the play and economy of forces 
continually raging through life. Even the erroneous truth, this most 
blatant mark of decadence, is only possible on the basis of the originary 
extravagance life luxuriates in. This is to say that preservation and 
expenditure are not simply and neutrally opposed to one another; any 
economy in which they interact is itself only possible because life must 
first of all expend itself in an economy of multiple becomings, or will to 
power. 
But there is a further twist to the transvaluation of this economy, for 
it must be asked which is the site of the error which is truth when the 
dismantling of this ancient idol means that truth is no longer thought of 
as existing 'out there' , as pre-given (be it as ideal, eternal 
form or, 
after the Copernican turn, as a priori form of objectivity). The site which 
Nietzsche names as the battleground for life's active forces of expenditure 
and life's reactive, life-negating forces of preservation is that of human 
physiology. There the ruinous adventure of life in combat with itself takes 
place, there it is being determined whether the affirmation of life in 
dissemination or the negation of it in preservation is to become dominant. 
This ongoing process may lead to the devastation of the human 
body, as has 
been the case with the incorporation of the truths of 
Platonism, as 
Zarathustra deplores: 
".. ich wandle unter den Menschen wie unter den 
Bruchstücken und 
Gliedmaßen von Menschen... ich [finde) den Menschen zertrümmert und 
zerstreuet wie über ein Schlacht- und Schlächterfeld 
hin. " 
"... I tread amongst humans as amongst fragments and 
limbs of humans... 
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I [find) human being smashed and scattered as over a field of battle and 
butchery. " (KSA 4, ASZ/TSZ, Bk II, t. m. , my omissions); 
or it may bring about the dissipation of the human body in a joyous 
exchange with other flows of matter. Through these processes life can, in 
the latter case, replenish its productive powers or, as in the former case, 
become temporarily impaired in its disseminative capabilities. Thus when, 
in the following note, Nietzsche speaks of life-threatening physiological 
errors, the threat which the error that is truth poses does not only 
concern life in its physiological instantiation (where the error is 
sustained like a cancerous growth) but concerns even life 'itself': 
"Der Irrtum Ist der kostspieligste Luxus, den sich der Mensch gestatten 
kann; und wenn der Irrtum gar ein physiologischer Irrtum ist, dann wird 
er lebensgefährlich. Wofür hat folglich die Menschheit bisher am meisten 
gezahlt, am schlimmsten gebüßt? FUr ihre 'Wahrheiten': denn dieselben 
waren allesamt Irrtümer in physiologicis... " 
"Error is the most costly luxury which human being can permit itself; and 
if the error is even a physiological error it becomes life-threatening. 
For what has humanity consequently payed the most, atoned the worst? For 
its ' truths' : for these were all errors in physiologicis... " (KSA 13,16 
1541, WM/WP no. 454, t. m. ) 
This point, namely that the economy of forces within the will to power is 
only possible on the basis of the originary plenitude of life, should be 
borne in mind when this economic thought (in its more elementary form) is 
taken up and developed below. 
We are now in a position to return to the discussion of the implications 
which a rationalistic philosophy's attachment to the notion of causality 
carries with it. If we briefly recall Kant's vision of a world no 
longer 
attached to the concept of causality, and the terror this provokes 
in him 
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because this concept represents for him the chief guarantor of the 
possibility of knowledge, it comes as no surprise that the very same 
scenario is viewed by Nietzsche, who is without naivety as concerns any 
quest for knowledge, with no more than mildly mocking detachment: 
"Die bestgeglaubten a priorischen 'Wahrheiten' sind für mich - Annahmen 
bis auf weiteres, z. B. das Gesetz der Kausalität, sehr gut eingeübte 
Gewöhnungen des Glaubens, so einverleibt, daß nicht daran glauben das 
Geschlecht zugrunde richten würde. Aber sind es deswegen Wahrheiten? 
Welcher Schluß! Als ob die Wahrheit damit bewiesen würde, daß der Mensch 
bestehen bleibt! " 
"The most believed in a priori 'truths' are for me - assumptions until 
further notice, for example the law of causality, very well rehearsed 
habits of belief, so incorporated that not to believe in them would 
ruin the race. But are they therefore truths? What conclusion! As if 
truth were proven by the fact that human being endures. "(KSA 11,26 1121, 
WM/WP no. 497, t. m. ) 
Here we must briefly recall Kant's definition of anything a priori as 
universal and necessary. That is to say that apriority (as unconditioned) 
by definition lies outside the realm of the properly temporal and of 
appearances (the conditioned) which, although constituted by or in terms of 
the a priori forms of sensibility and understanding, do not as appearances 
have the status of apriority. But since only appearances are subject to 
change it follows that for Kant 'a priori' and 'eternal' ('universal', 
unchangeable) are effectively synonymous. Thus when Nietzsche speaks of 'a 
priori truths', 'a priori' being most immediately associated with Kantian 
terminology, he means eternal truths, the 'truths' of the metaphysical 
tradition from which Kant himself at other times so eagerly wishes 
to 
dissociate his own philosophy. 
Nietzsche paints causality as one of the eternal truths 
behind which a 
dogmatically inclined reason likes to hide from the perpetual onslaught of 
-96- 
nature (or simply matter) which is profoundly indifferent to the parochial 
interests of self-preservation which occupy human being. What is called 
'truth' by that tradition is in fact no more than one of the tenets by 
means of which a particular life-form knows to preserve itself. This 
'truth', the law of causality, is thus the prime example of an 
anthropomorphic value, a belief which helps to structure the world into a 
regularity based on the primacy of being for the purposes of anthropos and 
which at the same time determines the human being which enters into 
commerce with the world on the basis of this reductive concept. 
Only now can the question be posed why Nietzsche views causality as such 
a reductive concept, and it can be asked which physiological values inform 
it. Throughout Nietzsche's writings there are innumerable notes in which he 
carries out dissections of the mechanisms by which the concept of causality 
imposes itself upon multiple processes of becoming. It was mentioned above 
that Kant refers to an objective succession (succession in the object) as 
an event. That is to say that for him an event marks the successful 
imposition of the conceptuality of the causal nexus upon an occurrence (in 
the natural world, the processes of which are to be brought under the sway 
of scientific knowledge). I would translate the German word Geschehen, as 
for instance used by Nietzsche at 12,2 (841, WM/WP no. 531, quoted below, by 
'occurrence', thereby distinguishing it from Kant's use of the word 
Begebenheit (e. g. KrV/CPR A192, B237; A194, B239; A201, B247) which is best 
translated as 'event'. The difference is that in the Kantian understanding 
of this term, the parameters of what happens are always already determined 
by the structures he elaborates in the Analytic of the first Critique, 
whereas Nietzsche's use of the term Geschehen is concerned with rethinking 
change in non-representational ways, that is to say before the imposition 
of subject and object or doer and deed upon a multifarious 
becoming. 
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And again, the demands of grammar rather than any investment in knowledge 
force the separation of an occurrence into doer and deed, the first of 
which is conceived in terms of being and substance, and as causing the 
second to take place as its effect: 
"Die Trennung des 'Tuns' vom 'Tuenden', des Geschehens von einem Etwas, 
das geschehen macht, des Prozesses von einem Etwas, das nicht Prozeß, 
sondern dauernd, Substanz, Ding, Körper, Seele usw. ist, - der Versuch 
das Geschehen zu begreifen als eine Art Verschiebung und Stellungs- 
Wechsel von 'Seiendem', von Bleibendem: diese alte Mythologie hat den 
Glauben an 'Ursache und Wirkung' festgestellt, nachdem er in den 
sprachlich-grammatischen Funktionen eine feste Form gefunden hatte. - 
"The division of 'doing' from the 'doer', of the occurrence from a 
something that produces the occurrence, of the process from a something 
that is not process but rather endures, that is substance, thing, body, 
soul etc., - the attempt to comprehend an occurrence as a kind of 
shifting and change of position of 'beings', of the permanent: this old 
mythology has fixated the belief in ' cause and effect' after it had found 
a fixed form in the linguistico-grammatical functions. -" (KSA 12,2 11391, 
WM/WP no. 631, t. in. ) 
Only through such an act of carving up the multiplicity of interacting 
forces into two and (in a fundamentally arbitrary, not to say capricious 
move) assigning to one, as cause, the status of being, to the other that of 
act, effect and change, can an event in the properly Kantian metaphysical 
sense be conceived: 
"Wenn ich sage 'der Blitz leuchtet', so habe ich das Leuchten einmal 
als Tätigkeit und das andere Mal als Subjekt gesetzt: also zum Geschehen 
ein Sein supponiert, welches mit dem Geschehen nicht eins ist, vielmehr 
bleibt, ist, und nicht ' wird' .- Das 
Geschehen als Wirken anzusetzen: und 
die Wirkung als Sein: das ist der doppelte Irrtum, oder 
Interpretation, 
deren wir uns schuldig machen. " 
"If I say 'lightning flashes' I have posited the 
flashing once as 
activity and another time as subject: so that 
in addition to an 
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occurrence I have presupposed a being which is not at one with the 
occurrence, which is rather permanent and does not 'become'. - To posit 
an occurrence as something that effects and the effect as being. that is 
the double error, or interpretation, of which we become guilty. " (KSA 12,2 
184], WM/WP no. 531, t. m. ) 
In the same note Nietzsche sums up the problem with this regressive 
causality: 
"... wir haben die Wirkung als Wirkendes angesetzt und das Wirkende als 
Seiendes. Aber auch noch in dieser Formulierung ist der Begriff 'Wirkung' 
willkürlich... " 
"... we have posited the effect as something that effects and the 
something that effects as being. But even in this formulation the concept 
'effect' is still arbitrary.. ." (ibid) 
That is to say that, although, as is recognised, the term 'effect' is 
still an arbitrary (willkürlich) imposition of anthropomorphic categories 
upon impersonal occurrences, this last quote provides a dissection of the 
detailed mechanisms of the processes through which becoming is habitually 
reduced to being (here as mere change). A multiple becoming is first of all 
cut down to the size of an effect (Wirkung) which is in turn posited as 
'something that effects' ([ein] Wirkendes). In the next step the 'something 
that effects' is then posited as being, as subject or substance or whatever 
else can be construed to be exempt from becoming and its insatiable 
temporality. 
Nietzsche here describes the processes of increasing hypostatisation and 
ossification by means of which a traditionally metaphysical conceptuality, 
perversely and without regard for the true nature of things, turns an 
essentially irreducible becoming (Geschehen) into a profoundly a-temporal 
being which thereby becomes comprehensible in mechanistic terms (as already 
quoted above: "... der Versuch das Geschehen zu begreifen als eine Art 
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Verschiebung und Stellungs-Wechsel von 'Seiendem', von Bleibendem.. " (KSA 
12,2 11393, WM no. 631)) . But Nietzsche' s excavat ory work is able to restore 
the primordiality of a becoming, which has been given a reactive direction 
by the impositions of human being. 
The advantage which human being gains by imposing such categories of 
(essentially temporal) identity - substance and causality - upon 
fundamentally non-identical processes of becoming lies in the construal of 
fixed points which can be made to correspond to the illusory fixity from 
which the 'I' is in each case enunciated, thereby underwriting the 
comforting humanist delusion that a self-identical subject and a self- 
identical object correspond to one another as if in a form of pre-given 
harmony. But the properly philosophical activity of thinking, unlike for 
instance a traditional metaphysics steeped in theological concerns, need 
not be comforting'°, need not reassure its audience of their security in 
certainty: 
"Wir stellen ein Wort hin, wo unsere Unwissenheit anhebt - wo wir nicht 
mehr weiter sehn können, z. B. das Wort 'ich', das Wort 'tun', das Wort 
'leiden': - das sind vielleicht Horizontlinien unsrer Erkenntnis, aber 
keine 'Wahrheiten'. " 
"We put a word where our ignorance commences - where we cannot see any 
farther, for instance the word 'P, the word ' do' , the word 'suffer': - 
those are perhaps the horizons of our knowledge but no 'truths'. "(KSA 12, 
5 131, WM/ WP no. 482, t. m. ) 
It may be inferred that to speak of causality is such an instance where a 
word merely masks the fact that we are confronted with a multiplicity which 
does not correspond to any of the traditional forms of understanding, which 
is irreducible to anthropomorphic values and which masks the boundary 
between the world as we have construed it, as we know and recognise 
it and 
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the - far larger - domain beyond the horizon which remains profoundly 
obscure to human knowledge. 
This obscurity does not arise because it so happens that the sciences 
have not yet reached that far but will in time conquer that territory, too. 
The obscurity to which the only appropriate response is the acknowledgement 
of unknowing (Unwissenheit) persists because of the necessarily limited 
nature of consciousness and of reason and of any instrument of human 
knowledge. The infinite, impenetrable darkness which surrounds the tiny 
speck of light under which the human animal labours outstrips the sphere of 
the knowable not because there lies a 'not yet' or a 'no more' hidden in 
the folds of that knowledge, awaiting its discovery by busy humans - it 
exceeds human knowability unknowably and utterly unreasonably and it will 
not be tamed by representational conceptuality, however subtle or refined. 
The human animal can no more catch up with the great obscurity which 
surpasses its knowledge than it can ever reach and move beyond the horizon 
which marks its earthbound trail, however swiftly it learns to move. The 
great release from instrumental rationality's impossible aspirations to 
total domination of its world and from the nightmare which ensues can only 
come about with the recognition of the primacy of will to power which 
interprets, creates and organises long before and well beyond the meagre 
calculations of which anthropos believes itself to be the origin: 
"Es ist nicht genug, daß du einsiehst, in welcher Unwissenheit Mensch und 
Tier lebt; du mußt auch noch den Willen zur Unwissenheit haben und 
hinzulernen. Es ist dir nötig, zu begreifen, daß ohne diese Art 
Unwissenheit das Leben selber unmöglich wäre, daß sie eine Bedingung ist, 
unter welcher das Lebendige allein sich erhält und gedeiht: eine große, 
feste Glocke von Unwissenheit muß um dich stehn. " 
"It is not enough that you recognise in which ignorance humans and 
animals live; you must also have and learn the will to ignorance. 
It is 
necessary for you to comprehend that without this kind of ignorance 
life 
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itself would be impossible, that it is a condition under which alone the 
living can preserve themselves and flourish: a large, firm dome of 
ignorance has to encompass you. " (KSA 11,26 [ 2941, WM/WP no. 609, t. m. > 
But to a life-form which has entered the stage of decadence and which 
feels itself in desperate need to cling on to whatever fixed points it can 
grasp in its rapid descent, to such a life-form the colossal darkness 
surrounding it holds nothing but terrors and anything which can be 
retrieved from the brink of the abyss provides a comforting illusion of 
stability. Thus to assume 'causes' and 'effects' and to rest assured in the 
knowledge of laws which organise and order everything that occurs into tidy 
regularities is particularly pleasing to the beleaguered human animal, 
whether this account it gives itself of the world is ultimately true or 
not. Nietzsche describes these desperate 'safety measures' in the following 
terms: 
"Etwas Unbekanntes auf etwas Bekanntes zurückführen, erleichtert, 
beruhigt, befriedigt, gibt außerdem ein Gefühl von Macht. Mit dem 
Unbekannten ist die Gefahr, die Unruhe, die Sorge gegeben, - der erste 
Instinkt geht dahin, diese peinlichen Zustände wegzuschaffen. Erster 
Grundsatz: irgend eine Erklärung ist besser als keine. Weil es sich im 
Grunde nur um ein Loswerdenwollen drückender Vorstellungen handelt, nimmt 
man es nicht gerade streng mit den Mitteln, sie loszuwerden: die erste 
Vorstellung, mit der sich das Unbekannte als bekannt erklärt, tut so 
wohl, daß man sie 'für wahr hält' ." 
"To trace something unknown back to something known relieves, soothes, 
satisfies and in addition provides a feeling of power. With the unknown 
danger, disquiet, anxiety is given, - the first instinct goes towards 
eliminating these awkward states. First principle: any old explanation is 
better than none. Because at bottom it is only a question of wanting to 
get rid of oppressive ideas one is not exactly strict about the means to 
get rid of them: the first idea with which the unknown declares itself as 
known is so agreeable that one 'holds it for true'. " (KSA 6, GD/TI, V, 5, t. m) 
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The task of the second part of this chapter has been to demonstrate the 
unsuitability of the concept of causality for thinking Nietzschean 
physiology. The move beyond the technicalities of Kant's discussion of 
causality as an a priori concept of the understanding in the second Analogy 
was made possible by two things: firstly, by a symptomatic reading of the 
examples he offers in that chapter and secondly, by introducing the 
question of value to the discussion of an a priori causality. As concerns 
the former point of attack, it is clear that Kant is guided by an enormous 
fear of the unknown in his choice of examples. The advantage of a 
mechanistic metaphysics of experience is that it fixates the vagaries of 
matter into manageable units. But Kant cannot countenance matter in any way 
whatsoever and has to pretend that the productions of Physis are subsumable 
to the productions of techne (as will become even clearer in the next 
chapter). A further stratagem by which he is able to put some distance 
between himself and material forces is to presume the subject exempt from 
the processes of nature, to stand by as if merely an unaffected observer 
whose own materiality and physicality could be neutralised at will. Lastly, 
Kant's examples try to give the impression that everything which takes 
place in nature only does so in relation to the human observer, he assumes 
an absolutely anthropocentric point of view from which the orderly parade 
of effect upon cause upon effect etc. may be inspected. 
It is the notion of value, in its Nietzschean sense of the 
interpretations of the will to power, which disrupts Kant's seemingly 
unproblematic anthropocentrism by showing how, far from in any sense 
marking a valid originary perspective, it too is an outcrop of the will to 
power. The question of value further derives its significance 
from the fact 
that when it is addressed to the most typical instantiation of an 
anthropomorphic value, namely causality, it emerges quite clearly 
that 
reactive ideals of preservation overwhelmingly occupy this 'pure concept of 
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the understanding' which is the same as to say that all the important 
questions about the primacy of being or becoming have already been decided 
in favour of the former by the time this type of conceptuality gets 
underway. Whilst it does not perhaps come as a great surprise that Kantian 
critique should be so entirely predicated on the primacy of being, it is 
also undoubtedly true that Nietzsche's experimental thinking celebrates an 
originary becoming under the name of will to power or physiology. In this 
it finds itself at war with a Kantian philosophy whose ultimate, if 
inexplicit, objective is the careful and elaborate containment of matter. 
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III. An Antinomy against Nature 
As I hope to have already shown in the first chapter, at certain decisive 
points in his text Kant falls conspicuously short of realising his own best 
insights. For instance, having 'discovered' the paralogistic implications 
of one of the key concepts of dogmatic rationalism (namely the 
substantiality and immortality of the soul or subject), he fails to 
radicalise his own project into the overcoming of any quasi-substantial, 
and that finally and most importantly means extra-temporal, subjectivity, 
which he retains under the name of transcendental unity of apperception. 
Equally, as concerns the antinomic structures of the dialectic of reason, 
the problem as exposed by Kant must be taken back to his own text as a way 
of radicalising critique immanently. The technical aspects of the problem 
can initially be stated in simple terms: it must be asked which are the 
factors that determine the shift between, on the one hand, the solutions to 
the first and second Antinomies, in both of which both thesis and 
antithesis can be shown to be based on erroneous assumptions and, on the 
other hand, the third and - for our purposes here far less significant - 
fourth Antinomies, for both of which Kant wishes to show both thesis and 
antithesis to be based on correct statements which, whilst still, like 
those of the earlier two Antinomies, contradictory are nevertheless 
reconcilable given the appropriate critical context. In order to clarify 
why this is such a crucial question and to show the implications a 
particular response to it might entail, the argument must be taken through 
a number of stages which at times may appear to digress far from the 
immediate point. 
To recap briefly the salient points of the Antinomies, these are the 
dialectical conflicts into which reason plunges of itself when faced with 
the task of forming the empirical representations given to it (solely 
by 
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the understanding, as pre-critical reason believes) into a coherent whole 
or world or cosmos. The cosmological ideas formed by reason fall into two 
groups, the first of which Kant identifies with dogmatism (dogmatic 
rationalism) and thematises as the thesis in each respective dialectic, the 
second of which he summarises as the position of (dogmatic) empiricism 
(which he also refers to as scepticism at other times) which he arranges in 
the antitheses (KrV/CPR A465f, B493f). He summarises the four theses of 
dogmatic rationalism in the following, terse manner: 
"Daß die Welt einen Anfang habe, daß mein denkendes Selbst einfacher und 
daher unverweslicher Natur, daß dieses zugleich in seinen willkürlichen 
Handlungen frei und über den Naturzwang erhoben sei, und daß endlich die 
ganze Ordnung der Dinge, welche die Welt ausmachen, von einem Urwesen 
abstamme, von welchem alles seine Einheit und zweckmäßige Verknüpfung 
entlehnt... " 
"That the world has a beginning, that my thinking self is of simple and 
therefore imperishable nature, that it is at the same time free in its 
voluntary actions and elevated above the compulsion of nature and that 
finally the entire order of things which make up the world descends from 
an originary being from which all derives its unity and purposive 
connection... "(KrV/CPR A466, B494, t. m. ) 
At the same point in the text he even states quite explicitly, and 
somewhat guilelessly, that the stuff of the theses has traditionally 
provided the "foundation stones of morality and religion", whereas the 
tenets of dogmatic empiricism which deny the assertions of the theses and 
hold the very opposite to be true, seem to deprive morality and religion 
"of all power and influence" (KrV/CPR A468, B496). 
The erroneous syllogism (major and minor premise of which are stated at 
KrV/CPR A497, B525) which seduces reason into these seemingly 
irresolvable 
antinomic structures takes the following form: 
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major premise: if the conditioned is given, the entire series of all its 
conditions is also given; 
minor premise: the objects of the senses are given us as conditioned; 
conclusion: the entire series of all the conditions of the objects of the 
senses are given. 
As was mentioned in chapter one, above, reason's twofold character 
firstly initiates the surge or ascent through the syllogism towards, 
secondly, the condition of the entire series of logically dependent 
propositions which it posits as final or absolute condition and hence of 
course as unconditioned. Thus one aspect of reason (the aspect which is 
amenable to critique) provides the impetus for the construction of 
syllogisms and the organisation of judgements, derived from the interplay 
of the other three faculties of - importantly - sensibility, understanding 
and (the faculty of) judgement (Urteilskraft), into these syllogisms. In 
this respect it is precisely the integrative capacity of reason which 
allows for judgements of knowledge to be formed into a cosmological whole. 
But reason's simultaneous and insurmountable dogmatic impulse to posit the 
condition of the entire series as given and, insofar as it is assumed to be 
itself unconditioned, as the absolute point of origin (for the series of 
syllogisms) towards which - in its less absolutist guise - it merely 
aspires, instantaneously closes off its own cosmos in the making. Dogmatic 
reason thereby curtails the integration of further synthetic a priori 
Judgements into the whole it forms (as critical reason) and at the same 
time (as dogmatic reason) forecloses. Reason's twofold potential 
thus 
encompasses the possibilities of it being the motor of coherent 
knowledge 
and the death of it, which latter possibility has, according 
to Kant, 
traditionally been the position of dogmatic rationalism and of a 
theistically inclined idealism 
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The difference between an activating and an arresting reason Kant here 
locates in the subtle shift of meaning between the words aufgegeben and 
gegeben (KrV/CPR A497f, B526). An active reason understands the series of 
conditions to any given conditioned as aufgegeben, as set, like a task to 
be accomplished, like a course to be followed, whereas reason's absolutist 
aspect takes that same series as gegeben, as given and that means closed 
off and, ultimately, given precisely by a prime mover as first point of 
origin to a series which consequently must be taken to be complete from the 
start. About this aspect of reason Kant remarks, at the end of the thetic 
'Observation on the Third Antinomy': 
"Die. .. Bedürfnis der Vernunft, in der Reihe der Naturursachen sich auf 
einen ersten Anfang... zu berufen, leuchtet daran sehr klar in die Augen: 
daß... alle Philosophen des Altertums sich gedrungen sahen, zur 
Erklärung der Weltbewegungen einen ersten Beweger anzunehmen, d. i eine 
freihandelnde Ursache, welche diese Reihe von Zuständen zuerst und von 
selbst anfing. " 
"The... necessity of reason to appeal to a first beginning in the series 
of natural causes... becomes very clear by the fact that all philosophers 
of antiquity felt themselves urged to assume a prime mover for the 
explanation of cosmic movements, that is, a freely acting cause which 
first and of itself began this series of states. '" (KrV/CPR A451, B479, t. m. , 
my omissions) 
Since the self-proclaimed task of Kant's critical solution to the 
antinomic problem is to delimit the claims to exclusivity of both the 
thetic and antithetic positions, that is, of both rationalist and 
empiricist dogmatism, it seems fair to assume that part of the solution 
will lie in the overcoming of the theist assertion that is particularly 
inherent in the former position. This point will be taken up 
below. 
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But apart from the split nature of reason, part of which lures it into 
untenable and ultimately theistic assertions, there lies another flawed 
impulse at the very heart of its syllogising, cosmogenic capacity. 
The understanding needs to work in concert with the pure forms of 
intuition in order for synthetic a priori judgements, and here that means 
judgements of knowledge, to become possible. If the understanding neglects 
this necessary union with sensibility, its propositions remain empty 
(KrV/CPR A51, B75) and it descends into mere (general) logic (KrV/CPR 
A52, B76), forsaking the possibility of contributing towards expansive 
judgements about the world. But reason, in its traditional manifestation as 
dogmatic rationalism, does not accept that sensibility (qua transcendental 
space and time, the pure forms of intuition, in Kant' s treatment of the 
problem) is indispensable for the formation of judgements of knowledge. Due 
to this error it believes that judgements based on pure concepts of the 
understanding by themselves can be constitutive of knowledge and can be 
constituted or integrated into coherent cosmological systems. 
But - and this is the most important point of transcendental idealism 
which Kant never tires of reiterating - the objects of knowledge are not 
things in themselves but are appearances and that chiefly means that they 
are subject to the conditions of a priori temporality and a priori 
spatiality. In order to remind reason of this indispensable condition of 
knowledge - and this is one of the central elements of the critique or 
delimitation of reason's self-understanding - Kant allocates a merely 
regulative function to reason. That is to say that reason cannot by itself 
be constitutive of judgements of knowledge, it merely regulates, organises 
and integrates them into a syllogistic structure' '. 
Thus, as concerns the syllogism at the basis of 
the Antinomies, dogmatic 
reason fails to appreciate that, unlike that of the major premise, 
the 
proposition which forms the minor premise 
(of the syllogism quoted above) 
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refers to appearances (' objects of the senses' KrV/CPR A497, B525), that is, 
to objects in part constituted by the a priori forms of intuition. By 
failing to comprehend 'objects of the senses' as subject to the 
delimitations of space and time which are only transcendentally, and not 
empirically ideal and which conversely are only empirically, and not 
transcendentally real, dogmatic reason fails to appreciate the true scope 
of experience and the extent to which propositions concerning the nature of 
the cosmos can be extended. Reason is, in short, over-ambitious and only 
its critique can curtail the overzealous application of its sufficient 
principle. 
It is of course perfectly possible, as witnessed by the vast majority of 
commentaries on the first Critique, to perceive the problems critique 
develops in its encounter with dogmatic reason solely in the terms laid out 
by Kant. But if at the same time one of the central tasks of critique is to 
destabilise the territorial claims of dogmatic (and that simply means pre- 
critical) rationalism (as well as its obverse, empiricism) then to probe 
more deeply into Kant's text with the objective of uprooting all hidden 
remnants of the old priesthood is to do the greatest service to Kant's 
avowed project. In this spirit the third Antinomy has to be approached. In 
the context of a chapter which seeks to trace Kant' s treatment of the 
category of causality through both Analytic and Dialectic of the first 
Critique, this is obviously the only Antinomy which requires closer 
attention. 
As a strategy for resolving the respective claims of contradictory and 
mutually exclusive metaphysical positions, the solution offered 
to the 
problem of the third Antinomy is of course hugely inventive. 
To cut the 
Gordian knot (Kant' s own metaphor, KrV/CPR A529,13557) which 
had bound 
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determinism and free will into seemingly irresolvable conflicting claims by 
declaring that conflict to be based on a miscomprehension of the field of 
application of those respective claims was nothing short of revolutionary. 
But whilst it is necessary to acknowledge the enormity of this achievement 
it would nonetheless constitute nothing but an utter abnegation of 
philosophy's historicality - even in its crudest form - to simply revert to 
the Kantian perception of this nexus of problems and to end the discussion 
once it has been decided whether the solution to the third Antinomy 
successfully separates noumenal and phenomenal causality. 
The most salient symptom of Kant's desire flows in this respect occurs in 
the formulation of the thesis to the third Antinomy'2. The structure of the 
Antinomies is centrally dictated by the fact that in each case the two 
metaphysical positions in conflict with each other are genuinely opposed, 
that they claim the same ground on the basis of wholly contradictory 
propositions. This structural requirement is fulfilled in the formulations 
of all the Antinomies except the third. Here the thesis reads: 
"Die Kausalität nach Gesetzen der Natur Ist nicht die einzige, aus 
welcher die Erscheinungen der Welt insgesamt abgeleitet werden können. Es 
ist noch eine Kausalität durch Freiheit zu Erklärung derselben anzunehmen 
notwendig. " 
"Causality according to laws of nature is not the only one from which the 
appearances of the world as a whole can be derived. It is also necessary 
to assume a causality according to freedom for their explanation (KrV/CPR 
A444, B472, t. m. ) 
Thus the thesis here not only claims its own ground but, implicitly, that 
of the antithesis as well; it admits the material of the antithesis 
into 
its own domain, "not only causality according to nature but also causality 
according to freedom". The thesis proclaims the antithesis as necessary but 
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not sufficient. This formulation of the thesis obviously opens up a huge 
dissymmetry between the rival claims, given that the antithesis nonetheless 
insists on its own position as the only viable one. As a consequence of 
this disequilibrium, when Kant maintains that the solution to this Antinomy 
requires the acceptance of both thesis and antithesis, he is utterly 
disingenuous as concerns his own procedure. In fact, he has already 
formulated the thesis in such a way that to admit causality both according 
to nature and according to freedom simply confirms the contention of the 
thesis - in declaring only the thesis to be correct he could still assign 
different fields of application to the two types of causality, thereby 
salvaging transcendental idealism as the invention which provides the 
solution to all Antinomies of reason. 
The reason the thesis is formulated as it is, thereby disturbing the 
requisite symmetry of the Antinomy, is simple: were it to be formulated in 
direct contradiction to the antithesis it would declare that 'everything in 
the world takes place solely according to the causality of freedom'. Whilst 
this would be the symmetrical opposite to the antithesis and thus formally 
the most appropriate, it would also obviously be wrong to claim that the 
world in its entirety is due to acts of the (noumenal) human will. 
The Copernican turn affords the possibility of locating an originary, 
formally productive capability in the faculties coordinated by 
transcendental subjectivity, thereby apparently allowing that subjectivity 
to supersede the God of the metaphysical tradition as the source and 
guarantor of a coherent, comprehensible and calculable nature, or 
experience. But, as was mentioned before, the simple replacement of one 
point of origin for another in the context of an otherwise unchanged 
formal 
structure of restricted, unilinear production, does not 
detract from the 
fact that a fundamentally theistic model remains in place. 
Kant's human 
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god, transcendental subjectivity, here in its manifestation as noumenal 
freedom, no less suppresses the originary productivity of nature than does, 
for instance, the Platonic t5ec or the Christian God. As was briefly 
mentioned above, Kant acknowledges that prior to the humanisation of the 
irpoTov xavov by transcendental idealism, it had been deemed necessary by 
the metaphysical tradition to inscribe a deistic prime mover into the 
causal series to get it underway. He implicitly aligns the formal features 
of his statement of the Antinomy's thesis with a characteristic of the very 
tradition against which it is ostensibly directed. And since (contrary to 
what Kant wishes his readers to believe) his solution to the free will - 
determinism debate is more immediately parasitic on that Antinomy's thesis, 
rather than offering genuine arbitration between both sides of its 
dialectic, it must be concluded that he can ultimately only resolve the 
problem by unreasonably and illegitimately privileging a stance (namely 
that of dogmatic rationalism) to which theistic prejudices are by his own 
admission generic. 
Kant's treatment of the problem of the third Antinomy displays a further 
weakness in the formulation of its thesis when it asserts that it is 
'necessary to assume' a causality according to freedom. For it must simply 
be asked what the basis of this necessity might be. So far in the first 
Critique, necessity had only been attributed to two things. Firstly, to the 
status of transcendentality, insofar as its apriority is defined in terms 
of necessity (as well as in terms of universality), and, secondly, to the 
status of phenomena in their relation to subjectivity, which is thematised 
under the fourth group of categories named modality. That is to say 
that 
for theoretically oriented reason necessity only applies to appearances, 
either in the aspect of their (transcendental) constitution or 
their 
(phenomenal) constitutedness. Thus when Kant urges that 
it is 'necessary to 
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assume' a noumenal causality - something utterly unthinkable in the terrain 
of theoretical reason - he obviously appeals to other than theoretical 
demands. In the third Antinomy the pearly gates leading to the realm of 
practical reason open up, from here Kant can construct the rational ethics 
which for him (as we have come to suspect) form the pinnacle of his 
critical achievement. 
The question is whether the critique of theoretical, cosmogenic reason is 
the most appropriate place from which to launch the defence of a free 
(noumenal) will. The demand to assume the practical truth of such an 
anthropocentric will is perhaps, not least of all, reminiscent of 
Nietzsche's wry observation (quoted at greater length above): 
"... die erste Vorstellung, mit der sich das Unbekannte als bekannt 
erklärt, tut so wohl, daß man sie 'für wahr hält' ." 
"... the first idea with which the unknown declares itself as known is so 
agreeable that one ' holds it for true' ." (KSA 6, GD/TI, VI, 5, t. m. ) 
This is obviously not the place to begin a discussion of Kant's practical 
philosophy and the unconscious forces to which it is subject. But at the 
point (in the solution to the third Antinomy) where the concerns of 
critical theoretical reason are channelled into those of critical practical 
reason, a marked change of tone becomes noticable. A certain undercurrent 
of regret seems perceptible when Kant is forced to admit: 
"Das Sollen drückt eine Art von Notwendigkeit und Verknüpfung mit 
Gründen 
aus, die in der ganzen Natur sonst nicht vorkommt. ja das 
Sollen, wenn 
man bloß den Lauf der Natur vor Augen hat, hat ganz und gar keine 
Bedeutung. 11 
"The ought expresses a kind of necessity and connection with grounds 
which is not found anywhere else in the whole of nature... 
indeed the 
ought, if one merely has the course of nature bef ore one's eyes, 
has no 
meaning whatsoever. 11 (KrV/CPR A547, B575, t. m. , my omissions) 
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And only a little later he becomes surprisingly explicit about his 
aspiration (which he knows to be hopeless) to dominate nature entirely by 
reason, even to rewrite its inevitable course in accordance with an 
implicitly superior reason: 
" .. da [in der Naturordnungl sollte vielleicht alles das nicht geschehen 
sein, was doch nach dem Naturlaufe geschehen ist, und nach seinen 
empirischen Gründen unausbleiblich geschehen mußte. " 
"... there [in the natural order] perhaps all that ought not to have 
occurred which did occur according to the course of nature and which had 
to occur unavoidably according to its empirical grounds. "(KrV/CPR A550, 
B578, t. m. , my insertions) 
This theme of a superior human faculty which, especially in its noumenal 
employment, remains entirely untainted by the impure materiality Kant calls 
the manifold, which enters experience through sensibility, emerges with 
particular violence in a paragraph which aims to cloak its virulently anti- 
materialistic stance by an ornately Latinate, and hence purportedly 
objective, terminology (since Kant italicises heavily throughout this 
passage, I emphasise by means of bold type): 
"Die Freiheit im praktischen Verstande ist die Unabhängigkeit der Willkür 
von der Nötigung durch Antriebe der Sinnlichkeit. Denn eine Willkür ist 
sinnlich, so fern sie pathologisch (durch Bewegursachen der Sinnlichkeit) 
effiziert ist; sie heißt tierisch (arbitrium brutum), wenn sie 
pathologisch nezessitiert werden kann. Die menschliche Willkür ist zwar 
ein arbitrium sensitivurm, aber nicht brutum, sondern liberum, weil 
Sinnlichkeit ihre Handlung nicht notwendig macht, sondern dem Menschen 
ein Vermögen beiwohnt, sich, unabhängig von der Nötigung durch sinnliche 
Antriebe, von selbst zu bestimmen. " 
"Freedom in the practical sense is the independence of the will from 
coercion by the impulses of sensuality. For a will is sensuous in so far 
as it is pathologically affected (by motives of sensuality); it is called 
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bestial (arbitrium brutum) if it can be pathologically necessitated. 
Although the human will is an arbitrium sensitivum, it is not brutum but 
liberum because sensuality does not necessitate its action but a faculty 
inhabits the human being to determine itself by itself independently of 
the coercion by sensuous impulses. " (KrV/CPR A533f, B561f, t. m. ) 
Nature, even in its critically controlled form as experience shaped by 
the a priori forms, is still an imposition on an otherwise independent 
practical reason. In fact, it is much more than an imposition, it is an 
unwanted, coercive, bestial tormentor which is alien and hostile to reason 
and which affects reason like a disease. The noumenal will is here clearly 
identified with the highest purity, a holy virgin for a rational age, 
whereas nature qua the sensuality through which the subject is affected is 
base and vile and in need of the most violent suppression '. 
This distribution of values between sensibility and reason, between 
nature and morality is clearly reminiscent of Socrates' agitating on the 
same point in the Phaedrus and Phaedo (quoted in chapter one, above). Kant 
here continues the long line of dogmatic anti-materialists that stretches 
all but unbroken from Plato to the eighteenth century. He relapses into the 
most aggressive dogmatism about the preciousness of the free noumenal will 
at the very point where critique could provide the formal means for the 
most effective assault on all previous dogmatisms. 
Kant seems to relish the spectacle of the noumenal will turning against 
nature when he celebrates practical freedom for 'producing something.. 
entirely of itself', and especially against the 'force and influence' of 
natural causes (KrV/CPR A534, B562). Here there is revealed, to adapt a 
well-known phrase of Nietzsche, reason as anti-nature. 
But Kant's hanging judge's mentality with regard to the inexcusable 
impurity of (causality according to) nature entirely overwhelms the text 
when his otherwise rigorously transcendental philosophy descends into the 
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murky depths of an empirical example, concerning the hypothetical 'case' of 
a 'free agent' spreading 'malicious lies' (KrV/CPR A554-556,6582-584). His 
whole legalistic register instantly betrays the fact that to apportion 
responsibility and hence guilt, to single out the culprit, comprises the 
hidden agenda in which the aims of transcendental idealism and of judicial 
process happily coincide. And of course this register also aligns Kant's 
project with that of Christianity which rests heavily on the assumption 
that we are all guilty before God, just as for Kant we are all guilty, 
because responsible, before the court of reason. Again it is clear that the 
substitution of an anthropocentric for a theocentric position in Kant's 
text constitutes no real advance as long as the fundamental structures and 
impulses governing the system remain in the end unchallenged and unchanged. 
But to return to our original question of the third Antinomy's disturbed 
symmetry, it is clear that the thesis is stated the way it is to make it 
acceptable to common sense as well as to the rationalistic ontology of the 
natural sciences (or, in short, Enlightenment philosophy). But this is 
effectively done at the cost of destroying the Antinomy proper since, as 
mentioned before, the contention of the antithesis is already contained in 
the thesis so that, finally, no proper Antinomy exists between these two 
positions. And that ultimately means that Kant can either sustain the 
antinomic structure or the contention of the causality of a free noumenal 
will - but not both! Typically, then, at the very point where the pressure 
of his rationalistic prejudices comes to bear down most forcefully on his 
otherwise critical argumentation, he cannot sustain the grand design, 
cannot abide by his own best insights. 
Finally, the question concerning the shift from the first two to the 
second two Antinomies needs to be taken up again. Why can it not 
be said 
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that in the third Antinomy, too, both thesis and antithesis are 
inappropriate as explanatory principles for a critical cosmology? Unless 
the baroque architectonic of the ' Schlussanmerkung, (cf. footnote 12, above) 
is to be believed, there is no reason why in this (pseudo-) Ant inomy, too, 
thesis and antithesis should not be considered equally untenable. But 
obviously the abyssal thought of a world without any kind of causal 
certitude is far too terrifying to entertain for the Kantian perspective. 
His repressive desires need and want both the noumenal and the phenomenal 
realm to be closely policed by causality, the concept that incarcerates 
becoming. 
Nietzsche goes straight to the heart of the matter and draws out the real 
significance of Kant's pseudo-antinomic causalism when he notes: 
"Dies ist die Antinomie: sofern wir an die Moral glauben, verurteilen wir 
das Dasein. " 
"This is the antinomy. insofar as we believe in morals, we condemn 
existence. " (KSA 12,10 11921, WM/WP no. 6> 
Needless to say, in the conception of the world as will to power, this 
repression is unsustainable. Consequently, when it comes to the elaboration 
of will to power as physiology in positive terms (in chapter four, below), 
it will obviously not be a matter of conceiving a body in terms of the a- 
temporal, unitary nexus of causality. From the paucity of a production 
based in human being physiology will entice thought back into the delirium 
of multiple material becomings. 
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DIVINE PUTRESCENCE 
"Der Abfall, Verfall, Ausschuß ist nichts, was an sich zu 
verurteilen wäre: es ist eine notwendige Konsequenz des Lebens, 
des Wachstums an Leben. " 
"Waste, decay, elimination is not itself anything which would 
have to be condemned: it is a necessary consequence of life, 
of the growth in life. " (KSA 13,14 [ 751 , WM/WP no. 40, t. m. )' 
I. The Idealisations of Reason 
Following the discussions, in the previous two chapters, of the 
categories of substance and causality and the related ideas of reason which 
they give rise to (as thematised in the Paralogisms and the Antinomies, 
respectively), it might be expected that this third chapter would trace the 
category of reciprocity through its Analogy and its idea of reason in 
analogous manner. But whilst a comparatively cursory glance at the 
appropriate parts of the first Critique, namely the third Analogy and the 
Ideal of Pure Reason, will be necessary, the majority of the present 
chapter will concern itself with quite another text. Before considering the 
reasons for branching out at this point it will be best to clarify why the 
third Analogy at least is dealt with in such relatively summary fashion 
here. 
But first of all it is necessary to recall that the readings carried out 
in the preceding two chapters of the present text did not chiefly have the 
aim of enhancing our understanding of Kant' s treatment of the Principles 
insofar as they ensue from the categories of relation, but that they were 
attempts at symptomatic interpretations of his implicit, one might say 
latent or unconscious, thinking of temporality. Because, as was mentioned 
before, the 'relations' systematically discussed in the three Analogies 
concern the "time-relations of appearances", insofar as the categories of 
relation give the rule to each of them in turn (KrV/CPR A177, B219). So an 
extended discussion of the third Analogy would only be justified here if 
it 
yielded an additional perspective on Kant's metaphysics of time. 
The third Analogy, with its 'Principle of Simultaneity, according to the 
Law of Reciprocity or Community' (to give it its full and rather cumbersome 
title) is not without significance for Kant, for he says of it that 
01 .. simultaneity... is... the condition of possibility of 
things themselves 
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as objects of experience. "(KrV/CPR B258). And of course the entire first 
Critique is in one sense an account of the formation of experience. As we 
know, by experience Kant means the regulated, thoroughgoing connection of 
representations or, as he puts it in the formulation of the general 
Principle of the Analogies of Experience, "Experience is only possible 
through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions. " 
(KrV/CPR B218). 
The particular significance of the Principle of Simultaneity can be 
unfolded if it is taken into consideration that the `community' 
(Gemeinschaft) which organises this Principle is a dynamic community or 
commerclum, "without which even the local one (communio spatii) could never 
be known empirically" (KrV/CPR A213, B260). This I take to mean that the 
space within which objects appear for sensibility (as discussed in the 
first part of the first Critique, the Transcendental Aesthetic) 'gives' the 
perceptions from which representations can be formed but that it is not 
sufficient for the conceptualisation of spatiality or of the coexistence of 
objects in time and space. In other words, the Principle of Simultaneity 
thematises the reciprocally causal relation of objects in space just as the 
Principle of Causality thematises the unidirectionally causal relation of 
objects in time, simply called causality. 
But it is in each case not merely a category which structures a Principle 
but, importantly, a temporalised category or schema. Kant reminds his 
readers of this when he writes: 
"Wir werden also durch diese Grundsätze die Erscheinungen nur nach einer 
Analogie, mit der logischen und allgemeinen Einheit der Begriffe, 
zusammenzusetzen berechtigt werden, und daher uns in dem Grundsatze 
selbst zwar der Kategorie bedienen, in der Ausführung aber (der Anwendung 
auf Erscheinungen) das Schema derselben, als den Schlüssel ihres 
Gebrauchs, an dessen Stelle, oder jener vielmehr, als restringierende 
Bedingung, unter dem Namen einer Formel des ersteren, zur 
Seite setzen. " 
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"We will then, by means of these principles, be Justified in combining 
appearances only according to an analogy with the logical and general 
unity of concepts and thus we will make use of the category in the 
principle itself, but in the elaboration (the application to appearances) 
we will put the schema of it, as the key to its employment, in its place 
or rather, we will set it alongside the category as a restrictive 
condition under the name of its formula. " (KrV/CPR A181, B224, t. m. ). 
Hence it seems reasonable to infer that whatever holds for the internal 
connection which structures a class of categories also holds for that which 
structures the corresponding group of Principles. On this point Kant 
remarks that "the third category in each class always arises from the 
combination of the second category with the f irst. " (KrV/CPR B110). Thus, 
for instance, community can be defined as "the causality of a substance in 
determination of another reciprocally" (KrV/CPR B111, t, m. ). And although 
Kant admonishes his readers most solemnly not to think that therefore the 
third category is in each case merely a derivation of the first two, one 
might assume that the operation ("a special actus of the understanding", 
ibid) by which the third category or, in our case, the third Analogy is 
arrived at, does not in fact differ widely from that of the earlier two. 
The only implication of this which is of importance to us is that the 
implicit dogmatic metaphysical values which were shown to inform the first 
two Analogies can be expected not to have been jettisoned or even just to 
have been significantly transformed in the construction of the third 
Analogy, 
For these reasons I propose to, as it were, circumnavigate the chapter 
dealing with it and to proceed straightaway to a consideration of the Ideal 
of Pure Reason. 
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In the chapter on the third idea (the Ideal of Pure Reason), as in the 
preceding chapters of the Dialectic, Kant seeks to demonstrate the errant 
ways of a speculative reason which believes itself capable of producing 
theoretical knowledge of an object even though it does not take into 
account in any way the conditions of possibility of all objective knowledge 
other than pure concepts, namely the pure forms of intuition (Kant 
formulates this as: 
"Wir heben von dem Gegenstande der Idee die Bedingungen auf, welche 
unseren Verstandesbegriff einschränken, die aber es auch allein möglich 
machen, daß wir von irgend einem Dinge einen bestimmten Begriff haben 
können. " 
"We remove from the object of the idea the conditions which limit the 
concept of the understanding but which also solely make it possible that 
we have a determinate concept of any thing. " (KrV A674, B702, t. m. ) 
In this respect the chapter on the Ideal conforms to Kant's method 
throughout the Dialectic but two of its characteristics are of particular 
significance for the present project in which a radicalised critique of 
Kant' s transcendental idealism is attempted. 
The first point arises out of Kant's presentation of the problematic of 
the Ideal of Pure Reason (KrV/CPR A567f, B595f). As Kant reminds his 
readers, by means of pure concepts of the understanding alone no objects 
can be represented because without the conditions of sensibility the 
conditions of objective reality themselves are lacking. That is to say that 
by means of the categories alone objects can be thought and can be judged 
as formally possible according to the laws of logic but nothing may be said 
as to the status of such objects in reality if they are not locatable in 
space and time. Categories do however become concrete when 'applied to' 
appearances (that is to say if they can be seen to be formative of 
appearances) because pure forms of intuition furnish them (the categories) 
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with the material (Stoff) which turns them into concepts of experience 
(Erfahrungsbegriffe), that is, concepts which are formative of experience 
and not just of logically correct manoeuvres. In other words, the 
conditions of sensibility (space and time), must interact with the 
categories to form experience and the concrete material of experience 
enters into this operation through the forms of intuition. Otherwise empty 
concepts become concrete, objective reality (and thus correspond to a given 
object) when impregnated with the material of the senses and that finally 
means by inchoate, perceptual matter. The astonishing implication of this 
train of thought is that Kant here, in a rare moment of unprejudiced 
lucidity, elevates pre-conceptual matter to yardstick and final measure of 
objective reality-2. He underscores this tendency further by the manner in 
which he subsequently extends this line of argument to the introduction of 
ideas and, a little later, of the ideal of reason: 
"Ideen aber sind noch weiter von der objektiven Realität entfernt, als 
Kategorien;... Aber noch weiter, als die Idee, scheint dasjenige von der 
objektiven Realität entfernt zu sein, was ich das Ideal nenne... " 
"But ideas are yet further removed from objective reality than 
categories ... But even further removed 
from objective reality than the 
idea seems to be that which I call the ideal... "(KrV/CPR A568f, B595f, 
t. M. ) 
In this scheme of things, matter, the raw material of the senses, is 
designated the site of greatest objective reality and both the concepts of 
the understanding and those of reason appear as if arranged on a sliding 
scale on which they lose their degree of (potential) objective reality the 
further they deviate from 'the absolute' of matter given in intuition3. 
This passage of Kant' s text is remarkable for the simple fact that 
it 
marks one of the few instances where the strenuous anti-materialism 
he 
-124- 
manages to sustain almost everywhere else is, however slightly, punctured 
by an assertion which is yet in keeping with the formal demands of his own 
project of circumscribing the legitimate and appropriate domain of 
theoretical reason. This observation would already be significant if for no 
other reason than that it undermines Kant's implicit rationalistic claims 
for authorial sovereignty and for the univocity of his text. But it is also 
interesting for another reason, which brings us to the second point 
mentioned above. 
As with all the ideas of reason, so too with the Ideal, Kant needs to 
show that an unavoidable and 'natural' illusion of reason leads it to 
assume them as given and hence as constitutive of knowledge when at best 
the only task they are fit to perform (concerning theoretical reason) is to 
keep in check, to act regulatively upon, the syllogistic material with 
which the understanding (and the faculty of judgement) provide it: 
"Diese Ideale, ob man ihnen gleich nicht objektive Realität (Existenz) 
zugestehen möchte, sind doch um deswillen nicht für Hirngespinste anzu- 
sehen, sondern geben ein unentbehrliches Richtmaß der Vernunft ab, die 
des Begriffs von dem, was in seiner Art ganz vollständig ist, bedarf, um 
darnach den Grad und die Mängel des Unvollständigen zu schätzen und abzu- 
messen. " 
"These ideals, although one does not wish to attribute objective reality 
(existence) to them, are nonetheless therefore not to be regarded as 
figments of the brain but they provide an indispensable standard measure 
of reason which is in need of a concept of that which in its kind is 
entirely complete in order to evaluate and to measure the degree and the 
defects of the incomplete in accordance with it. "(KrV/CPR A569f, B597f, 
t. m. , my italics) 
Just as for the understanding there exists - in the form of the material 
of intuition -a measure against which its operations can be evaluated and 
the degree to which they attain to this measure can be assessed, so too for 
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reason there exists such an absolute point of reference in the form of the 
ideal. And for both of them the issue of reality is the decisive factor. 
Kant exposes the unavoidable tendencies of speculative reason, firstly, to 
assume the ideal (as characterised in the above quote) as given and, 
secondly, in the guise of rational theology, to name this ideal 'god'. 
It seems inapposite here to enter into the details of the arguments by 
means of which Kant demonstrates the impossibility of all speculative- 
theoretical proofs of the existence of god, be these proofs ontological, 
cosmological or physico-theological, especially since they formally repeat 
his argumentation in the Paralogisms to some extent. Instead I propose to 
concentrate on Kant's general description of the transcendental ideal 
(mainly in the second section of the third chapter of the Transcendental 
Dialectic, A571ff, B599ff) and in particular on certain key terms with which 
he characterises that which speculative reason (mis-)takes for the highest 
reality, namely the ideal. 
In the transcendental ideal Kant claims to have discovered the principle 
under which each thing in general and according to its possibility stands, 
namely the principle of 'thoroughgoing determination' (durchgängige 
Bestimmung). This is not merely a formal organising principle like the law 
of contradiction but one that affects the content of a thing in general, 
insofar as this principle strives to determine which of all possible 
predicates apply to the thing. This principle itself is in turn structured 
by the ideal proper, the concept of the epitome (Inbegriff) of all 
possibility, according to which each thing can be determined or, as 
Kant 
sometimes calls it, by the originary concept or archetype (Urbegriff) which 
contains within it all possible predicates to the highest degree and most 
originary form (thus not admitting any derivates or hybrids). 
The 
determination itself proceeds as follows: 
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"',., es werden durch diesen Satz nicht blaß Prädikate unter einander 
logisch, sondern das Ding 
Prädikate, transzendental 
"... by means of this prop 
logically with each other 
transcendentally with the 
A573, B601, t. m. ) 
selbst, mit dem Inbegriffe aller möglichen 
verglichen. " 
osition predicates are not merely compared 
but the thing itself is being compared 
epitome of all possible predicates. "(KrV/CPR 
This means that reason, like the understanding in its own way, operates 
with such an absolute standard, against which all its objects are compared, 
assessed and measured as to their status vis-ä-vis this highest reality. 
But there is of course one enormous difference between the measure of 
reality as posited by the understanding and as posited by reason, insofar 
as the former (at least in its critical manifestation) acknowledges 
something outside itself, namely the material of sensibility, without which 
it remains unproductive of knowledge and of reality; whereas reason merely 
insists on the ideal as its highest instantiation of reality, without 
acknowledging that it is in danger of drifting off into transcendence, in 
danger of utterly divorcing itself from reality without the material of the 
senses: 
"Des Ideal... In der Erscheinung realisieren wollen... ist untunlich. " 
"To want to realise the ideal... in an appearance... is impracticable. " 
(KrV/CPR A570, B598, t. m. , my omissions). 
Thus it may be said that the site of the highest reality is posited at 
opposite ends of the spectrum by the understanding (as matter) and by 
reason (as god). 
We are now in a position to examine in which way Kant characterises the 
transcendental ideal whose only proper function is to regulate the 
theoretical propositions of the understanding but in which reason 
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unavoidably overreaches itself and presumes that it can be constitutive of 
knowledge by itself. In elaborating the nature of the ideal, as imagined by 
speculative reason, Kant observes: 
"Wenn also der durchgängigen Bestimmung in unserer Vernunft ein 
transzendentales Substratum zum Grunde gelegt wird, welches gleichsam den 
ganzen Vorrat des Stoffes, daher all mögliche Prädikate der Dinge 
genommen werden können, enthält, so ist dieses Substratum nichts anderes, 
als die Idee von einem All der Realität (omnitudo realitatis). " 
"If thus a transcendental substrate which contains, as it were, the 
entire stock of material whence all possible predicates of things can 
be taken, is put at the basis of the thoroughgoing determination of our 
reason, then this substrate is nothing other than the idea of an all of 
reality (omnitudo realitatis). " (KrV/CPR A575f, B604f, t. m. , my italics) 
This is to attribute to the ideal (to 'god') the greatest originary 
plenitude possible as well as the highest potential, potentia, power and 
capability. It is to say that all that can be lies contained in the ideal 
but, much more importantly, conversely it implies that plenitude, richness, 
highest power and highest capacity are locatable elsewhere, in a world 
beyond, and not here, where there are only things themselves. Since they 
are not themselves originary or, for that matter plenitudinous, they are 
mere copies of the original, they are mere imperfect ectypa (mangelhafte 
Kopeien (sic)) of the original archetype. The immediate effect of such an 
operation of idealisation, as performed by an as yet metaphysical reason, 
is to allocate both plenitude and power solely to a beyond unattainable for 
mere appearances or for the shadowy figures who move in such a deplorably 
deficient realm. 
As has already been mentioned, Kant calls the ideal Urbegriff, the 
originary concept or archetype. This means that the copies are derived 
from 
it but it does not derive from anything or anywhere else (or so 
dialectical 
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reason wishes to believe). The ideal is wholly original, first in a series 
of formations (which is why Kant also refers to it as ' prototype' ), highest 
in a hierarchy of formative ideas and not itself determined from elsewhere. 
The ectypa or imperfect copies, on the other hand, are wholly secondary, 
wholly derived: 
"Das Ideal ist... also das Urbild (prototypon) aller Dinge, welche 
insgesamt, als mangelhafte Kopeien (sic) (ectypa), den Stoff zu ihrer 
Möglichkeit daher nehmen... " 
"The ideal is.... thus the archetype (prototypon) of all things, which one 
and all, as imperfect copies (ectypa), derive the material for their 
possibility from it. .. " (KrV/CPR A578, B606, t. in. ) 
They are devoid of any power to generate their own material for 
themselves but have to import it from the higher, richer power of the 
ideals. Secondly, then, the metaphysical distribution of values results in 
the things of this world being entirely conditioned, being mere 
derivatives, only second-bests, whereas the ideal itself is distinguished 
by not being in any way conditioned or derived. 
In introducing the principle of thoroughgoing determination, Kant 
remarks: 
"... er [der Grundsatz] betrachtet... jedes Ding noch im Verhältnis auf die 
gesamte Möglichkeit, als den Inbegriff aller Prädikate der Dinge 
Überhaupt. " 
"... it [the principle] also views... each thing in relation to the entire 
possibility, as the epitome of all predicates of things in general. " 
(KrV/CPR A572,8600, t. in. , my insertions and omissions) 
That store of all possibilities is the epitome, the most complete, most 
perfect place of all predicates, a treasure trove from which things can be 
furnished. But this of course carries the implication that the copies 
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themselves are far from perfect. This is made abundantly clear in the 
continuation of the penultimate quote: 
"... indem sie [die Kopeienl demselben [dem Urbild] mehr oder weniger nahe 
kommen, dennoch jederzeit unendlich weit daran fehlen, es zu erreichen. " 
"... while they [the copies] get more or less close to it [the archetype], 
yet they fall at all times infinitely short of reaching it. "(KrV/CPR 
A578, B606, t. m. ) 
Thirdly, these points can be summed up by saying that the ideal on the 
one side and things or copies on the other side, are for all time 
infinitely far removed from each other, and perfection resides entirely and 
exclusively on the side of the former. 
What must of course be remembered is that Kant characterises the ideal as 
pl eni t udinous and powerful, as original and not conditioned or derived and 
as perfect without thereby in any way endorsing the image that emerges. In 
fact the entire sweep of the Dialectic is to demystify the processes by 
which speculative, metaphysical reason cuts itself off from the exigencies 
of objective reality. In the course of this demystification (or critique), 
Kant painstakingly even enumerates the precise steps (realisation, 
hypostatisation and, finally, personification) by means of which reason 
identifies its ideal in a movement which begins innocently enough with the 
search for the greatest reality and ends up with the person of an 
anthropomorphised god: 
"Dieses Ideal des allerrealesten Wesens wird also, ob es zwar eine bloße 
Vorstellung ist, zuerst realisiert, d. 1. zum Objekt gemacht, darauf 
hypostasiert, endlich, durch einen natürlichen Fortschritt der Vernunft 
zur Vollendung der Einheit, so gar personifiziert... ' 
"Thus this ideal of the most real being, although it is indeed a mere 
representation, is first realised, that is, made into an object, then 
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hypostatised, and finally, by a natural progress of reason towards the 
completion of unity, even personified... " (KrV/CPR A583, B611, t. m. ) 
But even in the midst of this highly ethereal and entirely erroneous 
procedure, Kant credits pre-critical reason with enough sense (even when 
devoid of all sensibility) not to imagine such a being to exist 
objectively: 
"Es versteht sich von selbst, daß die Vernunft... nicht die Existenz eines 
solchen Wesens, das dem Ideale gemäß ist, sondern nur die Idee desselben 
voraussetze... " 
"It is self-evident that reason... does not presuppose the existence of 
such a being that corresponds to the ideal, but only the idea of it. " 
(KrV/CPR A577f, B605f, t. m. , my italics and omissions) 
And he sums up the ontological argument in which such an idea, which is 
merely intended as a regulative concept of reason, is converted into an 
objectively given, real thing when he calls it 'a mere fiction' (eine bloße 
Erdichtung, KrV/CPR A580, B608). It is in such an act of fictionalising that 
the ideal, which initially is but another merely regulative idea of reason, 
is elevated to the untenable status of constitutive ground of all reality 
in the person of 'god'. The source of this transformation Kant names 
transcendental, which is to say pre-critical, theology (for instance 
KrV/CPR A580, B608). 
It appears that all these remarks by Kant can again be summarised and 
organised in the form of an ascending scale, depending on where the various 
types of thought locate themselves in relation to the two extreme 
interpretations of what constitutes the highest reality, god or matter. 
Needless to say, it is a critical vantage point from which this order of 
things emerges. 
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At the lowest point of this imaginary scale Kant finds theology; it 
identifies the ideal with 'god' whom it takes to be objectively real, whom 
it believes, simply, to exist. Thus for (this type of) theology the highest 
reality is a being for whose objective reality, as Kant goes on to 
demonstrate conclusively, no proofs (nor indeed disproof s) can be found. 
Theology's ideal is entirely devoid of any real substance or matter. 
Technically speaking this can be attributed to the fact that the necessary 
conditions of objective knowledge, in the form of (transcendental) time and 
space through which the material of the senses is given, has not yet been 
realised as being constitutive of experience. But within a diagnostic 
register the very same characteristics of theology merely attest to the 
illegitimate elevation of an imaginary agency to the ens realissimum. 
A median position is taken up by dialectical or pre-critical reason 
which, although still compelled to identify the ideal with 'god', at least 
moderates its zeal to the point of acknowledging that this ideal cannot in 
fact be found to exist in reality, independently of the unavoidable, 
illusiory tendencies of reason. Thus dogmatic reason at least realises that 
the ideal only exists insofar as reason thinks it. Reason has now entered a 
more modest phase in which it begins to orientate itself towards the 
exigencies of this world. But although it no longer adheres to the 
grotesque inventions of traditional theology, it does not yet fully embrace 
the implications of a world of appearances. 
Only at the pinnacle of the scale, in the development of critical reason, 
do even the last echoes of Christianity become wholly inaudible. This can 
finally happen for the very simple reason that, at least within the project 
of founding theoretical knowledge, the senses, their material and the equal 
share this has in the formation of knowledge, are given their proper due. 
It is, in short, no longer 'god' (be it directly or in the form of a 
prestabilised harmony) that guarantees the correspondence of human 
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knowledge to the objects of the world; instead the harmonious interaction 
of the faculties (of knowledge) ensures that the objects of knowledge can 
correspond to our means of knowing them, ensures in other words, that they 
can become objectively valid or real. This is obviously what turns the, 
seemingly merely technical, reversals of critique into a revolutionary 
thought. 
But whilst it is important to draw out the special position which 
critique occupies in the history of philosophy and the concurrent demise of 
the (Christian) ideal, we should not be lulled into thinking that Kant 
unequivocally eradicates all traces of a quasi-theological thought from all 
parts and aspects of his text, we should not even imagine that he would be 
free to do so. But at least the scale, elaborated above, the construction 
of which Kant greatly facilitates (even if he does not explicitly present 
it) by the way in which he introduces his material, allows us to gauge the 
distance from its two poles (matter and ideal) at which Kant's project can 
be situated. As before (chapter one, section three of this text), a 
particularly rich source of material for such an evaluation can be found in 
the Transcendental Deduction. In the same way in which Kant questions pre- 
critical reason's blind belief in the ideal and exposes its metaphysical 
implications, it is possible, and indeed necessary, to question the 
Transcendental Deduction's equally untenable, equally pre-critical belief 
in a transcendental unity of apperception. 
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II. The Transcendental Deduction (II) 
We have already seen in which, extremely loaded, terms the ideal is 
constructed (as plenitudinous, etc. ). Interestingly enough, transcendental 
apperception is occasionally described in not altogether dissimilar terms, 
as for instance when Kant refers to it as 'this pure, originary, immutable 
consciousness' ("dieses reine, ursprüngliche, unwandelbare Bewußtsein", 
KrV/CPR A107) and as 'this originary condition' ("diese ursprüngliche 
Bedingung", KrV/CPR A106). Is this consciousness, then, which at other 
times seems to have no other function than to provide the material of the 
three syntheses with formal unity (e. g. KrV/CPR A105), imbued with the same 
unconscious values which inform the old ideal? 
It is then first of all a matter of attention to the tone or register in 
which Kant describes transcendental apperception, if its Platonic basis is 
to be uncovered. Although it is true that the epithet 'pure', technically 
speaking, refers to the a priori conditions of possibility of knowledge, it 
is impossible to dissociate it entirely from a more sinister register of 
purity which stands in opposition to an allegedly sullied, compromised, 
corrupt and altogether impure order which traditionally marks matter, the 
body, physicality, etc. (these conflicting series have already been 
anatomised, cf. above, chapter one, sections one and two). In being 
characterised as 'originary', transcendental apperception in part seems 
to 
share the ideal's status as epitome (Urbegriff) and by being called the 
'originary condition' it is reminiscent of the attribution of precisely 
the 
same status to the ideal; furthermore, insofar as the former is 'immutable' 
it seems to carry the same capacity as the ideal to found knowledge even, 
or especially, when devoid of matter which is in the highest 
degree subject 




On the level of the argument, too, some 
transcendental apperception are being ins 
Deduction, a chapter whose chief function 
demonstrate that the pure concepts of the 
provide the rule according to which it is 
intuition to cohere. 
unsustainable claims about 
erted into the Transcendental 
is after all nothing more than to 
understanding can in principle 
possible for the manifold of 
In terms of Kant's project it is something of a truism to say that 
necessity can only be grounded in transcendental conditions ("Aller 
Notwendigkeit liegt jederzeit eine transzendentale Bedingung zum Grunde" 
KrV/CPR A106). Even if it is accepted that an empirical unified 
consciousness is necessary, within which disparate intuitions can be held 
together under convergent categories, and given the fact that this 
necessary consciousness as such requires transcendental conditions which 
make it necessary, this does not strictly speaking allow any immediate 
inferences as to the nature of these transcendental conditions. 
It would seem that less prejudiced inferences only lead from a synthetic, 
formally unified consciousness to a transcendental, formally unifying 
synthesis, or from an empirical synthesis to a transcendental source of it, 
namely to transcendental imagination, the faculty of synthesis. This should 
especially be the case since a concept (of the understanding, that is to 
say, a category) is that by means of which the manifold is unified 
(synthesised) into one representation (KrVICPR A103) and, conversely, a 
representation or an object (ein Gegenstand) is that, the concept of which 
expresses the necessity of such a synthesis (KrV/CPR A106). Why should it 
be the case that this kind of circular logic (whereby whatever appears 
synthesised can only be traced back to a synthesis) is applicable on the 
local level of a concept but not as far as the faculty of concepts, the 
understanding, and its chief vehicle, transcendental apperception, are 
concerned? It is a peculiar, albeit apparently unavoidable, 
feature of 
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Kant's text that it should be so enormously insightful regarding the 
operations of a (pre-critical) reason but that it seems blind to its own 
(pre-critical) prejudices. 
There appears a very telling paragraph in Kant's discussion of 
speculative reason in which he details its typical procedure not without a 
slightly condescending tone. He writes: 
"So ist also der natürliche Gang der menschlichen Vernunft beschaffen. 
Zuerst überzeugt sie sich vom Dasein Irgend eines notwendigen Wesens. In 
diesem erkennet sie eine unbedingte Existenz. Nun sucht sie den Begriff 
des Unabhängigen von aller Bedingung, und findet ihn in dem, was selbst 
die zureichende Bedingung zu allem andern ist... Das... ist absolute 
Einheit, und führt den Begriff eines einigen, nämlich des höchsten Wesens 
bei sich... " 
"Such then is the natural course of human reason. First it persuades 
itself of the existence of any necessary being. In this it recognises an 
unconditioned existence. Now it seeks the concept of that which is 
independent of all condition and finds it in that which is itself the 
sufficient condition of all else... That... is absolute unity, and carries 
with it the concept of a singular, namely the supreme being... " (KrV/CPR 
A587, B615, t. m. , my omissions) 
Kant is of course writing about the fabrication of 'god' (or at least an 
image thereof) within rational theology or 'natural' reason but it is very 
tempting, as well as very revealing, to read this passage as if it 
described the fabrication of human being (or an image thereof, by means of 
transcendental apperception) within a transcendental idealism which has 
simply not quite yet managed to rid itself of the old dogma of a supreme 
being - be it divine or merely human, a being which in any case 
is presumed 
to stand at the zenith of, and apart from, nature conceived as creation. 
Kent himself inadvertently hints at such a parallel when he writes: 
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"Dieses Ideal des allerrealesten Wesens wird also, ob es zwar eine bloße 
Vorstellung ist, zuerst realisiert, d. i. zum Objekt gemacht, darauf 
hypostasiert, endlich, durch einen natürlichen Fortschritt der Vernunft 
zur Vollendung der Einheit, so gar personifiziert...; weil die regulative 
Einheit der Erfahrung nicht auf den Erscheinungen selbst (der 
Sinnlichkeit allein), sondern auf der Verknüpfung ihres Mannigfaltigen 
durch den Verstand (in einer Apperzeption) beruht, mithin die Einheit der 
höchsten Realität und die durchgängige Bestimmbarkeit (Möglichkeit) aller 
Dinge In einem höchsten Verstande, mithin in einer Intelligenz zu liegen 
scheint. " 
"Thus this ideal of the most real being, although it is indeed a mere 
representation, is first realised, that is, made into an object, then 
hypostatised, and finally, by a natural progress of reason towards the 
completion of unity, even personified... ; because the regulative unity of 
experience does not rest upon appearances themselves (sensibility alone), 
but on the combination of its manifold by the understanding (in one 
apperception), consequently the unity of the highest reality and the 
thoroughgoing determinability (possibility) of all things seems to lie in 
a supreme understanding, and consequently in an intelligence. "(KrV/CPR 
A583, B61 1, t. m. , my omissions) 
It seems not altogether impossible to read this very procedure (reason's 
construction of its ideal) back into the Transcendental Deduction, Kant's 
ostensible account of how (and what with) the pure concepts of the 
understanding combine to produce experience. For does not Kant allow 
transcendental apperception to be hypostatised, does he not allow something 
that merely has to be able to be the concomitant of all conscious 
representations, the understanding, to become the under-standing, the uno- 
a1aot , the foundation of what is at heart simply a process of groundless 
thinking, of free synthesis? And does he not (as already discussed 
in 
chapter one, section three, above) confuse the unified nature of this 
formal consciousness with a- much more essentialist - unity which 
he 
wishes to stamp on this consciousness? And finally, above all, 
does he not 
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channel the multiple, pre- or extra-human impulses of nature, which he 
himself thematised under the name of synthesis, into the paltry ' vessel' he 
refers to as 'my identical self' ("mein identisches Selbst", KrV/CPR A129)? 
Throughout the Transcendental Deduction (in A) there runs an enormous 
tension between the rival claims to priority of the transcendental (unity 
of) apperception, and the productive synthesis in imagination. Kant likes 
to seek refuge from uncertainty about this conflict in the wonderfully 
ambiguous words ' relate' or ' relation' (beziehen, Beziehung), as for 
instance when he writes: 
"Also beziehet sich die transz. (sic) Einheit der Apperzeption auf die 
reine Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, als eine Bedingung a priori der 
Möglichkeit aller Zusammensetzung des Mannigfaltigen in einer 
Erkenntnis. " 
"Thus the transcendental unity of apperception relates to the pure 
synthesis of the imagination, as an a priori condition of the possibility 
of all combination of the manifold in a cognition. " (KrV/CPR A118, t. m. , my 
italics) 
The sentence does not even make entirely clear which of the two is meant 
by 'a priori condition', which is here more originary, transcendental 
apperception or transcendental imagination, the (hypo-)stasis of the 
understanding or the multiple becomings of synthesis. Similarly, the 
problem arises in the following formulation: 
"... die Einheit dieser Synthesis [des Mannigfaltigen in der 
Einbildungskraft] heißt transzendental, wenn sie in Beziehung auf die 
ursprüngliche Einheit der Apperzeption, als a priori notwendig 
vorgestellt wird. " 
*... the unity of this synthesis [of the manifold in imagination] 
is 
called transcendental when it is represented as a priori necessary 
in 
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relation to the originary unity of apperception. " CKrV/CPR A118, t. m. , my 
italics and insertions) 
What is this relation, is it one of subordination or of coordination and, 
again, which of the two ' relata' is more primordial? There are a large 
number of examples which could be cited just from the third section of the 
Transcendental Deduction (In A), the section where this ambiguity is most 
prevalent. Then again, Kant seems to settle the dispute once and for all by 
stating quite clearly: 
"Also ist das Principium der notwendigen Einheit der reinen (produktiven) 
Synthesis der Einbildungskraft 
Möglichkeit aller Erkenntnis, 
vor der Apperzeption der Grund der 
besonders der Erfahrung. " 
"Thus the principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) 
synthesis of the imagination prior to apperception is the ground of the 
possibility of all cognition, especially experience. " (KrV/CPR Al18, t. m., 
my italics) 
But far from solving the problem conclusively, this definitive statement 
seems to be utterly contradicted just a few pages later, when Kant 
declares: 
"Die Einheit der Apperzeption aber ist der transzendentale Grund der 
notwendigen Gesetzmäßigkeit aller Erscheinungen in einer Erfahrung. " 
"But the unity of apperception is the transcendental ground of the 
necessary lawfulness of all appearances in an experience. "(KrV/CPR 
A127, t. m) 
Although we are not quite yet in a position to draw out the more 
important implications of the decision which to privilege, primordial 
synthesis or originary apperception, we can offer some suggestions 
concerning Kant's seeming inability (or unwillingness) to resolve 
this very 
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important question,. And here we are at last able to return to the 
discussion above, in which it was proposed that the success of the critical 
project could to some extent be gauged by the standard it itself sets in 
its delineation of the failures and unavoidable errors committed by 
rational theology. In this regard I have attempted to highlight some of the 
more obvious similarities between the prototypon transcendentale, viz. the 
ideal of pure reason, and that other first foundation in another quest for 
the certainty of knowledge, namely transcendental apperception. Insofar as 
Kant can be shown to inadvertently repeat some of the lacunae of pre- 
critical reason, the intellectual distance which separates him from the 
consummation of critique can be staked out quite clearly. On the other 
side, that very examination drew us into yet another preliminary discussion 
of Kant's enormously significant discovery of synthesis as a possible 
primary force of nature (whereby ' nature' must of course retain the sense 
it takes on after the Copernican turn, namely as a construct of, and as 
only knowable by the faculties of knowledge). And it is this momentous 
discovery, however latent and unrealised it lodges in the interstices of 
his text, which indicates the huge advances of the critique of reason, as 
it gradually begins to question the claims of the Christian god over all 
beings - this reason, no longer safe in the knowledge of the divine ideal 
and not yet liberated into the divinity of matter. 
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III. The Marasmic Ideal 
At this point it becomes necessary to substantiate the earlier claim 
(made at the beginning of section one of this chapter) that in the present 
context it no longer suffices to consider some implications of the 
principles and ideas based on the categories of relation, as discussed in 
the first Critique. In this, as usual, we are simply following Kant's own 
procedure very closely. 
On one level, it was the self-appointed task of the first Critique to 
found a theoretical approach to the objects of nature qua experience, to 
found, in other words, a theory of nature and the possibility of natural 
science qua physics. It did this by taking up the question - central to 
philosophy since Plato - of how it is in principle possible that our 
representations (our knowledge) of objects correspond to these objects and, 
as is well known, reversing the question to allow it to inquire into the 
possibility of objects corresponding to our means of knowing them. By thus 
relocating the problematic in the realm of the faculties it became possible 
for Kant to bring centuries of unresolved argumentation to a solution with 
one stroke. More precisely, it is in the formulation of the 'highest 
principle of all synthetic judgements' , viz. that "the conditions of 
possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of 
possibility of objects of experience" (KrV/CPR A158, B197, t. m. 6) that Kant 
solved this age-old problem. 
What distinguishes Kant's answer most radically from those of his 
predecessors is of course the fact that for him the objects of our 
knowledge are not given as such prior to our modes of knowing 
them, that 
they are, in other words, precisely objects of our knowledge, of our means 
of knowing them. This is not to say that we produce objects as 
things in 
the world - materially they are indeed given, pre-exist and precede 
our 
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faculties. But as separate, individual objects (that is to say, formally) 
they are the products of our faculties. Nor does Kant's Copernican 
revolution state that the processes of this formal production are 
individual and 'subjective' (in which case they would give rise to all 
manner of unsolvable ' epistemological' problems). For, according to Kant, 
the processes by which theoretical knowledge is produced are universal and 
necessary, they do not change in different (for instance, historical) 
circumstances nor are they determined by psychological factors (cf. e. g. 
KrV/CPR A53, B77) and they are certainly not open to volition; they are 
entirely spontaneous (ibid A50, B74) or, one might say, automatic. 
By revolutionising the thinking around the issue of truth (traditionally 
comprehended as the correspondence of knowledge and object) in this manner, 
Kant takes on the burden of analysing and explicating, albeit predominantly 
on the level of their transcendental derivation, the processes which he 
alleges to be productive of this new critical truth (a perhaps not 
altogether unbearable " burden' for Kant, given his penchant for slow, 
methodical work). 
Among the cornerstones in this great excavatory work are of course the 
categories which provide a kind of guiding thread through the Analytic and 
Dialectic of the first Critique and thereby fulfill the role of drawing 
together what would otherwise be vast swathes of seemingly unrelated 
material. However contentious their alleged Aristotelian origin or their 
ultimate justification within the larger project of a critical philosophy, 
they undoutedly provide the means for Kant's exploration of how the objects 
of knowledge are constituted (cf. the more extens've discussion of these 
points in the Introduction, above). 
According to Kant it must be possible to articulate knowledge of 
the 
objects of the world in terms of synthetic a priori judgements. 
The 
apriority of the latter rests in the universal and necessary constitution 
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of the faculties which are productive of them (cf. above, previous page); 
but that they are synthetic is entirely due to the fact that there are 
disparate, although obviously not altogether unrelated, faculties in the 
first place. Only because there is an understanding as distinct from 
intuition, can the synthesis of their respective materials (and Kant's 
analysis of their procedures, whether separate or combined) occur'. 
Without in the least diminishing the enormous significance of the 
magnificent intellectual sweep in which Kant revolutionises philosophy and 
delimits the legitimate scope of theoretical reason, it is nonetheless 
finally impossible to ignore the intrinsic limitations of the theory of 
knowledge established in the first Critique. Kant himself was the first to 
realise this. 
For, although the grandeur of the project of thus philosophically 
founding theoretical knowledge is undisputed, the limitations of this type 
of knowledge (even in Kant's own terms) immediately come into view when it 
is realised what is known through it and how it is known, in short, when 
the scope of this type of knowledge is realised. 
For any object to become cognisable for the human faculties, its manifold 
must be apprehended by the senses and via the categories a concept of it 
must be formed. The faculty of judgement effects the subsumpt i on of the 
particular under the universal and since this operation is determined by 
the understanding in its pure concepts (the universal is given for which it 
must be possible to find the particular), the faculty of judgement is here 
acting determinatively. In terms of the pure forms involved, the 
apprehension in intuition and the recognition in a concept must 
be mediated 
by a synthesis in imagination (KrV/CPR Transcendental Deduction in A); only 
then can an object be known. 
But the object which is thus produced as object is an object 
in general 
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(überhaupt) which is to say that it is only known as object. This means 
that it must have empirical attributes but what its particular empirical 
characteristics are cannot be known in advance as a result of the 
productive processes described in the first Critique. All that is 
implicitly known of it is that it must be knowable in terms of quantity, 
quality, relation and modality because these general determinations are 
analytically contained in the concept 'object'. But which quantity or 
quality it has, and in which type of causal relation it stands, and whether 
it is actual, possible or necessary - this it is not within the scope of 
the first Critique to determine. Which is to say that the first Critique 
provides an account of how objects in general are formed and become 
knowable but not how they are known in particular and as particular. 
This problem simply repeats itself on the level of the system. Although 
not explicitly formulated as a problem, it is already implicitly contained 
in the following quote from Kant: 
"Unter Natur... verstehen wir den Zusammenhang der Erscheinungen... nach 
notwendigen Regeln, d. i. nach Gesetzen. Es sind also gewisse Gesetze, und 
zwar a priori, welche allererst eine Natur möglich machen; die 
empirischen können nur vermittelst der Erfahrung, und zwar zufolge jener 
ursprünglichen Gesetze, nach welchen selbst Erfahrung allererst möglich 
wird, stattfinden, und gefunden werden. " 
"By nature... we understand the connection of appearances... according to 
necessary rules, that is, according to laws. There are thus certain laws 
which first make a nature possible, and these laws are a priori. 
Empirical laws can exist and be discovered only through experience, and 
indeed in consequence of those original laws through which experience 
itself first becomes possible. " (KrV/CPR A216, B263, t. m. , my omissions) 
The thoroughgoing connectedness of appearancesq as produced by the 
interplay of the faculties, is what Kant understands by nature 
in the first 
Critique. The cohesiveness of experience according to necessary and 
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universal laws is the sense in which nature is discussed there. Nature is 
that of which we are capable of forming a coherent picture if and when the 
faculties in their a priori constitution interact appropriately. But, as 
Kant himself points out in the above quote, in this way only nature in 
general is given, `a nature`, as he calls it, a coherence in general, the 
possibility of coherence. As the a priori faculties function properly, a 
coherent picture comes into view but it is only an outline or a sketch. No 
theory of the formation of empirical laws of nature exists as yet. After 
the first Critique we know that we can know nature formally, but we do not 
yet know how we could know nature, how it becomes possible as empirical 
system. The material of empirical laws is derived from experience which is 
to say that this material does not have a priori status. But if these 
empirical laws are to be universally and necessarily valid they must 
somehow be comprehensible in a priori terms. This is why Kant needs to show 
that, whilst the material of empirical laws cannot be comprehended in a 
priori terms, it must indeed be possible to comprehend the method of their 
derivation as laws thus. 
As concerns the particular type of interrelatedness we have been 
concentrating on so far, namely the temporal connection of appearances as 
thematised under the categories of relation, an entirely new hiatus opens 
up around them. For although Kant does not explicitly state this in the 
first Critique, the only type of causality he deals with there is that of 
efficient causes, which can only comprehend mechanical forces working upon 
one another. This is not a problem as long as it only seeks to account 
for 
synthetic a priori Judgements in the context of how a science of nature qua 
physics is possible, as is of course the case in the first 
Critique (cf. the 
Preface to the second edition and the Introduction of 
the first Critique). 
But although such an account is absolutely necessary 
for the cognition of 
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nature, it is not sufficient, since not all objects of our cognition are 
comprehensible by reference to mechanical laws alone. Some of the objects 
which appear as a result of the work of the understanding, that is to say, 
some of the objects given in experience (although, crucially, not solely 
derived from it) blatantly exceed any such theorisation according to merely 
mechanical laws. 
Such objects are organisms or products of nature and we must now turn to 
the chief critical text in which Kant seeks to provide a theory of 
knowledge of these types of objects, namely the Critique of the Faculty of 
Teleological Judgement ('Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft'®). 
The comparison in terms of which many eighteenth century writers liked to 
formulate the problem of inorganic as opposed to organic things was that 
between a clockwork and an organism (cf. for example Kt U/ CTJ A288, B292) 9. 
The comparison is apt to the extent that both contain multiple parts which 
interact in such a way that the whole functions in accordance with a 
concept, specifically the concept of a purpose, we might have of it. The 
question is whether a clockwork and an organism are exactly alike or, if 
not, wherein their differences lie. This is how Kant describes the 
interrelatedness of the parts peculiar to a clockwork: 
"In einer Uhr ist ein Teil das Werkzeug der Bewegung der anderen, aber 
nicht ein Rad die wirkende Ursache der Hervorbringung des anderen; ein 
Teil ist zwar um des anderen Willen. aber nicht fur denselben da. " 
"In a clock, one part is the instrument of the movement of the others but 
one wheel is not the efficient cause of the bringing-forth of another; 
one part is there for the sake of the other but not due to it. 11 (KtU/CTJ 
A288, B292, t. m. ) 
The parts in a complex object of this kind at best cause one another's 
movements (which are comprehensible according to the laws of physics) 
but 
they do not cause each other materially; the purpose of one part 
is to 
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cause another to perform its function (which is here only a certain 
movement) correctly, but its purpose can never be to produce another part 
materially, nor can one clock produce another or mend itself when a defect 
arises. It is of course the horologist with whom the concept of the purpose 
of the whole rests and who produces this whole in accordance with the 
concept of its purpose. Here the purpose of the object logically and 
temporally precedes its production but the concept of the purpose is 
external to the object and the site, as it were, of this concept is of an 
entirely different order to that of the object itself. 
But the causality internal to the object thus produced is clearly only a 
mechanical causality, which is to say that the effects which the parts of 
the clockwork have upon each other can be comprehended exhaustively by 
reference to the type of causality which we know from the categories of 
relation. In other words, the understanding can form a complete picture of 
the object as such and of its inner workings by means of the type of 
causality inherent in the understanding, here its categories are 
sufficient. 
But not all objects conform exclusively to the understanding in this 
manner. Some objects (although nevertheless as such derived from the 
understanding) are given through experience and are such that they exceed 
the capabilities of our faculties of knowledge to cognise them as long as 
these faculties are determined by the understanding. It is impossible to 
account ultimately for the whence of this peculiar experience, but at some 
stage the faculties of cognition encounter phenomena which they experience 
as excessive to their own capacity. This is to say that the scope of the 
understanding could be exhausted and yet these peculiar objects would still 
not be entirely theorised. At that point, as always when the understanding 
reaches the limits of its application, pure reason steps in to supply a 
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concept not contained in the understanding. If this concept, or idea, of 
reason expects to act determinatively upon the objects of nature, reason 
involves itself in an unavoidable dialectic (hence the chapters on this in 
the Dialectic of the first Critique, as discussed in our previous two 
chapters and in section one of this chapter). The proper application of 
reason as concerns natural objects is to act regulatively upon the concepts 
of the understanding. In the context of the faculty of teleological 
judgement this means that when the understanding's concepts of (mechanical) 
causality, with which it aspires to determine all objects, no longer 
suffice to account for the causality of organisms, reason steps in to 
provide the regulative concept of purposiveness which, and this could stand 
as a definition of it, the faculty of teleological judgement utilises as an 
internal, material, objective purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit) with a purpose 
(Zweck). Kant marks the difference between purpose and purposiveness in the 
following manner 
",.. der Begriff von einem Objekt, sofern er zugleich den Grund der 
Wirklichkeit dieses Objekts enthält, [heißt] der Zweck, und die 
Übereinstimmung eines Dinges mit derjenigen Beschaffenheit der Dinge, die 
nur nach Zwecken möglich ist, [heißt ] die Zweckmäßigkeit-" 
"... the concept of an object, insofar as it contains at the same time the 
ground of the actuality of this object, is called a purpose, and the 
correspondence of a thing with that constitution of things that is only 
possible according to purposes, is called purposiveness. "(KU/CJ A XXVI, 
B XXVIII, t. m. )] 
A purpose is of course originally a concept of pure practical, not pure 
theoretical reason. It could not be otherwise since the ideas of 
the latter 
are themselves only invalid mutations of the pure concepts of 
the 
understanding and are by definition illegitimate in the 
formation of 
theoretical knowledge whereas a purpose is a legitimate concept of pure 
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practical reason. 
The purpose is internal, rather than external or relative which means 
that the object itself is judged to exist in conformity with the concept of 
a purpose which is internal to this object rather than external to it and 
therefore lying in another being or object for the sake of which the 
externally purposive object would exist. Simply put, the object is an end 
in itself and not just a means to an end external to it. 
Nor is the purposiveness, in accordance with which the object is thought 
to exist, merely formal and therefore only concerned with the object's 
structure. The purposiveness which is imputed to the object precisely 
concerns the manifold of intuition of this object, its matter, which is 
given and which the understanding experiences as untheorisable and 
unpredictable according to its laws and hence as utterly contingent. The 
understanding would never be at a loss to find a concept for the formal 
properties of an object for this is excactly the function of the 
understanding. But it is this fact of the understanding's inability to find 
anything lawful in the empirical, material aspects of organisms which leads 
the faculty of cognition (Erkenntnisvermögen10) to supplement this 
deficiency of the understanding with a concept derived from pure practical 
reason, a concept with which it can found an a priori principle even in the 
hazardous, apparently lawless jungle of the wholly empirical, a concept 
through which even organic matter can become subject to a priori laws. 
In the first part of the third Critique, the Critique of the Faculty of 
Aesthetic Judgement, the purposiveness which can be attributed to certain 
aesthetic forms is said to be only subjective. By this Kant means 
to say 
that the purposiveness of aesthetic objects is produced by, and ultimately 
only locatable in, the interplay of the faculties, thereby provoking 
pleasure; no actual purpose is even thought to adhere to 
the object which 
is thus judged. There Kant speaks of a purposiveness without purpose, which 
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is equivalent to a goal-oriented activity which never reaches its goal, a 
directionality without direction or simply an act of judging without the 
judgement being determined by a concept. 
But the purposiveness of organic objects is not just the effect of the 
unrestrained, pleasurable interplay of the faculties. The purposiveness of 
natural objects must be thought to be attributable to them via a concept 
(that of purpose) since it is to account for their objective (albeit 
material) existence and for the necessity which binds them to their (final) 
cause. Thus the purposiveness of organic objects hinges on the concept of 
purpose and must be applied to such natural objects as if it were an 
objectively valid concept - which it can never be since only the categories 
of the understanding attain that status. Another way of putting this is to 
say that organisms lend objective reality to the (otherwise ideal) concept 
of a purpose (KtU/CTJ A291, B295). This as if, with which the faculty of 
judgement pretends to itself to know much more than it ever could - namely 
the necessary material constitution of empirical, organic objects - Kant 
denotes by the term ' reflective' . The faculty of judgement must act as 
if 
it were in possession of such objectively valid concepts as are in fact 
only found in the understanding if it is to contain a principle for the 
investigation of nature (cf. sec. II of the first Introduction to the third 
Critique). But of course it does not possess any such determinatively 
functioning a priori (or necessary) concepts. So when it posits the concept 
of a purpose as the internal 'ground' of an organism, this concept is 
objective not in the sense of applying constitutively, but only 
reflectively, to an object, thereby expressing a necessity of the 
faculty 
of judgement for its own a priori principle. This restriction of 
the 
concept of an objective purposiveness is emphasised by the 
fact that Kant 
in this case speaks of the faculty of judgement in its reflective 
employment. An important implication of this is that the faculty of 
-150- 
judgement, although it needs to presuppose the purposiveness of natural 
forms for its own sake, never claims to know if objects are in fact 
purposive or not. Only the understanding can determine judgements 
concerning the actual, but only formal, constitution of natural objects 
since it is itself formally constitutive of them. The faculty of judgement 
can never aspire to such knowledge. 
It is of course the case that Kant, in elaborating these distinctions 
between different types of objects, does not seek to explain the 
inexplicable, namely why natural objects themselves come to be, or grow, or 
decay. No theory, whether essentially scientific or philosophical, could 
account for this. The former mode of enquiry might describe the processes 
of natural development as far as this is within its means, but it could not 
ultimately answer the question of why this occurs, nor does Kant have any 
ambition to stray into such transcendent, speculative realms. 
He is still engaged in the project of critique and this means that 'only' 
the transcendental constitution of our knowledge of natural objects is 
being investigated, not the objects of nature themselves but only our means 
of knowing them. In short, he is still only concerned with the interaction 
of the faculties which has to occur for knowledge of the natural world to 
Brise. 
One of the chief reasons why Kant elaborates these issues so meticulously 
is that the concept of the purposiveness of organisms, which is 
regulatively applied to them by the faculty of teleological judgement 
in 
its reflective employment, would appear to accomplish the impossible since 
it apparently is an eirenicon between the - hitherto irreconcilable - 
faculties of the understanding, which only effects the realm of nature, and 
that of reason, which only has effects in the realm of freedom, since 
this 
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purposiveness is a concept which is derived from reason but applied to 
nature". 
If these points seem rather complex, this is surely so because the 
position which the faculty of teleological judgement occupies vis-&-vis 
organisms is rather difficult to locate with precision in relation to the 
many formal requirements internal to the critical system. And yet it is 
only by thus locating the faculty of teleological judgement that the 
specific (and specifically temporal) differences between efficient and 
final causes, as drawn out by the Critique of the Faculty of Teleological 
Judgement, can be appreciated. 
The only conceptualisation of causality of which the understanding is 
capable involves a unilinear progression from cause to effect (nexus 
effectivus), in keeping with its unilinear conception of transcendental 
temporality. Even the category of reciprocity does not violate this one- 
directional principle since it essentially only juxtaposes or, as it were, 
doubles two instances of this type of causality and its concomitant type of 
temporality. And although the purposiveness of natural forms also involves 
this subsidiary kind of causality, namely reciprocity, insofar as all the 
parts of an organism are considered mutually cause and effect of each 
other, this can only be thought to be the case on the basis of another and 
more complex form of causality, namely that of final causes (nexus flnalis) 
because only a purpose is that concept of the whole which can be thought to 
organise and guide the mutual productions of the parts. 
In this type of causality the effect (B) of a cause (A) must at the same 
time in some sense be considered the cause (B) of the thing (A) which was 
its cause and which thing (A) is thus in turn considered an effect of 
(B). 
Thus an oak tree , for instance, can 
in one sense be thought the effect of 
an acorn (namely insofar as the acorn precedes the oak tree 
in time and the 
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latter comes to be as a result of, grows out of the former) but an oak tree 
can also be thought as that for the sake of which the acorn exists. In that 
sense the oak tree is the fruition of the acorn and must be thought to, as 
it were, lie contained in potentia in the acorn. Kant puts this very 
succinctly when he writes of the nexus finelis 
"... [ es] kann... eine Kausalverbindung... gedacht werden,... in der das 
Ding, welches einmal als Wirkung bezeichnet ist, dennoch... den Namen 
einer Ursache desjenigen Dinges verdient, wovon es die Wirkung ist. " 
"... a causal connection can be thought... in which a thing which is once 
called an effect, nevertheless deserves the name of cause of that thing, 
of which it is the effect. " (KtU/CTJ A285f, B289, t. m. , my omissions) 
It is immediately obvious what distinguishes the two kinds of causality 
most of all. Although both the concept of an efficient cause and that of a 
final cause are means by which a subjectivity seeks to explain the 
processes of nature to itself, the former concept can easily be supported 
by empirical evidence (the acorn, for instance, can be observed to develop 
into an oak tree), whereas no amount of empirical observation can 
underwrite the concept of a final cause: 
"... da wir die Zwecke in der Natur... eigentlich nicht beobachten, sondern 
nur, in der Reflexion über ihre Produkte, diesen Begriff als einen Leit- 
faden der Urteilskraft hinzu denken... " 
"... since we do not actually observe purposes in nature... but only add 
this concept in thought, in the reflection on its products, as a guiding 
thread of the faculty of judgement.. ." (Kt U/CTJ 
A332, B336, t. m. , 
my omissions) 
And since 'there can be no doubt that all our knowledge 
begins with 
experience' (KrV/CPR B1?, if the experience (from which alone a 
(theoretical) a priori concept can be deduced) does not exist, 
then that 
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knowledge cannot exist. We can think natural objects to be organised in 
accordance with final causes but we can only know them according to 
efficient causes. Again, Kant sums this up: 
"Man könnte die erstere vielleicht schicklicher die Verknüpfung der 
realen, die zweite der idealen Ursachen nennen... " 
"One could perhaps more appropriately call the former the combination of 
real causes, but the latter that of ideal causes... " tKtUfCTJ A286, B289, 
t. m. ) 
This implies that the concept of a final cause is entirely beyond the 
scope of (a critically circumscribed) nature itself and is merely an ideal 
concept with which we supplement the conceptual shortfall of the 
understanding in its encounter with organic beings. This is to say that, 
like all theoretical objects, the empirical objects of nature must first of 
all appear as (real) objects through the work of the understanding, for 
this is how they achieve their status as objects in the first place. But in 
addition, some objects demand the application (which can only happen 
retrogressively, that is to say, after their formation as objects of our 
cognition) of a further a priori concept, namely that of purpose, which is 
derived from reason and which, since reason cannot be formative of 
theoretical objects as such, must be considered an ideal cause. 
But although the concept of a final cause must properly be thought of as 
a merely ideal cause, it affords a glimpse of organisms in which they 
escape the narrow projection of temporality as necessarily only linear. 
In 
other respects, too, the Critique of the Faculty of Teleological Judgement 
yields some rather surprising insights. More particularly, there are 
three 
points to Kant' s. characterisation of the way in which organic 
beings are 
theorised where it, as it were, brushes against a much 
later conception of 
nature, namely that which can be found in the thought of 
the will to power. 
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Firstly, from a critical standpoint it is clear that we can never know 
natural purposes as such; rather, it is a 'necessary fiction' of the 
faculty of judgement to say that these objects are produced in accordance 
with a purpose, that they are the products of a technique of nature. 
Here it is not so much the content of the thought but its status that is 
significant, since Kant effectively says that the empirical objects of 
nature can only be 'known', that propositions concerning their empirical 
properties can only be integrated into larger, although still empirical, 
laws if the project of knowing them is in some respects relinquished. The 
critical version of the correspondence theory of truth still requires that 
the objects of knowledge correspond to our means of knowing them and thus 
allows them to be judged as objectively valid (true) if they harmonise with 
the interacting faculties. But this only concerns the formal properties of 
objects. But since our faculties are not productive of objects materially, 
it is implicitly the case that objects could never materially correspond to 
the formally productive capacities of the faculties. Thus, when a purpose 
is posited to underlie the material constitution of a natural object, it 
must be said that we know nothing of this object in this regard. And yet 
far from shunning the attempt to critically found the empirical study of 
nature, Kant carries on the critical project regardless but allows the 
status of knowledge to be altered radically and ultimately to be undermined 
in the process. 
Secondly, although it should not perhaps be overemphasised at 
this point, 
Kant acknowledges that what is peculiar to organic beings cannot entirely 
be comprehended by reference to linear temporality alone, as was 
briefly 
mentioned above. There is, rather, a certain circular temporality 
involved 
Which allows the transformations that typically occur in an organism 
to be 
more adequately understood'2. And although Kant reduces 
this elusive 
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temporality to the traditional Aristotelian conception of final causes (and 
is then forced to admit that this is only an ideal and not a real concept), 
he is surely only able to do so because he realises the insufficiency of 
linear temporality in accounting for complex organic development s1: 3. 
Thirdly, what distinguishes an organism from any other type of natural 
object is the fact that it is self-regulating and self-perpetuating, that 
it is not simply an aggregate of disparate parts but a system in which the 
parts interact in such a way that the system is internally self-sustaining. 
More precisely, the productions of nature can be considered as aggregates 
in some respects but as technical in others: 
"Die Natur verfährt in Ansehung ihrer Produkte als Aggregat mechanisch, 
... aber in Ansehung derselben als Systeme... technisch... " 
"Nature proceeds mechanically with regard to its products as aggregates, 
... but in respect of them as systems... technically... " (KU/CJ, 
First Introduction, section VI) 
An organism does not require a reference to a singular producer outside 
itself in order to explain how it comes to be or maintains itself. One of 
the ways in which Kant describes this unique quality is found in the 
following passage: 
"In einem.. Produkte der Natur wird ein jeder Teil, so, wie er nur durch 
alle übrige da ist, auch als um der andern und des Ganzen willen 
existierend, d. i. als Werkzeug (Organ) gedacht...; als ein die andern 
Teile (folglich jeder den andern wechselseitig) hervorbringendes Organ, 
dergleichen kein Werkzeug der Kunst, sondern nur der allen Stoll zu 
Werkzeugen (selbst denen der Kunst) liefernden Natur sein kann:.. nur dann 
und darum wird ein solches Produkt, als organisiertes und sich selbst 
organisierendes Wesen, ein Naturzweck genannt werden können. " 
"In... a product of nature every part is thought in such a way as 
it is 
due only to all the rest, existing for the sake of the others and of 
the 
whole, that is, as instrument (organ)...; as an organ which 
brings forth 
the other parts (consequently each brings forth the other reciprocally), 
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which can be no instrument of art but only of nature which provides all 
material for instruments (even those of art):.. only then and for that 
reason can such a product, as organised and self-organising being, be 
called a natural purpose. " (KtU/CTJ A288, B291f, my omissions) 
Instead of a singular, in principle identifiable producer external to the 
object itself (as is the case with clockworks and suchlike artefacts), the 
'cause' of these objects is that generalised self-producing capability we 
refer to as nature. Here the 'cause', namely an auto-productive capacity, 
is itself internal to the object. Nature is not external to the object in 
the way in which the clock-maker is external to the clock, that is to say 
temporally and logically precedent to it; in the case of nature we merely 
abstract or extrapolate such a self-causing capability in order to 
comprehend what is unique to such objects but there is no nature outside, 
over and above the products of nature in the way in which it could be said 
that the clock-maker exists apart from the clock. 
We merely think of a natural object as a purpose of nature, that is, as 
caused by a technique of nature in order to, one might almost say, 
compensate for the fact that we cannot name a cause of it other than 
'nature' and because, for the type of philosophy for which nothing is 
without ground it must be possible to name the ground or cause of each 
thing if it is to be cognisable. And the most peculiar characteristic of a 
natural object, thought of as a product or purpose of nature (in contra- 
distinction to the mechanical object as product of a purposefully acting 
producer), is that the parts do indeed cause each other to develop 
materially and reciprocally; these types of causation we refer to as 
generation and growth (KtU/CTJ A283f, B286-288). Since Aristotle the two 
types of bringing-forth have been distinguished into physic, for that mode 
of production which is self-sufficient and produces itself from out of 
itself, and techne, which relies on a producer outside itself in order 
for 
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it to come into being". 
These three peculiar issues which surround Kant's critical teleology, the 
abandonment of the project of knowledge (of organisms), the non-linear 
temporality on the basis of which organisms must be thought and their self- 
producing nature, can only be pointed out for the moment but they are 
incorporated into the discussion below. 
Until now this section has mainly confined itself to a relatively 
straightforward exegetical approach to some of the central issues 
concerning the faculty of teleological judgement. As in previous chapters, 
it now becomes necessary to examine whether critique realises its project 
of a post-metaphysical methodology or whether it is still partially 
implicated in the very dogmatic assumptions and prejudices, for the 
overcoming of which critique was developed in the first place. 
Since there are only two types of causality (as Kant tells us (KtU/CTJ 
A286, B290)) namely mechanism and teleology, and since in the previous 
chapter we saw that mechanical causality is fundamentally flawed, that is 
to say, metaphysically loaded, as a way of thinking natural objects, we now 
have to ask whether thinking nature according to teleological principles, 
as advocated by Kant, is any less compromised as a procedure. 
As is always the case with critique, it must stipulate the objects to 
which the branch of philosophy it circumscribes, should be directed. 
Thus 
the first Critique delimits the legitimate scope of a theory of nature, and 
its objects, in general. Equally, the (second part of the) third 
Critique 
should simply provide a methodology for the empirical sciences of organic 
nature, state what they could reasonably expect to cognise of 
their given 
object and what they should be able to say about it. At no point 
is it 
required that the Critique of the Faculty of Teleological 
Judgement itself 
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(which only needs to show the a priori principle of this faculty in 
reflective mode) provide empirical, teleological propositions, the so- 
called maxims of the faculty of judgement (e. g. KU/CJ A XXVIII, B XXX). And 
yet this is precisely what happens at certain points throughout the text, 
although in a very veiled and clandestine manner. The point here is that 
Kant should not import substantial teleological principles into the inquiry 
into the (conditions of) possibility of such principles. 
One such principle, and the foremost as concerns the metaphysical baggage 
it carries (cf. the extensive discussion of this in the previous chapter), 
is that which presupposes a self-preservative tendency to direct the 
processes internal to organisms (this is explicitly mentioned, although in 
no way critically illuminated, for instance at KtU/CTJ A289, B293 and 
A366, B371). By imputing such a motive to organisms, it seems that Kant 
implictly claims knowledge of something we can never know and which 
elsewhere he calls the inner ground of nature which is unknown to us' 
("der uns unbekannte innere Grund der Natur" KtU/CTJ A312, B316). A less 
prejudiced form of inquiry might ask why self-preservation should be 
considered as a more originary modus operandi of organisms than (self-) 
expenditure. Predictably, the third Critique contains no obvious answers to 
this question, but a diagnostic approach to this text unearths a persistent 
and implicit tendency which threatens to overwhelm the more radical aspects 
of the project of critique and which Nietzsche writes against when he says: 
"Die Physiologen sollten sich besinnen, den Erhaltungstrieb als 
kardinalen Trieb eines organischen Wesens anzusetzen. Vor allem will 
etwas Lebendiges seine Kraft auslassen: die 'Erhaltung' ist nur eine der 
Konsequenzen davon. - Vorsicht vor überflüssigen teleologischen 
Prinzipien! Und dahin gehört der ganze Begriff 'Erhaltungstrieb'. " 
"Physiologists ought to think again of positing the drive for 
preservation as the cardinal drive of an organic being: above all 
something living wants to expend its force: 'preservation' is only one of 
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the consequences of that. - Beware of superfluous teleological 
principles! And that is where the entire concept 'drive for preservation' 
belongs. " (KSA 12,2 C 631, WM/WP no. 650, t. in. ) 
Although Nietzsche addresses this admonition to physiologists, it surely 
applies no less to critical philosophers. The question of why the third 
Critique should wish to elevate self-preservation to an importance well 
above its station can be elaborated by reference to two quite distinct 
levels of the discourse; the first concerns one of the rare examples, given 
in the Dialectic of the text under consideration, whereas the second deals 
with a technical move which repeatedly occurs throughout the same text. 
The conspicuous dearth of examples from the realm of nature, given the 
enormous wealth of potential material for them, has the effect of throwing 
into greater relief the ones that are given. For instance, it seems to me 
that Kant's rather casual tone (implying that it is business as usual) is 
not to be believed when, in the discussion of the antinomy between the 
application of mechanical and teleological principles to the same 
organisms, he suddenly says: 
"Wenn ich z. B. von einer Made annehme, sie sei als Produkt des bloßen 
Mechanismus der Materie (der neuen Bildung, die sie für sich selbst 
bewerkstelligt, wenn ihre Elemente durch Fäulnis in Freiheit gesetzt 
werden) anzusehen: so kann ich nun nicht von eben derselben Materie, als 
einer Kausalität, nach Zwecken zu handeln, eben dasselbe Produkt 
ableiten. 11 
"If, for example, I assume of a maggot that it is to be regarded as a 
product of the mere mechanism of matter (of the new formation that it 
achieves for itself when its elements are set free by putrefaction), 
I 
cannot then derive from the selfsame matter, as a causality that acts 
according to purposes, t he self same product. " (Kt U/CTJ A353, 
B357, t. m. ) 
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And vice versa, the passage continues, once this product of nature is 
regarded as a natural purpose, it can no longer be explained by reference 
to mechanical productions - but that is not the point. Here it does not 
primarily seem to be a question of the technical points Kant makes about 
the antinomy. Much more fascinating is the sudden eruption into the text of 
a dark fear which remains well-concealed for most of the time'6, an 
eruption which has more revelatory force than any amount of careful 
exegesis. What reveals itself here in such stunning fashion is a, quite 
literally unspeakable, fear of decay and disintegration, to which 
physiological processes of putrescence organic beings are of course most 
immediately prone. Why else would this decaying matter only be glimpsed in 
one brief example, comparatively late on in the text, especially given the 
fact that Kant studiously avoids any reference to it when he mentions all 
the other developmental processes organisms undergo (KtU/CTJ A283f, B286- 
288)? And if it was not for the fact that what distinguishes organic matter 
from all other types of objects most decisively is this inherent tendency 
towards dissipation, a tendency that is bound to be utterly unsettling to 
the chief exponent of an integrated critical reason, why would Kant even 
want to erect the baroque sepulchre that is the third Critique in the first 
place? All that is finally decisively established by the third Critique is 
that transcendental idealism cannot in any way tolerate organic$ base 
matter although what it of course attempts to ' prove' Jr. precisely that the 
excessive productions of physis are, by analogy, entirely subsumable under 
the much more comprehensible, and much more safe, productions of a rational 
being according to techne. 
But whilst this extravagant example points in the direction of a profound 
fear, this fear can be probed and exposed even more successfully by 
reference to a structural feature which runs throughout the third 
Critique, 
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as for instance when Kant mentions a' raw chaotic aggregate' ("ein rohes 
chaotisches Aggregat") and, even more so, when he speaks of 'that 
disturbing boundless heterogeneity of empirical laws and heterogeneity of 
natural forms' <"jene besorgliche grenzenlose Ungleichartigkeit empirischer 
Gesetze und Het erogenei t ät der Naturformen", KU/CJ sec. IV of the first 
Introduction) - this is clearly what needs to be controlled and conquered 
by the conceptuality of the third Critique. 
We have already seen in another context (section three of chapter one, 
above) that Kant displays an irrational tendency towards unity, which he 
tends to presuppose dogmatically, rather than to strive for critically, in 
a manner not entirely dissimilar to reason's own stance towards its 
dialectical ideas, according to Kant's account of it. The most glaring 
example of this tendency occurs in section V of the second Introduction to 
the third Critique, where he compares the determinative and the reflective 
faculty of judgement under the aspect of their respective unificatory 
capacities. To begin with, harking back to the first Critique, he says of 
the determining faculty of judgement: 
"... die transzendentale [bestimmende] Urteilskraft... hat nichts weiter zu 
tun, als die Bedingung der Subsumtion unter dem vorgelegten Verstandes- 
begriff a priori anzugeben... " 
"... the transcendental [determining] faculty of judgement has nothing 
further to do than to state the condition for the subsumption under the 
given a priori concept of the understanding... " (KU/Cl A XXX, B XXXII, t. m. ) 
This is to say that when faced with the heterogeneity that is the 
manifold of intuition, namely the pre-conceptual matter of perception, the 
entire machinery of the understanding and the faculty of judgement working 
in concert can be activated to organise this heterogeneity into the 
manageble units Kant refers to as determining judgements. As 
far as unity 
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ie concerned, it is of course the transcendental unity of apperception 
which guarantees the unity of the object in general and hence that of 
experience in general, thus keeping at bay the excessive, heterogeneous 
materiality of the pre-conceptual manifold. 
A comparable problem arises as concerns the empirical diversity, in the 
individual products as well as in the empirical laws, of natural 
productions. This is how Kant states the problem and proposes to overcome 
it: 
"... [wir] müssen in der Natur, in Ansehung ihrer bloß empirischen 
Gesetze, eine Möglichkeit unendlich mannigfaltiger empirischer Gesetze 
denken, die für unsere Einsicht dennoch zufällig sind (a priori nicht 
erkannt werden können); und in deren Ansehung beurteilen wir die 
Natureinheit nach empirischen Gesetzen, und die Möglichkeit der Einheit 
der Erfahrung (als Systems nach empirischen Gestzen), als zufällig. Weil 
aber doch eine solche Einheit notwendig vorausgesetzt und angenommen 
werden muß, da sonst kein durchgängiger Zusammenhang empirischer 
Erkenntnisse zu einem Ganzen der Erfahrung Statt finden würde...: so muß 
die [reflektierende] Urteilskraft für ihren eigenen Gebrauch es als 
Prinzip a priori annehmen, daß das für die menschliche Einsicht Zufällige 
In den besonderen (empirischen) Naturgesetzen dennoch eine, für uns zwar 
nicht zu ergründende, aber doch denkbare, gesetzliche Einheit, in der 
Verbindung ihres Mannigfaltigen zu einer an sich möglichen Erfahrung, 
enthalte. " 
"... we must think in nature, as regards its merely empirical laws, the 
possibility of infinitely manifold empirical laws which are nonetheless 
contingent for our insight (cannot be cognised a priori); and in this 
regard we judge the unity of nature according to empirical laws, and the 
possibility of the unity of experience (as a system of empirical laws) as 
contingent. But since such a unity necessarily has to be pressupposed and 
assumed, since otherwise no thoroughgoing connection of empirical 
cognition into the whole of experience could take place...: the 
[reflective] faculty of judgement has to assume for its own use the a 
priori principle that what is contingent for human insight in the 
particular (empirical) laws of nature nevertheless contains a, although 
unfathomable for us, yet thinkable, lawful unity in the combination of 
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its manifold into an intrinsically possible experience. " (KUICJ A XXXI, 
B XXXIII, t. m. , my omissions) 
Thus on the level of the 'infinitely manifold' empirical laws of nature 
the problem of the manifold of intuition repeats itself and in both cases 
it sparks the search for an underlying a priori unity which this 
heterogeneity can be referred or, more simply, reduced to. Where the first 
Critique posited the unity of apperception as that which guarantees the 
unity of experience in its a priori principles, so in the third Critique 
the reflective faculty of judgement heautonomously posits, which is to say, 
gives to itself (cf. KU/CJ, the penultimate paragraph of sec. VIII of the 
First Introduction), the lawful unity that is assumed in the concept of a 
purposiveness of nature in order to be able to find unity of experience on 
the level of the empirical principles of nature, too. But whilst in the 
case of the former, the whole project of a critique of our cognitive 
faculties stands and falls with the possibility of a unified experience, 
there seem to be no ultimate grounds for assuming a unity of the empirical 
constitution of nature. Kant gives vent to the prejudicial nature of this 
thinking very clearly when he writes: 
"... die entdeckte Vereinbarkeit ... mehrerer empirischen heterogenen 
Naturgesetze unter einem sie... befassenden Prinzip [ist) der Grund einer 
sehr merklichen Lust, oft sogar einer Bewunderung... Dagegen würde uns 
eine Vorstellung der Natur durchaus mißfallen, durch welche man uns 
voraus sagte, daß, bei der mindesten Nachforschung... wir auf eine 
Heterogeneität ihrer Gesetze stoßen würden, welche die Vereinigung ihrer 
besonderen Gesetze unter allgemeinen empirischen für unseren Verstand 
unmöglich machte. " 
"... to discover that... several heterogeneous empirical laws of nature can 
be unified under a principle that comprises... them [is] the ground of a 
very considerable pleasure, often even of admiration... By contrast, we 
would thoroughly dislike a representation of nature by which one told us 
in advance that, in the slightest investigation. .. we would meet a 
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heterogeneity of its laws which would, for our understanding, render 
impossible the unification of its particular laws under universal 
empirical ones. " (KU/CJ A XXXVIIIf, B XLf, t. m. , my omissions) 
Put like this it would seem that the preference for a particular 
constitution of nature as expressed here by Kant could easily be supplanted 
by another, although perhaps equally prejudicial, view. What is important 
here is that Kant openly admits that, given the historical, and perhaps 
even to some extent personal, circumstances that surround this text, one 
view of nature is preferable to another - not more veracious or accurate 
but simply more desirable, more convenient. After this it hardly seems to 
matter which particular prejudice is indulged; the effect is to render 
nature, the empirical, heterogeneous, manifold materiality of production, 
as cast off from the hitherto safe anchor of transcendental philosophy. 
Nietzsche remarks on this development: 
",.. wie tief das Wertschätzen in die Dinge geht, ist bisher übersehen: 
wie wir in einer selbstgeschaffenen Welt stecken - Beschränktheit des 
Gesichtskreises des Kantischen Idealismus C... was geht uns die Wahrheit 
an, wenn es sich um unsere höchsten Wertschätzungen handelt - 'man muß 
dann dies und jenes glauben' meinte Kant). " 
"... how deeply all evaluating enters into things has up to now been 
overlooked: how we are stuck in a self-created world - limitedness of 
the field of vision of Kantian idealism (... what does truth concern us 
when it is a matter of our highest evaluations -' then one has to believe 
this and that' Kant thought ). " (KSA 11,26 1751 , M. t. ) 
Kant expresses this need to construct a nature convenient for the human 
animal on a more localised level and in seemingly more technical terms when 
he says that 'a teleological judgement compares the concept of a natural 
product with what it should be', namely according to a rational concept 
"ein teleologisches Urteil vergleicht den Begriff eines Naturprodukts nach 
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dem, was es ist, mit dem was es sein soll" KU/CJ First Introduction, 
sec. X). Similarly, although Kant admits that from a theoretical point of 
view this cannot in fact be the case, he says (KU/CJ A XIX, B XI)C) that the 
supersensible realm of freedom should have influence over the sensible 
realm of nature which is to say that the ' immense gulf' (ibid) which 
separates the two realms cannot be bridged from the side of nature (it 
cannot forge a transition to the supersensible realm) but the reverse is 
possible and must in fact be possible, the supersensible must be able to 
build a bridge to the sensible realm. Nature's laws cannot be extended to 
the laws of freedom but it must be possible to extend the demands of 
practical reason to the realm of nature. 
To impose this 'ought' on nature indicates very clearly that for Kant, 
nature cannot be left as it is because it is imperfect (too heterogeneous) 
and hence morally deficient. This impulse to 'improve' nature is commented 
on by Nietzsche in the following passage: 
"Feststellen, was ist, wie es ist, scheint etwas unsäglich Höheres, 
Ernsteres als jedes 'So sollte es sein', weil letzteres, als menschliche 
Kritik und Anmaßung, von vornherein zur Lächerlichkeit verurteilt 
erscheint. Es drückt sich darin ein Bedürfnis aus, welches verlangt, daß 
unserm menschlichen Wohlbefinden die Einrichtung der Welt entspricht; " 
"To ascertain what is, how it is, seems something unspeakably higher, 
more serious than every 'thus it ought to be' because the latter, as 
human critique and presumption, seems to be doomed to ridiculousness from 
the start. A need expresses itself therein which demands that to our 
human well-being the arrangement of the world should correspond; " 
(KSA 12,7 1 15 ], WM/ WP no. 333, t. m. ) 
The profound irony of this is that the very strategies with which it was 
attempted to extend and strengthen the hold of transcendental idealism, and 
to keep (organic) nature's dissipatory tendencies at bay, contain the germ 
for the eventual overcoming of this project. 
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But before this radicalised critique can be realised more fully, several 
further strands which the third Critique displays in this regard, need to 
be exposed. The first of these touches directly on the unsustainable dream 
of a common ground which unites the faculties of cognition in their 
transcendental constitution on the one side with empirical nature on the 
other side. And although the following quotes from the third Critique must 
obviously be read as properly critical remarks, in the sense that they 
concern the necessary characteristics of (one of) the faculties and not any 
claims concerning actual nature or nature in itself, they nevertheless 
express an obviously deeply felt need to anthropomorphise nature, to prune 
it down to a human size the more it threatens to utterly exceed it"-, about 
which impulse Nietzsche had the following remarks to make: 
"Abseits von einer religiösen Sanktion und Verbürgung unsrer Sinne und 
Vernünftigkeit - woher sollten wir ein Recht auf Vertrauen gegen das 
Dasein haben! Daß das Denken gar ein Maß des Wirklichen sei, - daß was 
nicht gedacht werden kann, nicht Ist, - ist ein plumpes non plus ultra 
einer moralistischen Vertrauens-seligkeit (auf ein essentielles 
Wahrheits-Prinzip im Grund der Dinge), an sich eine tolle Behauptung, der 
unsre Erfahrung in jedem Augenblicke widerspricht. Wir können gerade gar 
nichts denken, in wiefern es ist... " 
"Apart from the religious sanction and guarantee of our senses and 
rationality - whence should we derive the right to trust in existence! 
That thinking be a measure of the real, - that what cannot be thought is 
not, - is a crude non plus ultra of a moralistic trustfulness (in an 
essential principle of truth in the ground of things), in itself a mad 
assumption which experience contradicts at every moment. We can precisely 
not think anything as it Is. " (KSA 12,2 [ 931, WM/WP no. 436, t. m. ) 
The register of terms around which Kant builds this phantasm is that of 
'measure' (Maß) and related words. The term Zweckmäßigkeit is of course the 
first instance of this since it already contains the notion of, in this 
case, the products of nature agreeing with, or being adequate to an a 
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priori concept of the faculty of judgement. But Kant expands this register 
well beyond this immediate, central term of the third Critique, as for 
instance when he defines purposiveness": 
",., die Zweckmäßigkeit oder Angemessenheit der Nature... zu unserem 
Vermögen der Urteilskraft. " 
" .. purposiveness or the adequacy of nature... to our faculty of 
judgement. " (KU/CJ sec. II, first Introduction). 
This is of course entirely commensurate with one of the earliest 
definitions of the Copernican turn, namely that the objects of our 
cognition should correspond to our means of knowing them and not vice versa 
(KrV/CPR B XVI). But even to say that we must assume this to be the case, 
rather than actually attributing this quality to nature, again merely 
expresses a certain wishful thinking and exposes the boundless ambition of 
transcendental idealism to colonise all of existence with its conceptuality 
- nothing must escape reason. This ' imperialism' of reason vis-ä-vis the 
empirical is brought out quite clearly in the following passage: 
"... es ist ein Geheiß unserer Urteilskraft, nach dem Prinzip der 
Angemessenheit der Natur zu unserem Erkenntnisvermögen zu verfahren, 
... ohne ... auszumachen, ob es irgendwo seine 
Grenze habe, weil wir zwar 
in Ansehung des rationalen Gebrauchs unserer Erkenntnisvermögen Grenzen 
bestimmen können, im empirischen Felde aber keine Grenzbestimmung möglich 
ist. " 
"... it is a behest of our faculty of judgement to proceed according to 
the principle of nature's adequacy to our faculty of cognition, ... without 
... deciding whether it has its limits anywhere, since although we can 
determine limits as regards the rational employment of our faculties of 
cognition, no delimitation is possible in the field of the empirical. 
" 
(KU/CJ A XXXIXf, B XLIf, t. m. , my omissions) 
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Further instances of this desire to find a measure binding the human 
faculties and nature together occur in sec. V of the first Introduction, 
where Kant speaks of 'a certain parsimony of nature, adequate to our 
faculty of judgement' C"eine gewisse unserer Urteilskraft angemessene 
Sparsamkeit") and in the second Introduction, where Kant explains this 
concept of nature's adequacy further: 
"Wenn man also sagt: die Natur spezifiziert ihre allgemeinen Gesetze nach 
dem Prinzip der Zweckmäßigkeit für unser Erkenntnisvermögen, d. i. zur 
Angemessenheit mit dem menschlichen Verstande... so schreibt man dadurch 
weder der Natur ein Gesetz vor, noch lernt man eines von ihr durch 
Beobachtung. . man will nur, daß man.., durchaus nach jenem Prinzip und 
den sich darauf gründenden Maximen ihren empirischen Gesetzen nachspüren 
müsse, weil wir, nur so weit als jenes Statt findet, mit dem Gebrauch 
unseres Verstandes in der Erfahrung fortkommen und Erkenntnis erwerben 
können. " 
"When we say that nature specifies its universal laws according to the 
principle of purposiveness for our faculty of cognition, that is, for the 
adequacy with the human understanding... one does not thereby prescribe a 
law to nature, nor does one learn one from it by observation. .. one only 
wants that we have to track down its empirical laws according to that 
principle and the maxims based on it because only as far as this takes 
place do we progress with the use of our understanding in experience and 
can we aquire knowledge. " (KU/C3 A XXXVf, B XXXVII, t. m. , my omissions) l 
Whilst this projection of nature is largely in keeping with the overall 
critical project, as cannot be emphasised too strongly, at the same time it 
needs to be realised that this view of a (critically reinscribed) nature 
utterly precludes any encounter with nature qua material production which 
has not already implictly conquered that materiality. Especially as 
concerns this register of a measure mediating between rational (human) 
production and natural production, the third Critique comes to resemble a 
critical reworking of the Leibnizian 'pre-stabilised harmony`, and as 
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surely as that earlier version it requires, or in fact implies, the idea of 
a divine mediator to sustain this precarious balance. It will therefore not 
come as a great surprise to find that Kantian teleology, too, prepares the 
ground for, and inexorably moves into theology. To see this happening will 
constitute the next stage of our examination of the third Critique. 
Although Kant is extremely anxious to avoid the importation into the 
natural sciences of the claim that 'god' is the cause of (the products of) 
nature or that the whole of nature can finally be explained as a purpose of 
'god', and instead emphasises that in the natural sciences one must speak 
of a purpose of nature only, this is merely to ensure that the business of 
the natural sciences does not get swamped with illicit concepts which can 
have no counterpart in objective reality (cf. KtU/CTJ A301f, B305f). But 
although natural science itself must not speculate about the ultimate cause 
of nature as a whole and must not seek to apply teleological principles to 
it, critique encompasses a consideration of teleology which places it in 
the context of the other sciences (cf. KtU/CTJ A361, B366). The question is, 
where does teleology belong, to the theoretical or to the practical part of 
the (philosophical) sciences, and if, as is the case, it belongs to the 
former, does it have greater affinity to natural science (which examines 
what can be an object of experience) or to theology ('which deals with 
the 
original ground of the world as the epitome of all objects of experience', 
cf. KtU/CTJ A359f, B365, t. m. ). Kant initially remarks that ' teleology 
does 
not constitute a distinct part of theoretical natural science 
but is 
attached to theology as propaedeut ic or transition' (KtU/CTJ 
A305,8309) but 
does not substantiate this observation for another seven paragraphs. 
Only 
then (975) does he begin to shed light on the (according 
to Kant! ) 
unavoidable tendency of the human mind to enquire into 
the cause of nature 
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as a whole (first mentioned in 968, KtU/CTJ A302, B306). 
Here Kant first of all reminds us that to conceive an object as a purpose 
of nature implies that the same object is contingent as concerns the a 
priori laws of nature, as found in the understanding. Taken together, these 
objects of nature constitute the 'foremost proof for the contingency of the 
cosmos' ("den vornehmsten Beweis für die Zufälligkeit des Weltganzen", 
KtU/CTJ A331, B335, t. m, ). 
But such a completely contingent empirical cosmos obviously militates 
against the principle of sufficient reason and (as far as Kant is 
concerned) simply cannot be left to stand in its seeming arbitrariness. In 
order to remedy this abyssal state of affairs, Kant proposes that human 
reason must assume that as contingent the cosmos is dependent upon a 
supreme being which exists apart from it (loc. cit. ). 
Such a being's relationship with its product (the cosmos) must, secondly, 
be thought by analogy with a rational (human) producer who produces objects 
according to intentions (rational causes). In fact, this analogy with a 
rational human producer must be assumed on three hierarchically ordered 
levels which are progressively integrated throughout the third Critique: 
firstly, the individual object of nature must be viewed as if it were the 
product of a rational causality; secondly, nature, as productivity, is 
thought to operate like such a rational cause, this is called the technique 
of nature; thirdly, the world as a whole, the cosmos, must be thought of as 
If it were the product of such a rational being. This necessity - which 
is 
of course only a necessity of the human faculty of cognition and not 
objectively attributable to the cosmos - leads Kant to finally state 
that 
'teleology finds no completion of the solution to its investigations other 
than in a theology' ("die Teleologie [findet) keine Vollendung des 
Aufschlusses für ihre Nachforschungen, als in einer Theologie", KtU/CTS 
A331, B335, t. M. ). 
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Needless to say, Kant is at pains (especially throughout 575, where he 
introduces this thought) to identify this 4 completion' of teleology as a 
mere exigency of the human faculties, and not as a dogmatic claim 
concerning objective reality. This is how he formulates this important 
distinction: 
"Es bleibt also schlechterdings ein nur auf subjektiven Bedingungen, 
nämlich der unseren Erkenntnisvermögen angemessenen reflektierenden 
Urteilskraft, beruhender Satz, der, wenn man ihn als objektiv-dogmatisch 
geltend ausdrückte, heißen würde: Es ist ein Gott; nun aber, für uns 
Menschen, nur die eingeschränkte Formel erlaubt: Wir können uns die 
Zweckmäßigkeit, die selbst unserer Erkenntnis der inneren Möglichkeit 
vieler Naturdinge zum Grunde gelegt werden muß, gar nicht anders denken 
und begreiflich machen, als indem wir sie und überhaupt die Welt uns als 
ein Produkt einer verständigen Ursache (eines Gottes) vorstellen. " 
"Hence it remains a proposition which rests entirely on subjective 
conditions, namely those of the reflective faculty of judgement adequate 
to our faculties of cognition, which proposition, if it was expressed as 
objectively-dogmatically valid, would be: There is a god; but now, for us 
human beings, only permits the limited formulation: We cannot think or 
comprehend purposiveness, which has to be presupposed in the cognition of 
the inner possibility of many natural things, in any other way other than 
by representing it and the world in general as the product of an 
intelligent cause (of a god)" (KtU/CTJ A333, B336f, t. M. ) 
Here it would seem that the true meaning of teleology, insofar as it must 
culminate in a theology, reveals itself. Whilst this obviously constitutes 
a hugely important qualification of a typically dogmatic stance vis-ä-vis 
the relationship between natural science and theology (so much so that 
this 
'qualification' can in some sense be identified with the entire project of 
critique), it must finally be asked whether the critical reformulation of 
the thought of 'the world's dependency upon, and origin in, an 
intelligent 
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being which exists apart from it, (KtU/CTJ A331, B335) is ultimately any 
less nihilistic than its dogmatic Christian predecessors'e 
That this projection of the world as dependent upon, and originating in, 
an extramundane supreme being is utterly nihilistic, Nietzsche never fails 
to remind us, because what is implicit in it is that this world is not only 
not self-sufficient or self-sustaining, but that it is so fundamentally 
deficient that it needs an (in this case rational) ground outside itself to 
sustain it (if only as rational conception). When critique - in this case 
the Critique of the Faculty of Teleological Judgement - underwrites a 
conception of nature whereby this nature can only become comprehensible if 
thought to exist due to an act of, and that means, as an intentional 
purpose of 'god', it denigrates nature and consequently only expresses the 
dark terror which the uncontrollable transmutations of matter provoke in 
it. Nietzsche points out the chief implication of this domination of what 
should be over what is, the domination of the ideal (which he renames 
'desirability' (Wünschbarkeit)) over the real: 
"Die Wenigsten machen sich klar, was der Standpunkt der Wünschbarkeit, 
jedes 'so sollte es sein, aber es ist nicht'... in sich schließt: eine 
Verurteilung des gesamten Gangs der Dinge. " 
"Very few clarify to themselves what the standpoint of desirability, 
every 'thus it ought to be but is not'... comprises: a condemnation of 
the entire course of things. " (KSA 12,7 [621, WM/WP no. 331, t. m. , my 
omissions) 
And the notion of science (as the domination and suppression of nature's 
excessiveness) which issues from this is certainly deeply nihilistic and 
only concerned with containment and preservation rather than with 
enhancement and expenditure. Nietzsche defines such a reactive science as. 
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"Wiegenschaft - Umwandlung der Natur in Begriffe zum Zweck der 
Beherrschung der Natur... " 
"Science - transformation of nature into concepts for the purpose of the 
domination of nature... " (KSA 11,26 11703, WM/WP no. 610) I9. 
That the critique of reason results in such nihilistic ideas was already 
apparent in the earlier reading of the first Critique. At the very end of 
the Dialectic of the first Critique, in its Appendix, Kant feels compelled 
to show that the ideas, like the categories earlier, can be the objects of 
a deduction-(. In this deduction of the ideas of pure reason Kant seeks to 
show that the ideas have objective validity, although they can only be 
employed regulatively upon the material given them, not directly through 
intuition, but by (constitutive judgements of) the understanding. So they 
can never be applied to objects (as formed by the understanding) but can 
only serve to integrate propositions concerning objects (of the 
understanding) into greater systematic unity. Of the three ideas of reason, 
the psychological, the cosmological and the theological (discussed in the 
Paralogisms, the Antinomies and the Ideal, respectively), it is undoubtedly 
the last which has the greatest integrative capacity; Kant says of it that 
it induces us to view all possible experience in the following manner: 
"... als ob der Inbegriff aller Erscheinungen (die Sinnenwelt selbst) 
einen einzigen obersten und allgenugsamen Grund außer ihrem Umfange habe, 
nämlich eine gleichsam selbständige, ursprüngliche und schöpferische 
Vernunft, in Beziehung auf welche wir allen empirischen Gebrauch unserer 
Vernunft in seiner größten Erweiterung so richten, als ob die Gegenstände 
selbst aus jenem Urbilde aller Vernunft entsprungen wären... " 
as if the epitome of all appearances (the sensible world itself) 
had 
s single supreme and all-sufficient ground outside of its circumference, 
namely an, as it were, independent, original, creative reason, 
in 
relation to which we direct all empirical use of our reason 
in its 
greatest extension as if the objects themselves had sprung 
from that 
archetype of all reason... "(KrV/CPR A672, B700, t. m. ) 
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In this regard the transcendental principle of the faculty of judgement 
(as it is presented in the third Critique), according to which a 
purposiveness of nature is assumed, and the third of the ideas of reason 
(as discussed in the first Critique) have much in common. Both can only be 
employed regulatively upon material furnished by the understanding; both 
have the function of providing philosophical or scientific investigations 
with a supersensible substrate which guarantees the systematic unity of the 
empirical manifold; lastly, and most importantly, both demonstrate clearly 
that the Platonic schema of this world as fallen, deficient, dependent, 
secondary etc. remains firmly in place, albeit under the provision of the 
as if, when it is attempted to systematise any knowledge of it. 
It is obvious that any attempt to de-humanise and to de-moralise nature, 
any attempt to extricate this critical god, this pale ideal of reason from 
nature must obliterate such a system of nature. Nature cannot come into its 
own until it is free of this marasmic ideal which forces its productions 
into the straitjacket of a unified system. 
A glimpse of an alternative perspective is afforded in the following 
passage: 
"Tiefe Abneigung, in irgend einer Gesamtbetrachtung der Welt ein für 
alle mal auszuruhn; Zauber der entgegengesetzten Denkweise; sich den 
Anreiz des änigmatischen Charakters nicht nehmen lassen. " 
"Profound aversion to reposing once and for all in any one overall view 
of the world; enchantment of the opposing way of thinking; not to be 
deprived of the attraction of the enigmatic character. " (KSA 12,2 
(1551, 
W1'ß/WP no. 470, t. m. ) 
It is in the Nietzschean thought of the will to power that we will 
have to 
look for a way of thinking nature as utterly heterogeneous, as entirely 




In the previous chapter we asked whether the notion of mechanical 
causality, in its Kantian formulation, could provide the model for a truly 
post-metaphysical thinking of nature. And there, as concerns the a priori 
constitution of nature, it became apparent that, as much as Kant seeks to 
overcome the dogmatic, which is to say ultimately Christian, conception of 
nature and its science, causality, whether as pure concept of the 
understanding, as its principle or as idea of reason, is implicated in 
reactive ideals of preservation and thus merely perpetuates a prejudicial 
and not yet fully critical thinking of nature. 
Similarly, in the third part of the present chapter it became necessary 
to enquire whether the empirical constitution of nature (qua organic 
matter) and the conceptuality Kant develops to deal with it under the name 
of teleology, could provide a richer, more productive, or a less emaciated 
means for thinking nature. But, as I hope has become clear, since Kant 
thinks of naturally productive processes by analogy with rational 
productions, organisms are still assimilated under an idealist structure. 
And precisely what is most characteristic of their organic nature, namely 
their intrinsic tendency towards more or less rapid dissipation, their 
capacity for putrefaction, their material excessiveness and 
unassimilability (resistance to being made equal or homogeneous), is still 
repressed and cannot be represented by the idealist conceptuality at 
Kant 's 
disposal. 
Since both the first and the third Critique failed to provide any 
satisfactory solutions to the quest for a thought of nature which 
is not 
deeply imbued with anti-materialist tendencies, it now becomes necessary 
to 
ask whether Nietzsche rehearses a thinking which, whilst still 
in an 
important and difficult sense critical, approximates to 
the characteristics 
of matter on its own terms, as mentioned above; whether 
his thinking 
-176- 
reproduces these organic processes any more successfully than does Kant' s; 
whether, in short, Nietzsche's is a truly physiological thinking - not the 
imposition of logos (qua rationality) on physis, as is the case with Kant, 
but the re-enactment of physis in logos, in a thought which celebrates that 
it must 'self' -destruct. 
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THE TIME OF PHYSIOLOGY 
"Die 'wahre Welt', wie immer auch man sie bisher konzipiert hat, - 
sie war immer die scheinbare Welt noch einmal. " 
"The 'real world', however one has hitherto conceived it, - 
it has always been the apparent world once more. " (KSA 13,11 1501, 
WM/WP no. 566, t. in. ) 
I. The Repetition of Critique 
So far this text has implicitly raised a number of questions and posed a 
number of problems and although it is not the task of philosophy to answer 
questions, it should be very explicit about the problems it raises. Hence 
this final chapter will not attempt to answer any questions but will 
attempt to intensify them, to take them to the edge of thinkability - and 
hopefully beyond. 
In the previous three chapters the relation between Kant and Nietzsche 
was examined by focusing on the relevant sections from Kant's critical 
texts, albeit from a strongly Nietzschean perspective (of which there are 
obviously more than one). In contrast to that procedure, the current 
chapter will concentrate on Nietzsche's writings, albeit against the 
background of (our earlier readings of) Kant's critical philosophy. More 
specifically, it needs to be shown in what sense Nietzsche's philosophical 
physiology constitutes the moment at which Kantian critique is completed 
and its reactive moments overcome. The intensification, completion and 
overcoming of Kantian critique will therefore be seen to be central to 
Nietzschean physiology. 
Kant's significance as a philosopher undoubtedly rests on the 'invention' 
of immanent critique, that is to say on the critique of reason by reason in 
order to establish the legitimate domain of reason. But the self- 
examination which reason undergoes is still predicated on a number of 
assumptions which remain unquestioned. Another way of putting 
this would be 
to say that although Kant seeks to examine the conditions of possibility of 
Judgements of reason, the conditions of possibility of this examination 
itself, namely the values which structure it (cf. ch. 2, II, above), remain 
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outside the scope of Kantian critique. The method which Nietzsche develops 
in order to demonstrate such inevitable, intrinsic limitations is 
genealogy. But more specifically, and more pertinent for the present 
project, Nietzsche intensifies the movement of critique to encompass reason 
itself and he does so, crucially, on the basis of a physiological thinking. 
Although there are a great many facets to Nietzsche's physiological 
thinking as the radicalisation of critique, three central moments can be 
isolated which demonstrate that Nietzsche utilises the movement of critique 
while yet forcing it to mutate in some important respects. The three 
central aspects of Nietzsche's critique of Kantian critique are, firstly, 
the saturation of the latter by a will to truth; secondly, the 
anthropocentric fabrications of reason and, thirdly, reason's investment in 
the primacy of being, all of which bind Kantian critique to Platonism. In 
the following each of these constraints of Kantian critique will be 
discussed in turn and their common ground explored. 
As concerns the first point, the will to truth inherent in Kant' s 
critique of reason, the Kantian method of critique can be described in the 
following terms. It questions the legitimacy of claims (to knowledge, in 
the case of the first Critique) based on dogmatic assumptions. In the 
Dialectic of the first Critique these assumptions are named as those of 
rational psychology, cosmology and theology, each of which believes itself 
in possession of substantive knowledge even though it is without a doctrine 
of the faculties which prepares the ground for an understanding of how 
knowledge is in principle possible. According to Kant, the claims 
to 
knowledge of these three dogmatic disciplines exhaust the field of pure 
pre-critical philosophy. The philosophical method of critique establishes 
itself by first of all demonstrating that the claims of its predecessors 
in 
the field are unfounded and beyond their legitimate scope, 
that they are, 
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in short, transcendent. As such, critique is the most effective de- 
stabilising force as regards Platonic-Christian metaphysics. It de-grades 
an assumed transcendent 'I', as much as such a world or such a 'god'. The 
claims of Christian, dogmatic metaphysics are shown to be unfounded and 
with it the belief in 'god' as guarantor of knowledge is dispelled 
(although not of course faith in other aspects of divine providence). In 
this respect, critique marks the moment at which philosophy overcomes its 
deference to theology. With critique, philosophy abandons god - or so it 
seems. 
Kant had discovered the movement of thought with which it is possible to 
question assumptions and the claims to legitimacy which they cloak. But his 
critique of reason itself is not without equally dogmatic, that is to say 
pre-critical assumptions. First and foremost of these is the fact that the 
value of truth remains unquestioned in his critical system. In the whole 
magnificent edifice which is the first Critique, the ground on which it 
stands is never subjected to a critique (contrary to what Kant claims, e. g. 
KrV/CPR AXXI'). Kant demonstrates that the objects of knowledge, as 
appearances, are in each case produced as such. This distinguishes his from 
earlier philosophies which took their object simply as given. But whilst 
the entire first critique is an investigation into the conditions of 
possibility of judgements of knowledge, and that ultimately means into the 
modes of production of such judgements, the production of the production 
itself remains outside the scope of this investigation. And yet the entire 
force of the arguments of the first Critique rests on the fact that 
whatever remains outside the scope of critique must be assumed to 
be a 
remnant of the old dogmatism. 
Kant forces the god of Christian dogmatism to abdicate, to relinquish 
its 
claims to found any system of knowledge. But the commanding position of 
authority itself, from which the entire field of knowledge 
is organised, 
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does not in fact fall vacant, nor is it finally abolished in the sweep of 
critique. For as long as the adherence to the absolute, unquestioned value 
of truth is maintained, the old god lives on, albeit in a less conspicuous 
guise. For from within the movement of critique itself it must be asked 
what is the meaning of 'god' in the realm of knowledge. Its function in any 
dogmatic doctrine is to suppress the realisation of the producedness of 
(the objects of) knowledge. But an exactly analogous role is played by the 
unannounced assumption of the value of truth within Kant's critical 
philosophy itself. Again, a realisation of the producedness, in this case 
of the production (of the objects) of knowledge is suppressed because as 
long as a will to truth centrally organises this production, it fulfils the 
role of a given, it resists the de-stabilising force of critique2. 
Nietzsche, on the other hand, continues critical philosophy but widens its 
scope to include this implicit will to truth which is one of the central 
dogmatisms within critique itself as, for instance when he writes: 
"Es ist immer noch ein metaphysischer Glaube, auf dem unser Glaube an die 
Wissenschaft ruht, - auch wir Erkennenden von Heute, wir Gottlosen und 
Antimetaphysiker, auch wir nehmen unser Feuer noch von jenem Brande, den 
ein Jahrtausende alter Glaube entzündet hat, jener Christen-Glaube, der 
auch der Glaube Platos war, daß Gott die Wahrheit ist, daß die Wahrheit 
göttlich ist... " 
"It is still a metaphysical belief, on which rests our belief in science, 
- we knowers of today, too, we godless ones and ant i met aphysi ci ans, we 
too take our fire from that blaze which was started by a thousand year 
old belief, that belief of Christians, which was also the belief of 
Plato, that god is the truth, that the truth is divine... " (KSA 3, FW/GS 
V. 344, also KSA 5, GdM/GoM III, 24, t. m. ) 
But the perspective from which it becomes possible for Nietzsche to 
question the dogmatic implications within Kantian critique is that which is 
opened up by the thought of the will to power. It is only by understanding 
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the will to truth as a type of will to power that the absolute nature of 
truth is finally undermined and, obversely, that the primacy of production 
is affirmed. Because if truth (the old idol) is transvalued as the will to 
truth and the will to truth as an instance of the will to power, truth is 
seen as produced and thus the former stasis of truth, its divine, ideal, 
unproduced status, is utterly dissolved. But it must be asked why the 
primary production that is the will to power would be channelled into a 
will to truth if the truth that is its product suppresses the very primacy 
of the production which produces this truth in the first place. Nietzsche 
offers the following interpretation of this problem of a truth opposed to 
life, of a life that turns against itself in this notion of truth: 
"... des asketische Ideal entspringt dem Schutz- und Heilinstinkte eines 
degenerierenden Lebens, es deutet auf eine partielle physiologische 
Hemmung und Ermüdung hin, gegen welche die tiefsten, intakt gebliebenen 
Instinkte des Lebens unausgesetzt mit neuen Mitteln... ankämpfen. Das 
asketische Ideal ist ein solches Mittel... " 
" .. the ascetic ideal springs from the instinct of protection and 
healing 
. 
of a degenerating life, it points to a partial physiological inhibition 
and fatigue against which the deepest instincts of life which have 
remained intact incessantly fight with new means... The ascetic ideal is 
such a means... 11 (KSA 5, GdM/GoM III, 13, t. m. ) 
This is to say that the ascetic ideal, here in the form of a truth that 
is posited as absolute, is a symptom of life in conflict with itself. The 
starting point in this excerpt is a degenerating life. But it must be 
remembered that weakening, or degeneration, is already present if the will 
to more, the will to growth is somehow impeded. For the will to power 
is 
first and foremost a will to grow and to expand: 'will to power 
in the 
organic process: the imperative growing' ( "Wille zur Macht im organischen 
Prozess...., der Imperativ wachsend' KSA 12,7 191, WM/WP no. 
644) . At other 
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times the will to power is simply called 'a something that wills to grow' 
("ein wachsen-wollendes Etwas" KSA 12,2 11481, WM/WP no. 643). 
The completely circular logic which Nietzsche unfolds here means that 
even as the will to power weakens in a life form, it still protects this 
particular organism against its imminent dissolution by erecting another 
barrier against expenditure without reserve (that is to say, against 
death). It assures its own continued existence, it preserves itself, by 
inventing and establishing another source of power apart from that which is 
already intrinsic to it. It compensates for the loss of its 'own' force by 
projecting the will to power it is in another realm. But these are not 
voluntary actions or acts of consciousness. It is solely the will to power 
which doubles into the will to truth. When the will to power has weakened 
to a certain extent, it has to duplicate itself, has to reproduce itself 
extrinsically in order to sustain the particular life form in which this 
weakness occurs. According to Nietzsche, this phenomenon can be observed on 
all levels of organic life, for instance 'the division of a protoplasm into 
two takes place when the power to master the possessions which have been 
appropriated is no longer sufficient' ("Die Teilung eines Protoplasmas in 
zwei tritt ein, wenn die Macht nicht mehr ausreicht, den angeeigneten 
Besitz zu bewdltigen" KSA 11,36 1211, WM/WP no. 655). One such reproduction 
of the will to power is the will to truth and a life form whose demise is 
thus temporarily halted is a humanity in the throes of Platonism. 
Critique furnishes the method by means of which the modes of production 
of phenomena can be drawn out. But Kant's critique stops short of a full 
critique because it does not understand itself as produced, and in 
particular as produced by a will to truth. That is to say it does not 
realise that the will to truth is the type of ideal which is imposed as a 
point of stability in what would otherwise be a continuous stream of 
productive transformations. In this sense, the Nietzschean diagnosis of an 
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ascetic ideal (a will to truth) at the heart of Kantian critique formally 
repeats the analysis of the transcendent (unfounded and unsustainable) 
ideal which, according to Kant, centrally organises dogmatic theology. 
Nietzschean critique can go further for the simple reason that it does 
not operate with any conceptions, such as a metaphysical truth, which are 
opposed to life. It simply does not need to pose sources of power outside 
those intrinsic to it. In Nietzschean critique the will to power thinks. It 
has strengthened to such a degree that it no longer needs to posit a realm 
other than that of its own productions. In Nietzschean critique, thought 
convalesces from the long but temporary disease that is Platonism. It calls 
ascetic ideals into question, it submits them to a physiological critique 
but it does not operate on the basis of such ideals. The 'basis' of 
Nietzschean critique is precisely that everything is produced - in the mode 
of the physiological. 
The second aspect of Nietzsche's radicalisation of Kantian critique 
concerns an implication of the Copernican turn with which Kant abandons the 
attempt to know things as they are 'in themselves' and instead concentrates 
on their phenomenal status (that is to say, as materially ' given' in space 
and time but knowable as objects, as phenomena, due to the interaction of 
the faculties). The Copernican turn which is the starting point for Kant's 
critical philosophy has been discussed several times in the previous 
chapters of this dissertation. But its initially merely technical aspects, 
namely the reformulation of the relation between the object and knowledge 
of it, and the re-thinking of the object as appearance, carry 
two important 
implications. The first, put simply, is that by redirecting the attention 
of philosophy towards the conditions of possibility of the object of 
knowledge, Kant demonstrates the status of the object as produced and no 
longer as simply given. For this reason alone it would 
be philosophically 
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regressive to go back to a conception of objects prior to that of the 
Copernican turn. It is necessary to sustain this first implication of the 
Copernican turn for without it thought can only relapse into assuming 
objects as such to be given, the position of every, as it were, vulgar 
idealism prior to Kant's reconsideration of its conditions of possibility 
as transcendental. 
But alongside this properly critical strand there runs another which 
immediately recuperates this loss of metaphysical ground. Whilst Kant 
realises the produced nature of all phenomena, he locates the origin of 
these productions firmly in the realm of the faculties. And although the 
subjectivity which is interjected as the source of the productions of 
objects can be understood merely to mark the point of convergence of these 
transcendental founts and, in short, as a transcendental (universal) 
subjectivity, it nevertheless means that a human agency is placed at the 
centre of the productions which make up the universe. The effect of this is 
formally very similar to that of Kant's continued uncritical belief in 
truth. Here, too, a theocentric conception is overcome but since it is, in 
this case, replaced by an anthropocentric perspective, the most fundamental 
features of the old system are only seemingly altered. For it is immaterial 
to the distribution of values whether the site and source of the highest 
values is called god or man (transcendental subjectivity). In either case 
an agency is posed as exempt from nature and that means, for Kant as much 
as for Nietzsche, of nature as production, as produced. As was shown before 
(ch. 1.111; ch. 3. ID, Kant only allows transcendental apperception to 
accompany the three syntheses of the understanding but apperception itself 
is not, according to him, formed in a synthesis. It is clear that this is 
formally very similar to saying that 'god' is the source of creation 
but 
not itself created or natural. And in either case the fundamentally 
Platonistic structure, in which a supersensible realm is opposed 
to the 
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sensible, or nature, remains in place. Nature is only ever construed as 
derived and secondary in such Platonistic conceptions of it. It is not 
itself sufficiently plenitudinous to extend throughout the entire field of 
creation or production. According to this Platonistic logic, its intrinsic 
deficiency must be supplemented from elsewhere. Hence a supersensible realm 
is invented: 'god' and the t SEa, in the case of Plato, transcendental 
subjectivity and noumena, in that of Kant. 
Nietzsche's thinking is able to strike a fatal blow to this conception of 
the world and of human being in it by a transvaluation of the entire 
Platonistic structure on the basis of a primary physiology. If his thought 
simply opposed another conception to that of Platonism, it would only 
reduplicate the oppositional structure which is coterminous with Platonism. 
The same goes of course for Nietzsche's stance towards Kantian critique. As 
with all the idealised conceptions of earlier philosophy, rather than 
opposing them, they can be overcome if the ground on which they are 
articulated is transvalued on the basis of a primary physiology. Critique 
certainly has the potential to be adapted in the service of a physiological 
thinking, but this adaptation only becomes possible when critique is 
cleared of the idealist impositions which hold it back from realising its 
potential for destabilising traditional metaphysics. 
In the same way that the oppositional stance that is Platonism cannot be 
overcome by an oppositional thinking (which would merely duplicate it), so, 
too, any variation on its fundamental anti-materialist theme would not move 
beyond its central assumptions. But Nietzsche's physiological 
thinking does 
neither, It does not deny the reality of the Platonistic 
(or of Kant' s 
idealist) projections. It merely inquires into the value of these 
conceptions and asks what their function is in the overall economy of 
life. 
Thus consciousness which, qua the self-consciousness of 
the 'I think', Kant 
takes to be originary must be rethought as a mere epiphenomenon of a 
more 
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complex and more fundamental productivity. In the physiological rethinking 
of consciousness it no longer stands outside the incessant synthesising of 
the will to power. It is, in short, no longer a being-conscious 
(Bewußtsein) but has been transformed in the productive process of 
becoming-conscious (Bewußtwerden). This becoming-conscious is as much a 
function of an organism as any other of its physiological functions such as 
ingestion or digestion. Becoming-conscious occurs in the service of the 
organism, and is not intrinsically functionally superior to any other of 
its involuntary processes. Nietzsche writes: 
"In Hinsicht auf das Ungeheure und Vielfache des Für- und Gegeneinander- 
arbeitens, wie es das Gesamtleben jedes Organism darstellt, ist dessen 
bewußte Welt... ein kleiner Ausschnitt. Dies Stück Bewußtsein als Zweck.. 
für jenes Gesamtphänomen von Leben anzusetzen, fehlt uns alles Recht: 
ersichtlich ist das Bewußtwerden nur ein Mittel mehr in der Entfaltung 
und Machterweiterung des Lebens. Deshalb ist es eine Naivett,. .. irgend 
eine Einzelheit der Sphäre des Bewußtseins als höchsten Wert anzusetzen: 
und vielleicht gar 'die Welt' aus ihnen zu rechtfertigen. " 
"As regards the immensity and multiplicity of working for and against, 
such as the entirety of life in every organism shows, its conscious world 
.,, is only a small segment. To posit this piece of consciousness as 
purpose for the entire phenomenon of life, we have no right at all: 
becoming-conscious is obviously only one more means in the unfolding and 
expansion of power of life. Therefore it is a naivety... to posit any 
singularity in the sphere of consciousness as the highest value: and 
perhaps even to justify 'the wor 1 d' from out of them, " (KSA 12,10 
11371, 
WM/WP no. 707, t. m. , my omissions) 
This passage diagnoses a paralogistic thinking as regards the value 
accorded to consciousness in an idealist philosophy. Rather 
than being 
understood as the product of the will to power's synthesising activity, 
idealism construes consciousness as the originary source of 
the world; the 
world itself springs from it, and it is of little consequence whether 
this 
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consciousness is that of god or of man. Nietzsche's thinking overcomes this 
paralogism by re-incorporating consciousness into all the other perpetual 
becomings of an organism - just as Kant is able to leave behind dogmatic 
rationalism by showing that the paralogisms of reason are only possible on 
the basis of the synthetic productions of the other faculties. 
Within the thinking of the will to power, any traditional notions which 
oppose body to spirit (irrespective of which terms this opposition is 
formulated in) are no longer valid. This is not to say that their 
'dialectic' has been 'sublated' in a higher synthesis3. It is, rather, the 
case that the perspective opened up by the will to power shows that 
'spirit' had only ever been possible as yet another production of the will 
to power as physiology. One implication of this is that the body which is 
the object of so much fear and hatred within Platonism, is again 
comprehended as the basis on which even Platonism itself first becomes 
possible. Secondly, the absolute opposition between human consciousness on 
the one side and the otherness of nature's materiality on the other side, 
simply falls away if both are conceived as forms of the will to power and 
if a physiology is named as the site of their perpetual exchanges. In other 
words, this aspect of Nietzsche's transvaluation of critique has the effect 
of liberating matter from the idealist imposition according to which it too 
only arises as an effect of an originary consciousness. That is to say, 
Nietzsche is able to de-humanise nature, to recommence a thinking which 
understands itself to be possible on the basis of the productions which 
Nietzsche thematises under the name will to power, and not vice versa. 
Here, too, Nietzsche utilises the insights offered by (the Dialectic of the 
first) critique whilst yet turning them against critique to overcome the 
remnants of an obsolete idealism. In particular, by extending the scope of 
What is comprehended as the result of a paralogistic operation, 
Nietzsche 
is able to devalue the centrality of 'man' in nature, to destabilise 
the 
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anthropocentrism intrinsic to Kantian critique. This reinterpretation of 
the paralogism is the second aspect of the transvaluation of critique. 
Both Kant's continued adherence to a metaphysical conception of truth and 
his substitution of a theocentric by an anthropocentric originary 
consciousness are finally nothing more than symptoms of his unquestioned 
acceptance of being as primordial. And this brings us to the third aspect 
of Nietzsche's transvaluation of critique which can only be touched upon 
relatively briefly here because its final fruition requires another context 
(sec. IV, below) for its discussion. Here attention can only be drawn to a 
few salient points. 
Despite the fact that it is driven by the motor of critique, Kant's 
entire ontology is predicated on the belief (which of course remains 
unquestioned by Kant) in the primacy of being as presence. There is first 
of all the obvious point that Kant posits a noumenal realm which, although 
unknowable, functions as a point of absolute fixity. The productions of 
human consciousness only concern the phenomenal aspect of a thing but 'in 
itself', prior to, outside of its constitution as phenomenal object, it 
retains a pristine, unaltered state. But this obviously presupposes the 
existence of objects which can be theoretically divided into their 
phenomenal and noumenal sides. Nietzsche called this Kantian conception of 
the two aspects of a thing 'the sore spot of Kantian critique' ("der faule 
Fleck des Kantischen Kritizismus") and had this to say about it: 
"Kant hatte kein Recht mehr zu seiner Unterscheidung 'Erscheinung' und 
'Ding an sich'... insofern er den Schluß von der Erscheinung auf eine 
Ursache der Erscheinung als unerlaubt ablehnte - gemäß seiner 
Fassung 
des Kausalitätsbegriffs und dessen rein-intraphänomenaler Gültigkeit: 
welche Fassung anderseits jene Unterscheidung schon vorwegnimmt, wie als 
ob das 'Ding an sich' nicht nur erschlossen, sondern gegeben sei. 
" 
"Kant no longer had a right to his distinction 'appearance' and 
'thing 
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in itself' ... Insofar as he rejected as impermissible the inference from 
an appearance to the cause of an appearance - in accordance with his 
version of the concept of causality and its purely intra-phenomenal 
validity: which version on the other hand already anticipates that 
distinction, as if the 'thing in itself' was not merely inferred but 
gl ven. " (KSA 12,5 e 4l , WM/ Wp no. 553, t. m. , my omissions) 
The irresolvable dilemma at the centre of Kant's critical philosophy is 
that it only becomes possible for him to concentrate on the transcendental 
conditions of possibility of phenomena by first of all instituting the 
division of things into their phenomenal and noumenal aspects. But at the 
same time to posit noumena at all is a deeply un-critical move in that by 
definition they lie outside the realm of the productions of the 
understanding and in that sense are transcendent. This is to say that the 
status of noumena in Kant's theory of the production of knowledge is deeply 
problematic. The question is how they can be arrived at without having been 
inferred from phenomena when at the same time inferences from phenomena to 
another realm, other than that of their transcendental constitution, is 
utterly illegitimate, given Kant' s redefinition of causality as solely 
applicable to the phenomenal realm. In this sense noumena fall outside the 
compass of the transcendental whilst at the same acting as guarantor of the 
phenomenal function of objects. This puts them on a par with the ideas of 
reason which take up a similar position vis-a-vis the objects Kant 
discovers to be synthetically produced. Hence noumena, too, are exempt from 
the movement of becoming. 
But even in the realm of phenomena, which are by definition temporalised 
and which can be material (both of which surely sully what could otherise 
be an immaculate objective status), the concept of substance provides a 
theoretical point at which an object is not open to transformation. 
Its 
accldentia may undergo change but qua substance it does not 
(cf. the 
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detailed discussion of this in ch. 1. I. , above). Even though the application 
of the concept of substance to a manifold of intuition is a synthetic act, 
as a consequence of this act the object is then conceived in extra-temporal 
terms and as unchanging with regard to the aspect of it which is theorised 
as substance. 
But even the change, which Kant admits may affect the accidentia of an 
object, is really little more than a change of position within a cosmos of 
fixed things which persist. We have already seen (ch. 2.11, above) how 
Nietzsche ironises 'this old mythology' ("diese alte Mythologie"), the 
suppression of the primary processes of becoming, as 'the attempt to 
comprehend an occurrence as a kind of shifting and change of position of 
' beings' , of the permanent... ' (KSA 12,2 11391, WM/WP no. 631, t. m, ). 
It has to be emphasised, though, that all the objections to Kant' s 
ontology which have been mentioned so far operate on the technical level 
and are locatable as internal to his system. Over and above these 
technicalities it has, however, to be realised that his ontology is 
entirely predicated on the unquestioned assumptions that there are objects, 
that they exist. Although the first Critique is obviously on one level an 
attempt to theorise how things, qua objects, are produced by a 
transcendental subjectivity and hence become knowable, the entire work is 
nonetheless based on, and unthinkable without, the presupposition that 
things (although at that point as yet unknowable to that subjectivity) 
exist prior to their formation as objects by subjectivity (Kant' s idealism 
is, after all, not that of Berkeley with his esse est percipi). Kant need 
not formulate this underlying assumption anywhere in his text because it is 
so entirely beyond the scope of the inquiry for him, so unquestionably 
self-evident. But objectivity is itself one of the fabrications of 
enthropos with which it assures its continued existence, which consequence 
does not mean that the fabrication is true. 
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Nietzsche' a thought, in contradistinction to that of Kant, does not start 
from the supposition that being (as presence, substantLa etc. ) is primary. 
Instead it grows out of a conception of the world as perpetual becoming. On 
the basis of this Nietzsche rehearses a thinking in which the status of all 
entities is radically transformed. They are no longer objective 
positivities which are factual and simply given but are now thought of as 
useful fictions, precisely as fabrications. In this vein, Nietzsche writes: 
"Die fortwährenden Übergänge erlauben nicht, von 'Individuum' zu reden 
... Wir würden nicht von Zeit reden und nichts von Bewegung wissen, 
wenn wir nicht, in grober Weise, 'Ruhendes' neben Bewegtem zu sehen 
glaubten... Der Satz von der Identität hat als Hintergrund den 
'Augenschein', daß es gleiche Dinge gibt. Eine werdende Welt könnte im 
strengen Sinne nicht 'begriffen', nicht 'erkannt' werden: nur insofern 
der 'begreifende'. .. Intellekt eine schon geschaffene grobe Welt 
vorfindet, gezimmert aus lauter Scheinbarkeiten, aber fest geworden, 
insofern diese Art Schein das Leben erhalten hat - nur insofern gibt es 
etwas wie 'Erkenntnis'. .. " 
"Continual transitions make it impermissible to speak of an 'individual' 
... We would not speak of time and would not know anything of motion 
if 
we did not believe to see, in a crude way, 'what is at rest' beside what 
is in motion... The background to the law of identity is the 'apparent 
fact' that there are identical things. A world In becoming could not, in 
the strict sense, be 'comprehended', be 'known': only insofar as the 
'comprehending'... intellect finds an already created, crude world, 
constructed from mere semblances, but become fixed, insofar as this kind 
of appearance has preserved life - only insofar is there something 
like 
'knowledge' 
... " (KSA 11,36 (23], WM/WP no. 
520, t. m. , my omissions and 
emphases). 
As concerns the dichotomy of conceptions of the world according to being 
or becoming, Nietzsche resolves this in a manner formally reminiscent of 
Kant's solution to the (third) antinomy. As was discussed before (ch. 2, 
III), Kant overcomes the rivalry of claims of determinism and 
free will by 
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assigning each to a different realm, namely to the phenomenal and noumenal, 
respectively. Although many of the constituents of Nietzsche's thinking are 
obviously very different from those of Kant, formally he repeats many of 
his predecessor's moves. In this case, as concerns the rival claims of 
being and becoming, Nietzsche, too, assigns them different functional 
domains. In brief, a world of being has to be construed for the purposes of 
knowledge (cf. above quote) and that means for the purposes of self- 
preservation of anthropos. A world of becoming cannot be cognised for in it 
there are no fixities, such as an immutable concept of truth. Nor are there 
fixed, or indeed any, objects in it (after Kant, the concept of an object 
implies that something has been fixated). And knowledge in any traditional 
sense of the word can obviously not come about if there are no fixed 
objects to be known and if the project of knowledge has been completely 
bankrupted by the absence of any belief in the fixity of truth. 
Just as in Kant's solution to the antinomy one side is privileged from 
the start (as demonstrated in ch. 2. III, above), so too, in Nietzsche' s re- 
consideration of the problem, no neutral symmetry can be expected. But 
where Kant (by the manner in which he formulates the antinomy) implicitly 
privileges the noumenal side (the side of being, crudely speaking), 
Nietzsche's thinking presupposes that perpetual becoming is that which 
makes the impositions of being possible in the first place. Kant ultimately 
wishes to claim that reason is the immutable, unchanging basis on which the 
productions of nature can be understood whereas Nietzsche's reactivation of 
the primacy of becoming entails that all phenomena of stability are 
themselves conceived as produced, as secondary and as less fundamental 
than 
the constituents of the production, that is to say of the economy of the 
will to power. 
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So far in this chapter I have attempted to show that Nietzsche formally 
repeats some of the key moments of critique, whilst yet adapting these 
moves to submit the reactive aspects of Kantian critique themselves to a 
critique. In particular, this meant, firstly, that the Ideal of dogmatic 
theology could still be seen to be operative in Kant's text, albeit in a 
more subtle form, in the will to truth which organises it from above, so to 
speak. Secondly, we saw that the conception of the parat ogisms of rational 
psychology was broadened to encompass Kants anthropocentrism. Thirdly it 
was shown that the terms of the antinomy of rational cosmology could be 
intensified in order to encompass the rival claims to primacy of being and 
becoming4. 
It has been possible to keep the discussions of these transvaluative 
moves relatively brief because all the substantial work had already been 
done in the previous three chapters. Thus the first and second chapters 
focused (in part, if not exclusively) on the paralogism and on the 
antinomy, respectively, as discussed in the first Critique. The third 
chapter offered a reading of the ideal, as discussed in the first Critique, 
but also extended to the second part of the third Critique. 
The next, final step will obviously have to be an exposition of the 
physiological 'fundament' which makes this rethinking, this transvaluation, 
possible in the first place. 
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II, Waves of Physiology 
In the previous three chapters, different aspects of Kant' s theorisat ion 
of the causal nexus were examined. In the course of this I hope to have 
shown that substance, causality and teleology are all equally bankrupt, if 
for subtly different reasons, as means of thinking the productions of 
bodies. Here it is necessary to remind ourselves why it is of any 
importance how a body is thought. In chapter one (sec. II, above) the two- 
world theory which is synonymous with Platonism was outlined. As has often 
been pointed out, in order for Platonism to be operative, this oppositional 
structure needs to be sustained'-. But apart from this structural 
requirement, the effectiveness of Platonism is utterly parasitic on a 
profound hatred of the body, is utterly dependent on the thorough 
suppression of physiology (my aim was to draw attention to this central 
feature of Platonism from the start, hence the quote from 'Phaedrus' with 
which the first chapter opens). A great deal has been written on how to 
move beyond Platonism by moving beyond the oppositional thinking which is 
constitutive of Platonism6 without repeating the very oppositional 
structures this non-Platonic thought was sought to supercede. Far rarer is 
the attempt to overcome Platonism by reinstating physiology in the primary 
position of which Platonic thought robs it7, and yet Nietzsche's incessant 
onslaught on Platonism is as much concerned with the suppression of 
physiology which occurs in it, as with its oppositional structures. 
In what 
follows I shall therefore attempt to draw out the sense and the manner 
in 
which Niet zsche' s writing constitutes an affirmation of 
the body or, as 
Nietzsche himself likes to put it (for instance in the preface 
to the 
second edition of the 'Gay Science' ), the sense in which 
it marks the 
convalescence of the body in philosophy. 
It is a peculiarity of Kantian philosophy that although 
it is a critique 
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of reason qua dogmatic, and that ultimately means qua Platonic-Christian, 
metaphysics, it does not intensify critique into an affirmation of the 
body. As concerns this point, the twofold task will be to show what 
precisely prevents this intensification in Kant's philosophy and, 
conversely, what facilitates this intensification in the thought of 
Nietzsche. 
Before we proceed any further in this line of enquiry, it might be 
advisable to clarify in general one crucial point as concerns this 
Nietzschean physiology, namely the difference between it and the empirical 
science which is classed as a branch of biology. The latter type of 
physiology examines the functional relations of (and to some extent 
between) organisms. As such, its presuppositions and clandestine 
assumptions about the nature of organic beings are just as limited as those 
of any other rationalist science, even if its object is signally capable of 
being thought in such a manner as to destabilise these very presuppositions 
and assumptions. The philosophical physiology which Nietzsche advocates and 
practices is as far removed from this empirical (rationalist) science as 
from any other. Nietzsche's attraction to physiology seems to me to stem 
from the fact that its register can so easily and conveniently be 
appropriated by a thinking which seeks to affirm the materiality of the 
body but, very importantly, without setting it in opposition to mind, 
spirit, god or other idealist impositions. 
A second advantage of physiology is that its object (the functions of 
organisms) provides a foil for rethinking any number of productions 
in any 
of the traditional spheres (such as art, science, politics, nature, 
philosophy, etc. ) without simultaneously having to reiterate 
the 
traditional anthropocentrisms which structure them°. 
Thirdly, it might be asked why a specifically physiological register 
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should be preferable to a generally biological one for the re-thinking of 
non-anthropomorphic productions. One obvious reason, and one which the 
classical philologist Nietzsche was surely aware of, arises from the 
respective etymologies of ßa6w and V Because whereas the former can mean 
simply 'to live' but in the sense of 'to maintain one's life, to preserve 
life', the latter translates as 'to produce, beget, bring forth, make to 
growls. Especially in this last respect phuein is obviously more 
appropriate for thinking the productions of the will to power for which 
growth is more primordial than preservation, for which preservation is only 
ever a secondary effect of the much more basic will to grow that is the 
will to power (cf. ch. 4, I, above). 
Furthermore, Nietzsche's philosophical physiology seeks to describe the 
functional processes by which life expends (and only secondarily sustains) 
itself in and through a human body. In this respect the descriptive scope 
of a physiological register is more readily adaptable to this task than 
that of biology in general. 
Having drawn out some important distinctions between an empirical and 
Nietzsche's philosophical physiology, in what follows reference is 
exclusively made to the latter type. 
Although Nietzsche does of course attack Platonism on many different 
fronts and develops a whole host of strategies to destabilise its ways of 
thinking, it seems to me that his physiological thinking is the most 
effective weapon in his armoury. Put schematically, in Platonism a 'higher' 
realm, that of the forms, is posed whence issue value, meaning, sense and 
signification which structure, sustain and give form to the 'lower' realm, 
that of matter and the body. It is of secondary importance precisely with 
which terms the high and the low are inscribed - in Christianity, 
for 
instance, they become 'god' as against the flesh of mortals, in 
Kant, the 
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transcendental as opposed to the empirical. The crucial point is that a 
complete and thoroughgoing denigration of ' this, , the ' low' world is thus 
carried out and 'this' world always ultimately means the materiality of the 
human body because it is that, according to the Platonic schema, which most 
of all stands in the way of the thinker attaining to the purity of the 
realm of the forms. The 'ground' of (the things of) 'this' world is, 
ironically, located in that unattainable higher realm which is by 
definition remote from the realm of the materiality of humans, that is to 
say, physiology. In this regard the Platonic two-world schema is a very 
forceful expression of an all-pervasive hatred of the physiological and 




One of the obvious implications of this schema is that whatever is 
designated as low is itself intrinsically valueless, worthless" and that 
means first and foremost that it is not invested with any productive power. 
In order to dislodge this devaluating conception of matter, Nietzsche 
develops a physiological thinking. In it, but only as a first step, the 
body is accorded a formally similar status to that which previously 
attached to the Platonic forms. It is now thought as the site whence 
signification and value derive and hence it is now accorded primary status. 
In this sense Nietzsche can speak of 'idealisation', that is, of 
the 
processes whereby primary physiological values transform 
themselves into 
secondary values of consciousness and its cultural edifices 
(cf, ch. 2, II) 
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high high high high high 
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This initial step has been exhaustively theorised as Nietzsche's 
overturning of Platonism by means of a thinking which ' twists free' II 
because by reversing the order of priority between the two 'realms', it is 
not just the status of an originary productivity which has somehow, 
miraculously, passed from the one to the other. Instead, the entire schema, 
the two-world theory itself, is thereby compromised beyond redemption: 
"Die wahre Welt haben wir abgeschafft: welche Welt blieb übrig? die 
scheinbare vielleicht?.,. Aber nein! mit der wahren Welt haben wir auch 
die scheinbare abgeschafft! " 
"The true world we abolished: which world was left? the apparent one 
perhaps? ... But no! along with the true world we have also abolished the 
apparent one! " (KSA 6, GD/TI IV). 
This undoubtedly constitutes a moment in the Nietzschean overcoming of 
Platonism. But it is necessary to show that Nietzsche's drilling into the 
'ground' of physiology reaches further than this rather tidy, rather clean 
model envisages. Because it is an important aspect of the dissolution of 
the Platonic schema to unsettle the association of the realm of the forms 
qua source of values with purity and its adjoining conceptuality of clean 
and unsullied productions (of values). But equally, any other models of 
production in which vestiges of this immaculate conception remain, 
in this 
respect obviously retain the character of the Platonic projection. 
There are in actual fact three central aspects to Nietzsche's 
descent's 
into the physiological which make it such a powerful antidote 
to the 
Platonic affliction. The first of these (which was briefly 
discussed just 
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now) is the destabilisation of the two-world structure which organises 
Platonism. It is true to say that to base thinking on physiology obviously 
undermines any Platonistic project insofar as Platonism is always, by 
definition, implicated in an oppositional structure whereas a body knows 
nothing about oppositions: the perpetual exchanges of matter which 
characterise a body have nothing to do with, and cannot be comprehended in 
terms of, oppositionality. An oppositional structure is the type of 
structure which denies what is most fundamental about a body: the fluidity 
of 'its' matter and of the transformations of matter. 
But however important, as a moment in the Nietzschean down-going, the 
undermining of the structure of Platonism is, it also unfortunately offers 
a way of avoiding the grittier, less purely structural components of 
Nietzsche's physiological thinking. For, as I hope to have shown in the 
previous three chapters, one crucial aspect of Kant's continuation of the 
trajectory of Platonism is his inability to confront the perpetual 
transformations of the human body, the exchanges of matter which proceed 
through it and which utterly compromise its status as a closed-off object. 
The history of Platonism is, in other words, coextensive with the history 
of the suppression of the materiality of bodies. In order to interrupt this 
trajectory, a more or less violent, more or less abrupt eruption of what 
can only be described as bodily slime into the sanitised discourses of the 
philosophers needs to occur. Because this is precisely what a Platonistic 
deprecation of the body is directed against: its putrefactory fluidity, 
the 
fact that it is essentially unsubsumable to the rigid, formal and 
ideal 
conceptuality of a type of thinking which has its origin 
in fear and horror 
of an excessive, disintegrating fluidity and which needs to 
fixate this 
perpetual flux (of matter) in order to justify existence 
to itself. It is 
in this sense that Platonism' s hatred of time and of matter, of 
the body 
and of becoming are all united in one grand sweeping movement 
which is 
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specifically directed against anything which intrinsically resists 
subsumpt ion. 
The point at which Nietzschean physiology not only casts off the 
structure of the Platonic two-world theory qua anti-sensuous 
oppositionality but also overcomes this structure as the first model of an 
anti-material rigidity imposed on the uncontrollable flows of the body 
comes, strangely enough, at the point when Nietzsche attempts to think of a 
possible place for 'god' in this new or renewed, convalescing physiology. 
In Platonism (as in Kant) 'god' does of course mean something that is the 
highest, and that is to say, the most remote from the vagaries of the body. 
In Platonism, 'god' is the highest ideal, the greatest source of value for 
all that is lower down in the hierarchy. In Platonism, everything else may 
change, may be in or subject to time, but 'god' is immutable and extra- 
temporal. When Nietzsche comes to rethink the possibility of something like 
'god' on the basis of his physiological thinking, it will of course have 
mutated into something entirely different from this anaemic, extra-temporal 
spectre which has terrorised the human body for two millenia, down to the 
last little crevice and corpuscule. 
It must in principle be possible for the Nietzschean physiological 
thinking to reconsider even the most ideal, even the most anti-physical 
aspects of Platonism in terms of their physiological production because 
physiology is precisely the method13 with which the producedness of all 
phenomena can be demonstrated, by means of which they can be traced to a 
will to power which inhabits a body in a specific way. In this sense 
physiology is the motor of Nietzsche's transvaluation of all values. 
On 
this basis Nietzsche is able to rethink 'god' as something 
like a point or 
instant of greatest intensity which is Intermittently reached 
by the will 
to power in its pulsating play of contraction and expansion. 
In this 
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perpetual ebb and flow, the will to power is periodically concentrated as 
In the crest of a wave before breaking, receding and regathering momentum. 
high high high high high 
low low low low low 
Here the 'high' points in this incessant ebbing and flowing might also be 
thought of as 'god' points into which the will to power is periodically 
concentrated but which are, firstly, not distinct from the entire process 
of becoming in a temporal sense and which, secondly, do not have any 
absolute value which would elevate them above and separate them from, the 
rest of the ongoing process. Nietzsche describes this sequence in the 
following way: 
"Gott' als Kulminations-Moment: das Dasein eine ewige Vergottung und 
Entgottung. Aber darin kein Wert-Höhepunkt, sondern nur Macht-Höhepunkte. 
... Der Rückgang vom Höhepunkt Im Werden... als Folge dieser höchsten 
Kraft 
... welche, gegen sich sich wendend, nachdem sie nichts mehr zu 
organisieren hat, ihre Kraft verwendet, zu deorganisieren... " 
"'God' as moment of culmination: existence an eternal deification and de- 
deification. But therein no high point of value but high points of power. 
.. The receding from the high point In becoming. .. as consequence of 
this 
highest force... which, turning against itself, after it has nothing more 
to organise, utilises its force to de-organise .. " (KSA 12,9 
181, WM/WP 
no. 712, t. m. , my omissions) 
In the same note Nietzsche demands the 'absolute exclusion of mechanism 
and of matter' ("Absoluter Ausschluß des Mechanismus und des Stoffes") as 
types of conceptuality which are utterly inappropriate for the thinking of 
the will to power. This I understand to mean that mechanical causality 
(as 
well as, by implication, teleological causality, its conceptual complement) 
does not do justice to the complexities of the topology and economy of 
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becoming and that it must therefore be left behind when a physiological 
thinking is attempted. Similarly, it is necessary to disregard any schema 
which opposes matter to form, to spirit, or to any other kind of idealist 
conceptuality which starts from the pre-supposition that the latter, for 
instance as consciousness, 1s qualitatively different from (and superior 
to! ) the former, just as 'god' (in that scheme of things) is different in 
kind from all natural processes. 
As opposed to this, Nietzschean physiology implies that the processes of 
a body may at times naturally intensify to such a degree that the 
culmination of forces at that moment can be understood to reach a state of 
deification. What is quite clearly not meant by this is any kind of 
alignment of increased consciousness, greater spirituality, higher anti- 
material purity etc. , with such moments of deification. For whilst the will 
to power as physiology does at times produce consciousness as an 
epiphenomenon of all the other transformative processes matter can undergo 
(the becoming-conscious of matter, c. f. sec. I of the present chapter), this 
does not mean that Nietzsche thinks of such becoming-conscious as a 
deification of matter. Instead it is necessary to distinguish two types of 
transformative process, two series, which might accidentally overlap but 
which are not intrinsically or necessarily related, and which are certainly 
not identical. 
One of these series involves the host of transformations of matter which 
can be thought of as a body. Among these processes, although from the 
perspective of the will to power there is no particular reason to privilege 
this, there occurs the becoming-conscious for which a body has a certain 
capacity. Here the important point is to draw out the continuity 
between 
wholly unconscious physiological processes and the gradual 
flowing of these 
into ever more conscious, but still fundamentally physiological, 
activities. It is perhaps not too fanciful to suggest 
that even the word 
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physiology itself embodies such a gradual transformation of physis into 
logos, of body into thought, while never becoming anything fundamentally 
other than body. Nietzsche writes: 
"Die Glaubwürdigkeit des Leibes ist erst die Basis, nach der der Wert 
alles Denkens abgeschätzt werden kann. Gesetzt, wir hätten lauter Dinge 
erdacht, die es nicht gibt... Der Leib erweist sich immer weniger als 
Schein! Wer hat bis jetzt GrUnde gehabt, den Leib als Schein zu denken? 
Der vollendete Brahman-Verehrer. " 
"Only the credibility of the body is the basis according to which the 
value of all thinking may be judged. Assuming we had thought up all 
manner of things which do not exist... The body proves less and less of 
a semblance! Who, up until now, had reasons to think the body as 
semblance? The complete Brahman-admirer. " (KSA 11,39 [ 181, m. t. , my 
omissions) 
This first series, then, marks physiology as a topology beyond both 
idealism and a vulgar materialism. 
Another series concerns the economic fluctuations of the will to power 
insofar as it expands and expends itself, grows and becomes more 
organisationally complex but then, once it has saturated the entire field 
of its possible structuration, it decreases and diminishes in force and 
recedes (to regroup and regather)14. This second series emphasises the 
plasticity of the will to power as physiology, including the multi- 
dimensionality of its contractions and expansions and the way in which 
these delirial fluctuations precede a conceptualising whose successes 
depend on the extent to which it can impose disjunctions upon prior and 
more fundamental continuous flows. 
It is clear from this that any confluence of these two series could never 
be a necessary consequence of the processes described in each. 
And it 
cannot be overemphasised what a complete deathblow to Platonism 
it is if, 
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firstly, that which Platonism construes as ideal, and as 'given' , is traced 
back to its physiological origins and re-thought in terms of the 
Idealisations of the body; if, secondly, there is nothing remote or 
absolute about the highest ideal ('god') anymore because it is so entirely 
re-incorporated into all the other perpetual transformations of the body; 
and if, thirdly, the concept of 'highest consciousness` is extracted and 
separated from the concept 'god' and the two sequences, one of which 
theroatises the becoming-conscious of a body and the other thematising the 
possibility of becoming-god, are thought as separate and as only 
coincidentally overlapping. 
This is to say that by means of physiology Nietzsche can overcome an 
ideality that is posited as given by the tradition of Platonism, regardless 
of whether that ideality is construed as originary supersensuous productive 
consciousness t' god') or simply in terms of human consciousness 
(transcendental subjectivity, in Kant's terminology) 16. In either case, 
Nietzsche is able to tempt philosophy away from the (libidinal) investment 
it has had in these anaemic forms of conceptuality. That with which he 
tempts it is a new thought of the body, well beyond the oppositional 
schemas of Platonism. To think about this other body, this becoming-body to 
which the tradition has largely been deaf in its perceived obligation to 
keep thinking in terms of a two-world theory, will be a much greater 
challenge to philosophers than anything which has gone before. This 
is how 
Nietzsche paints this enticing vision: 
"Gesetzt, daß 'die Seele' ein anziehender und geheimnisvoller 
Gedanke 
war, von dem sich die Philosophen mit Recht nur widerstrebend getrennt 
haben - vielleicht ist das, was sie nunmehr dagegen einzutauschen 
lernen, 
noch anziehender, noch geheimnisvoller. Der menschliche 
Leib, an dem die 
ganze fernste und nächste Vergangenheit alles organischen 
Werdens wieder 
lebendig und leibhaft wird, durch den hindurch, über 
den hinweg und 
hinaus ein ungeheurer unhörbarer Strom zu fließen scheint: 
der Leib ist 
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ein erstaunlicherer Gedanke als die alte 'Seele'. " 
"Assuming that 'the soul' was an attractive and mysterious thought from 
which philosophers have rightly taken leave only reluctantly - perhaps 
that which they are now learning to substitute for it is even more 
attractive, even more mysterious. The human body, upon which the entire 
furthest and nearest past of all organic becoming becomes alive and 
corporeal again, through which, over and out of which a tremendous in- 
audible stream appears to flow: the body is a more astonishing thought 
than the old ' soul' ." (KSA 11,36 1351, WM/WP no. 659, t. m. ). 
This note is entitled "Am Leitfaden des Leibes" C' Along the leading 
thread of the body' '- and it will have to be asked where this thread leads 
if it is followed. It is possible to enter into this question obliquely by 
becoming aware of the thought that is rehearsed here, as Nietzsche draws 
attention to the body as conduit for the 'tremendous inaudible stream of 
all organic becoming'. The immeasurable significance of this thought is 
precisely that everything is now rethought on the basis of the primacy of 
becoming, everything is rethought as becoming, and for Nietzsche that means 
becoming as perpetual material transformations. After Nietzsche it is no 
longer legitimate to set thinking in opposition to material forces. 
Nietzsche ridicules such an oppositional mode when he writes: 
"Niemand kam je auf den Einfall, seinen Magen als einen fremden, etwa 
einen göttlichen Magen zu verstehen: aber seine Gedanken als 'ein- 
gegeben', seine Wertschätzungen als 'von einem Gott eingeblasen', seine 
Instinkte als Tätigkeit im Dämmern zu fassen... " 
"It has never occurred to anyone to understand his stomach as a 
strange, even a divine stomach: but to conceive of his thoughts as 
'inspired', his evaluations as 'blown in by a god', his instincts as 
activity in the twilight... " (KSA 11,36 1361, WM/WP no. 659, t. m. ) 
Conversely, this means that a Nietzschean physiological 
thinking must 
assert its non-Platonic character by immersing itself 
in the 'tremendous 
kam:, 
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inaudible stream', even at the risk of being washed away by it. This 
immersion, with its attendant danger of submerging, of drowning (in which 
the Zarathustrian 'down-going' might become a 'going under' 17) is akin to 
being led into a labyrinth without any certainty that the re-emergence from 
it is guaranteed. Nietzsche plays on this theme at the end of another note 
(KSA 11,37 14]) which, to my mind, is one of the central texts of his 
physiological project. Without entering into the enormous complexity 
displayed by the finale of this note, and in particular by its obscure 
reference to Ariadne, it suffices to remember that in the myth of Ariadne 
and Theseus, she leads him out of the labyrinth by means of a leading 
thread (Leitfaden). In this way he escapes the danger of the Minotaur, a 
wild, untameable beast which threatens to devour him, much as ' untamed' 
unconscious desires threaten to consume a body not given over to the rule 
of reason, according to a Platonistic thinking'e. 
A later account of the emergence of man from darkness and confusion can 
of course be found in what is possibly the central text of Platonism, the 
parable of the cave in book VII of Politeis. In either case, those exposed 
to darkness, ignorance, confusion and danger are led into the light of 
knowledge, safety and security by a benign guide, or so myth and fable 
would have it. But in actual fact there is nothing innocently benign or 
helpful about this ascensional trajectory. Instead, this emergence into the 
light is always only possible on the back of a mangled and broken body. 
Plato no doubt understood the poor inmates of his dungeon to be the 
prisoners of their bodily needs and desires. But how much more are they 
debarred from any freedom of movement by their aspirations to 'light', 
'knowledge', 'truth' and 'god', all of which lie beyond the cave? 
As against these ascensional aspirations which are those of any project 
of enlightenment in the broadest sense, Nietzsche seeks to tempt 
thinking 
into the labyrinth, which is an aggravated cave, away 
from light and 
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certainty and truth, into the maelstrom of becoming, the site of which he 
names the body. How a Platonistic thinking indulges its prejudices against 
a greater obscurity, Nietzsche indicates in the following notes: 
"Hauptirrtum der Psychologen: sie nehmen die undeutliche Vorstellung als 
eine niedere Art der Vorstellung gegen die helle gerechnet: aber was aus 
unserem Bewußtsein sich entfernt und deshalb dunkel wird, kann deshalb 
an sich vollkommen klar sein. Das Dunkelwerden ist Sache der Bewußtseins- 
perspektive. " 
"Principal error of the psychologists they take the indistinct 
representation to be a lower kind of representation calculated as against 
the distinct: but what removes itself from our consciousness and 
therefore becomes obscure, can therefore itself be perfectly clear. 
Becoming-obscure is a matter of the perspective of consciousness. " 
(KSA 12,5 ( 551, WM/ WP no. 528, t. m. ) 
"Die Physiologen, wie die Philosophen glauben, das Bewußtsein, im Maße es 
an Helligkeit zunimmt, wachse im Werte: das hellste Bewußtsein, das 
logischste kälteste Denken sei ersten Ranges. Indessen - wonach ist 
dieser Wert bestimmt? Das oberflächlichste, vereinfachteste Denken ist 
in Hinsicht auf Auslösung des Willens das am meisten nützliche... " 
"Physiologists, like philosophers, believe consciousness, to the degree 
it increases in lucidity, to grow in value: the most lucid consciousness, 
the most logical, coldest thinking is of the first rank. However - 
according to what is this value determined? The most superficial, most 
simplified thinking is the most useful as regards the release of the 
will... " (KSA 12,5 C 681, WM/WP no. 527, t. m. , my omission' 
9) . 
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III. Critique as yEraaoA 
I hope to have shown that the body of Nietzschean physiology is neither 
the living sepulchre in which the Platonic idealist's soul lies temporarily 
buried, nor the instrument or material substrate of a self-possessed agent, 
nor again a 'body-thing' 2° as passive object of scientific probing, which 
is conveniently organised according to mechanical causality and adjacent 
rationalist conceptuality. 
A body - to give the unthinkable constriction of a unitary coherence to 
this most dispersed of multiplicities - is never one. Nor does it make 
sense to speak of the point where that imaginary unity may come to rest. 
They do not exist, these stable coordinates which would faithfully promise 
to remain intact while the search for that phantom, 'a body' would take 
place. Of course, a body is never at rest, never simply is. A body is 
continually in becoming, it simply escapes the attentions of a stationary 
observation, such as Kant dreams of in his thematisation of the Analogies 
of Experience. What is captured between the pages of biology textbooks or 
in the reams of sour Platonistic mumblings are mere glimpses, mere shreds 
and caricatures of the rich physiological multitude swarming across the 
surface of the earth21. 
Again, it is worth emphasising that these ongoing processes take place 
completely spontaneously, not merely prior to or outside the intentional 
control of any particular agency but, more fundamentally, the very concept 
of intentionality is entirely inappropriate in the sphere of physiology. 
A 
living organism is thus continually involved in systems of exchange 
(of 
matter and energy) that cut across the inside-outside division. 
It is 
always already engaged in economies with 'the outside' and 
is continually 
undergoing transf ormation. Its stability is thus only of a relative 
nature. It must be stressed that an organism is a 
form of becoming without 
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anything substantial, stable or pre-given that becomes, it is variously a 
becoming-matter, becomi ng-energy, becoming-life. 
Plows of matter breaking down, assimilating other flows, releasing 
energy, combining into larger formations, interlacing streams, reshaping 
everything in their path, leaving waste matter, sprouting new growths, a 
body is never at rest but perpetually grows, expands, contracts, channels 
liquids, exchanges gases, decomposes into a wholly different body. A body 
is at best the unconscious circuitry for myriad flows of matter, energy, 
desire or thought, holding out the range for their interlacings without 
coincidence. The unconscious nature of these assured interactions is of the 
greatest importance because it alone guarantees their smooth working. 
Consciousness is too impoverished, too limited and too unsure of itself, in 
short, too base to incept, sustain and regulate the infinitely complicated 
Interactive processes that distinguish a body which is first and foremost 
metabole. 
As was hinted in the previous section, a physiological register is a 
particularly rich source for a Nietzschean thinking of material becoming 
because physiology is not concerned with what a body is (as substantial 
entity) but with what It can do (its potency), not with its structure but 
with its functioning. Foremost among the functional capabilities of an 
organism are the metabolic processes by means of which it is continually 
and spontaneously undergoing decomposition, or dissimilation. 
The technical 
term for this is 'catabolism', during which processes of decomposition 
complex molecules, the smallest constituents of the organism, are 
broken 
down into simple ones, an annihilation in miniature and a concomitant 
release of energy occur29. This is to say that an enhancement of 
vital 
processes (due to a release of energy) results from a physiological 
breakdown or expenditure24. This is clearly in marked contrast 
to the 
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Platonic-Christian fear and hatred of the processes of decomposition with 
its alignment of physical and moral corruption which fear, moreover, still. 
dominates Kant' s critical philosophy. 
'Metabolism' comes from the Greek 'metabole', meaning 'change' or, more 
literally and accurately, 'overthrow'. It stems from a combination of the 
prefix 'metal, denoting 'over' or 'beyond', and the verb ' bal lei n' -' to 
throw'. The sum total of the chemical processes that occur in living 
organisms and that result in growth, production of energy, elimination of 
waste material etc., in short, the living processes themselves are nothing 
other than a perpetual overthrowing of the organism. Thus, it must also be 
pointed out that from this physiological mode of thinking there issues an 
understanding of Nietzsche' s notion of (self-) overcoming and the overman 
simply as those physiological types that enter into their own perpetual 
transformation, dissimulation, decomposition or, more bluntly, death, with 
the greatest enthusiasm, and without even knowing it. 
One of the most important features of a physiological register is, then, 
that from it there ensues a firm focus on the metabolic as the chief mode 
of every particular organism. This is to say that whatever phenomenon, 
occurrence, process etc. is examined according to this physiological method 
will always come into view in terms of the overcoming (metabolism) 
intrinsic to it. This (self-)overcoming simultaneously refers to the 
ongoing dis-establishment of its interiority and 'self'-identity and, more 
profoundly, to the mode of becoming specific to it. 
What Nietzsche therefore achieves in this physiological thinking is 
to 
revive the (potentially tremendously powerful) method of immanent critique 
(critique of x by x), yet without also having to maintain the 
idealist 
conceptuality which accompanied Kant's version of it. This means 
that for a 
Nietzschean physiology the oppositions which structure the 
Platonistic 
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thinking still rehearsed by Kant, such as those between inside and outside, 
spirit and matter, substantial and accidental characteristics etc., are 
rendered inactive and simply no longer have any productive power: 
"Wir können uns Nichts anders als stofflich denken. Auch Gedanken und 
Abstrakta bekommen von uns eine sehr verfeinerte Stofflichkeit, die wir 
vielleicht ableugnen: nichts destoweniger haben sie eine solche. Wir 
haben uns daran gewöhnt, diese feine Stofflichkeit zu übersehn und vom 
'Immateriellen' zu reden. Ganz wie wir tot und lebendig, logisch und un- 
logisch usw. getrennt haben. Unsere Gegensätze verlernen - ist die 
Aufgabe. " 
"We can think Nothing other than as material. Thoughts and abstractions, 
too, receive from us a much subtlised materiality which we perhaps deny. 
nonetheless they have such a materiality. We have become used to 
overlooking this subtle materiality and to speak of the 'immaterial'. 
Just like we have divided dead and alive, logical and illogical etc. To 
unlearn our oppositions - is the task. " (KSA 10,1 13 ], m. t. ) 
By thus breaking up the spirit-matter dualism, matter can be liberated 
into the divinity only accorded to spirit within Platonism. This means that 
whatever is thought in this physiological mode is thereby released into the 
'immanent critique' according to which everything exists, insofar as 
'immanent critique' here comes to mean the mode of overcoming intrinsic to 
it. It could therefore also be said that just as much as the metabolic (as 
the central feature of physiology) marks a revival of the notion and method 
Of immanent critique, so immanent critique can be seen to function as a 
prototype of Nietzsches's physiological thinking. 
The crucial difference obviously lies in the fact that for Kant 
the 'x' 
in the trope 'critique of x by x' can always only be equated with reason 
because the rational is for him the ' founding mode' of all phenomena. 
All 
phenomena are as such (for Kant) insofar as they are constituted 
by (the 
faculties of) reason. This is in keeping with the Copernican 
turn and the 
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consequences it has for the conception of all phenomena as produced by that 
part of reason which Kant designates as the understanding. But reason 
cannot question itself fully and thus become critique without reserve 
because it cannot question the will to truth which is definitional to it. 
In contrast to this, Nietzsche diagnoses the loss of ground of reason. In 
charting the self-devaluation of the highest values hitherto, 'the highest 
values devalue themselves' Cdie obersten Werte entwerten sich' KSA 12,9 
[351, WM/WP no. 2), Nietzsche emphasises that reason, together with all the 
other Platonistic investments, progressively weakens as chief explanatory 
force for all phenomena, that it is no longer capable of 'grounding' them. 
But it is important to emphasise that in Nietzsche's understanding of this 
process, reason is not overcome by anything extrinsic to it, such as 
feeling or experience'. Rather, it is intrinsic to reason, precisely 
insofar as it ever had any significant explanatory force, that it overcomes 
itself, that it devalues itself in the very process of trying to sustain 
its value. This is how the will to power as rationalisation plays itself 
out. In this regard, Nietzsche follows Kant's procedure very closely when 
the latter conceives of the overcoming of reason by reason as immanent 
critique. 
But not only does Nietzsche show that reason overcomes (and thereby 
devalues) itself tin this respect he simply repeats Kant' s model of 
critique), but he develops a thinking in which the trope 'critique/ 
overcoming of x by x' completely dominates over whichever 
' x' is inscribed 
in it, whereas for Kant the ' x' always had to be some form of 
' reason' . In 
this sense it could be said that a physiological thinking 
is that wherein 
the nature of this trope <' critique/overcoming of x by x') as 
trope is 
privileged and the ' x' in it becomes, if not coincidental, at 
least of 
secondary importance. This entire movement of thought turns 
full circle 
when we remember that the term ' trope' derives from the 
Greek rporr 4,, to 
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turn, and rp6Yroc, turn, manner, mode of life. Nietzsche is exceedingly 
explicit about this when he writes: 
"Alle grossen Dinge gehen durch sich selbst zu Grunde, durch einen Akt 
der Selbstaufhebung: so will es das Gesetz des Lebens, das Gesetz der 
notwendigen 'Selbstüberwindung' im Wesen des Lebens. " 
"A11 great things go to ground, perish through themselves, through an act 
of self-overcoming: thus the law of life wills it, the law of the 
necessary self-overcoming in the nature of life. "' (KSA 5, GdM/GoM III, 
27, t. m. ) 
Immanent critique, or self-overcoming, is the fundamental mode of life 
through which great things overcome themselves. Great things are great 
precisely to the degree to which they participate in this essential mode of 
life. Critique itself overcomes itself insofar as it relinquishes its 
idealist investments (chief among them reason's claim to foundational 
status) and is reborn as a physiological thinking in which self-overcoming 
in the mode of any ordinary organism has complete precedence over anything 
thought to be stable, even when and as it overcomes itself. 
Hence Nietzsche' s physiological thinking, unlike that of Platonism, is in 
no way opposed to life and its natural processes. It does not set up any 
superior instance, agency or vantage point (such as ' truth' or ' god' , the 
'ideal' or reason) from which and in terms of which life may be judged and 
measured. This is how Nietzsche describes the utterly ' immanent' nature of 
physiological thinking: 
"Wir gehören zum Charakter der Welt, das ist kein Zweifel! Wir haben 
keinen Zugang zu ihr als durch uns: es muß alles Hohe und Niedrige an uns 
notwendig ihrem Wesen zugehörig verstanden werden! " 
We belong to the character of the world, there is no doubt! 
We have no 
access to it other than through us: all that is high and low 
in us must 
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necessarily be understood as belonging to its nature! " (KSA 12,1 [89), 
M. t. ) 
This is to say that ' we' , that ' our' bodies, belong to the world and its 
perpetual movement and not vice versa. It is clear from this that a 
physiological thinking aspires to the very movement Nietzsche finds in life 
itself, namely a perpetual metabolising, a fundamental, material overcoming 
of itself. Hence the move from metaphysics to metabolism is in the highest 
degree indicative of the transformations thinking undergoes as it turns 
away from Platonism. Because metaphysics is that type of thinking which 
posits something (ideal) over and above the physical and which is, 
moreover, thought to be inherently superior to a merely material nature. 
The metabolic, on the other hand, which is the leading thread of a 
physiological thinking, in the fullest sense of the word Incorporates what 
can be thought of as excessive to material nature back into material nature 
and has the effect of rendering matter 'itself' intrinsically excessive, 
intrinsically beyond itself. A body is always already so entirely beyond 
itself, insofar as it is involved in the perpetual overcoming that is its 
metabolism, it does not even need anything 'above' or 'beyond' it which 
would structure it, and give it meaning and sense extrinsically. 
In this sense a body embodies life perfectly: it refuses to stand still 
and to submit to being, as does life; the becoming which is called a 
body 
is never interrupted, halted or brought to a stop, and nor is life; a 
body 
can never catch up with Itself and is always irretrievably 
beyond itself, 
as is life. It is for these reasons that a thinking which emulates 
the body 
and which begins to listen to the 'tremendous inaudible stream of all 
organic becoming' is the only thinking which does not set 
itself in 
opposition to life which is always a way of denigrating 
life. Life itself 
Is strengthened in a physiological thinking because the self-overcoming 
of 
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life is promoted. Life' s originary excess can be heard through ýº ysiolr y, 
The great release of thought occurs when it is realised that the most 
profound mode of life is the cataclysmic or the catastrophic. Life ' itself' 
has nothing to preserve, not even ' itself' . It is clear that the demand is 
always to waste what appears safe and enclosed. The safer something 
appears, the more radically it may be wasted. The imaginary interiority of 
the human animal appears as the greatest certainty to a godless age and for 
that reason alone it must be sacrificed in a splendid and entirely useless 
gesture. Death is the most extreme expenditure of the spectre of 
interiority. And so it is absolutely necessary to perish, as cells, as 
rational agents, as organisms and as a race. To celebrate this headlong 
rush into expenditure without reserve, into catastrophe and to embrace its 
necessity joyously - that is the meaning of physiology". 
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IV. The Time of Physio logy 
One of the most important starting points for Kant's rethinking of the 
issues concerning the production of knowledge in the first Critique is to 
say that there are two separate and qualitatively different founts of 
knowledge, namely intuition and understanding. But having so radically 
separated these two, it becomes necessary for him to show that and how they 
can be combined to produce the kind of advanced, integrated experience Kant 
calls knowledge. The details of the progressive integration of their 
respective material are given in the Analytic of Principles which 
thematises the subsumption of the manifold of intuition under each of the 
categories in turn. But the demonstration that this combination is in 
principle possible, that these two deeply heterogeneous sources of 
knowledge can be fused at all, is the subject of the Transcendental 
Deduction. In that chapter, then, Kant needs to demonstrate that knowledge 
of an object is the result of the formation of the object as a synthesised 
manifold of intuition unified in a concept of the understanding. This is to 
say that, according to Kant, a subject can claim to know an object on the 
basis of a complex, bipartite synthesis in which the object as distinct 
entity is produced in the first place. Synthesis is that which brings 
together what are otherwise merely 'empty thoughts' and 'blind intuitions' 
(KrV/CPR A51, B75)27 and hence it is that which actually brings about the 
emergence of objects through the fusion of these elements, it is that which 
makes possible expansive judgements beyond merely analytical (tautological) 
'truths'. 
But in the shift of perspective which occurs from Kant to Nietzsche and 
the fundamentally different understanding of a philosophical project which 
accompanies this shift, this outline of how objects arise will naturally 
undergo some radical transformations. Among these there are two 
in 
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particular which are of special interest to the present attempt to chart 
the emergence of Nietzsche's physiological thinking from the Kanti. 3n 
formulation of critique. 
The first of these two points describes the supercession of the impotent 
belief in knowledge by the vigorous creation of a culture within which the 
perpetual productions of the will to power are recognised for what they 
are, a task Nietzsche describes most succinctly as: 
'"Der Glaube ' so und so ist es' zu verwandeln in den Willen ' so und so 
soll es werden' ." 
"The belief 'such and such it is' to be transformed into the will ' such 
and such it shal I become' ." (KSA 12,1 1 12 5) , m. t. ) 
For Kant it is of course still a matter of a subject relating to an 
object according to a specific model of knowledge, namely that which he 
envisages in the Copernican turn. In this particular type of relation both 
subject and object are conceived as distinct entities and the faculties of 
knowledge in their interplay can be named as the site where subjects and 
objects are produced in their phenomenal constitution. This means that, 
having abandoned 'god' as the highest ground, Kant puts the human subject 
in its place: knowledge of the human phenomenal subject and knowledge of 
phenomena for the human subject are the two aspects of his central concern. 
But this model is only sustainable as long as the blind faith in reason 
which lies at the heart of it remains unquestioned. In this sense 
the 
Kantian investment in the possibility of knowledge is no more than a 
symptom of what Nietzsche calls incomplete nihilism. In it, the old 
ideal 
or idol C'god', truth) is still worshipped, albeit in a thoroughly 
modernised, secularised form which, moreover, is entirely 
devoid of any of 
the ecstatic dimensions inherent in any truly religious, sacrificial 
practice. The Platonic structures remain firmly in place as 
long as 
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critique does not al-: -o encompass reason and its claims to knowledge. 
But we know that Nietzsche does much more than simply to question reason: 
he attacks, ridicules and demolishes reason as long as it claims to be the 
ground of all things, of the world and of the human beings in it. The 
entire project of knowledge as the 'founding mode', of the sciences as the 
highest forms of relating to the world, and of philosophy as that discourse 
which gives the metaphysical underpinning to these forms of relation, is 
shown up in Nietzsche' s writings as the pathetic, impoverished fantasy of 
an enfeebled life-form that it is. The question ' what can I know? ' has 
simply lost all meaning for Nietzsche because the ' I' that is required to 
pose this question has been ` decentred` to the point of insignificance. It 
is merely another instance of an imaginary stability, a quasi-identity 
which only serves to hold at bay a great, all-pervasive exuberance, only 
another makeshift levee against the flood: 
".., wir haben dem Glauben an die Erkennbarkeit der Dinge ebensosehr wie 
dem Glauben an die Erkenntnis abgeschworen. Das 'Ding' ist nur eine 
Fiktion, das 'Ding an sich' sogar eine widerspruchsvolle unerlaubte 
Fiktion: aber auch das Erkennen, das absolute und folglich auch das 
relative, ist ebenfalls nur eine Fiktion! Damit fällt denn auch die 
Nötigung weg, ein Etwas das 'erkennt', ein Subjekt für das Erkennen 
anzusetzen, irgend eine reine 'Intelligenz', einen ' absoluten Geist'. 
- diese noch von Kant nicht gänzlich aufgegebene Mythologie, welche Plato 
für Europa in verhängnisvoller Weise vorbereitet hat und die mit dem 
christlichen Grund-Dogma 'Gott ist ein Geist' alle Wissenschaft des 
Leibes und dadurch auch die Fortentwicklung des Leibes mit dem 
Tode 
bedrohte, - diese Mythologie hat nunmehr ihre Zeit gehabt. 
" 
"... we have renounced the belief in the knowability of things as much as 
the belief in knowledge. The ' thing' is merely a fiction, the ' thing in 
itself' even full of contradictions, an impermissible fiction: 
but 
absolute and consequently also relative knowing, too, is equally only 
a 
fiction! With it there falls away the compulsion to posit a something 
which 'knows' 
,a subject of knowing, any pure 
' intelligence' , an 
' absolute sni ri t' - this mythology, not even entirely given 
up by Kant, 
-220- 
which Plato prepared for Europe in fateful manner, and which threatened 
death, by means of the basic Christian dogma 'god is a spirit', to all 
science of the body and hence also to the further development of the 
body, - this mythology has now had its time. " (KSA 11,38 [ 15], m. t. > 
What distinguishes Nietzsche' s thinking most radically from that of Ka:,,, 
is its readiness to hurl itself into the flood and to drift off in it so 
that nothing is saved, nothing is preserved and it is futile to ask of the 
outcome. Via Nietzsches writings, thinking becomes again what it always 
was below the flimsy surface of an ostensible quest for knowledge, a de- 
personalised, de-humanised, automatic, self-sustaining voyage without 
departure or arrival, most readily comparable to the insensible but hugely 
effective coursing of blood through the veins of a body, a deep, 
unconscious roar which carries with it all that it touches and which 
'cares` as much for the survival of the organism it pervades as the ocean 
'cares' for the seafarers embarked on it. 
Finally, the most momentous implication of this shift of perspective 
concerns the respective understanding of temporality that accompanies Kant 
and Nietzsche's philosophical project: to theorise the production of 
knowledge of an object by a subject in the case of the former and to 
celebrate the exuberance of physiology or the will to power in 
the case of 
the latter, to put it somewhat schematically. 
As has been discussed before (ch. 1, I, above), Kant realises that 
the 
transcendental aspect of time is strictly unrepresentable. 
The conception 
of time derived from experience, on the other hand, 
invariably implies that 
time is unilinear, unidirectional and irreversible. 
And hence Kant 
compromises with this reductive conception when he says 
that "we represent 
the time-sequence by a line progressing into infinity" 
(KrV/CPR A33, B50). 
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But by his own admission, time as transcendental cannot be repre, =:. ted to 
consciousness in the forms in which it articulates the world to itself, 
namely in terms of the categories of the understanding and the schYm; ata to 
which they contribute. Although Kant explicitly states that this is so, !, is 
absolute commitment to the project of knowledge and a blind investment In 
the all-pervasive force of reason lead him to quickly pass over what is 
potentially an enormous stumbling block for his theory of the formation of 
knowledge through the interplay of the distinct faculties. 
Early on in the first version of the Transcendental Deduction Kant makes 
this hugely important observation about time or, as he habitually refers to 
it, inner sense: 
"Unsere Vorstellungen... gehören... zum innern Sinn, und als solche sind 
alle unsere Erkenntnisse zuletzt doch der formalen Bedingung des innern 
Sinnes, nämlich der Zeit unterworfen, als in welcher sie insgesamt... In 
Verhältnisse gebracht werden müssen. " 
"Our representations... belong... to inner sense, and as such are finally 
subject to the formal condition of inner sense, namely time, as in which 
they must all be... brought into relations. " (KrV/CPR A98f, t. m. ) 
Here Kant clearly says that all our representations are in time, that it 
is time which 'gives' representations (which are eventually to become 
knowledge) although the specifics of their relation can only be determined 
by categorial input. 
Furthermore, Kant says that synthesis, as the spontaneous actus which 
unifies a pre-conceptual heterogeneity and as such can justifiably 
be 
thought of as the productive capacity per se, is the expression of, or 
simply belongs to, the faculty of imagination (cf. also KrV/CPR 
A118, 
A120, A123, B130, B152f , as for instance when 
he states that: 
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"Verknüpfung [ist)... das Produkt eines synthetischen Vermögens der 
Einbildungskraft, die den inneren Sinn in Ansehung des Zeitverhältnisses 
bestimmt. " 
"Connection is... the product of a synthetic faculty of imagination which 
determines inner sense as regards the relation of time. " (KrV/CPR B233, 
t. m. ) 
But Kant equally, albeit very much implicitly, allows for synthesis to be 
essentially an unconscious activity, although capable of becoming 
conscious, when he remarks in passing "... all connection, we may become 
conscious of it or not... 11 (" ... alle Verbindung, wir mögen uns ihrer bewuß t 
werden oder nicht... " KrV/CPR, B130, t. m. , my emphasis). If we further take 
into consideration that Kant conceives of an object as the product of a 
synthetic process, "an object is that in whose concept the manifold of a 
given Intuition is unified. " (" Objekt ist das, in dessen Begriff das 
Mannigfaltige einer gegebenen Anschauung vereinigt ist. " KrV/CPR 
B137, t, m. , Kant' s own emphasis), it gradually emerges that in the 
Transcendental Deductions Kant thematises what can only be termed the 
(conditions of possibility of) the becoming-object of the manifold. Of the 
synthesis at the heart of this productive process Kant writes: 
"... eine objektive Bedingung aller Erkenntnis, nicht deren ich bloß 
selbst bedarf, um ein Objekt zu erkennen, sondern unter der jede 
Anschauung stehen muß, um für mich Objekt zu werden, weil auf andere Art, 
und ohne diese Synthesis, das Mannigfaltige sich nicht in einem 
Bewußtsein vereinigen wllrde. " 
"... an objective condition of all knowledge, not just one which 
I myself 
require in order to know an object, but under which every intuition must 
stand in order to become an object for me because otherwise, and without 
this synthesis, the manifold would not unify itself in a consciousness. 
" 
(KrV/CPR 8138, t. m. , Kant' s own emphasis) 
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This shows that although Kant feels compelled to locate, or to anchor, 
synthesis in the faculty of imagination, nonetheless in the Transcendental 
Deductions he operates with the notion of an unconscious or pre-conscious 
temporality which spontaneously synthesises the pre-conceptual 
heterogeneity which perpetually and indiscriminately assaults the senses 
and which is progressively integrated into the distinct, unified entities 
Kant calls objects. 
It seems to me that one of the ways in which Nietzsche' s thought of the 
eternal recurrence of the same can be approached is to say that it remains 
formally very close to these Kantian characterisations of the relation 
between time and ' objects' - although the status of the latter is obviously 
drastically undermined in the conception of the world as will to power 
("This world is will to power - and nothing besides", WP no. 1067), Since 
Nietzsche has shown the project of knowledge to be deeply infused with an 
incomplete nihilism, his reconsideration of temporality is no longer 
subservient to the Kantian project of founding a rational metaphysics. It 
is obvious that he agrees with Kant when the latter says that time is 
intrinsically unknowable. But this is not because, as for Kant, the medium 
(inner sense) in which a pre-conceptual heterogeneity becomes available for 
the formations of consciousness (in short, concepts) cannot be represented 
as such other than in terms of these concepts which are imposed on it. 
This 
is itself merely a conceptual problem. Instead, Nietzsche's thinking passes 
beyond any ambition to 'know' time as transcendental. As for Kant, 
for 
Nietzsche time 'itself' is unknowable but, unlike Kant, Nietzsche 
finds 
that time is thinkable and for him it has become so within the parameters 
of the non-Platonistic, post-metaphysical conception of the world as will 
to power. In this way it becomes possible to be submerged 
in the 
unconscious flows that bear along the matter of the universe, 
to ride the 
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wave of becoming. It becomes possible to envisage how the univer-se must 
move, how it must perpetually transform itself. Hence what Nietzsche si.; s 
about temporality is the necessary and inevitable outcome of mult: pý 
strands of thought which include the following components. 
First of all it must be observed that for Nietzsche time has to be 
infinite. Only by conceiving of it in this way can the absolute primacy of 
becoming be affirmed. A time which would have begun would have had to be 
created and thus requires the assumption of a creative force outside or 
prior to time in whose power it would lie to make time commence, This would 
obviously again be nothing other than yet another Platonic-Christian 
falsification and suppression of becoming. But just as much as time must be 
thought as without commencement, so it must also be thought as without end, 
whether as simple cessation or as telos. If becoming was capable of ceasing 
it would already have done so (although it is perhaps more accurate to say 
that if it was capable of ceasing it would never have done otherwise and 
hence would never even have begun to become, a thought which is in turn 
paradoxical since, as we saw just now, time cannot have begun). The fact 
that the world exists and continues to exist is itself the most material 
proof of the infinity of time. 
This further implies that being is in principle impossible. Becoming 
would have to be suspended, would have to cease, for being ultimately to 
become possible, insofar as being is thought of as in absolute opposition 
to becoming, namely as eternal or permanent, as immutable and 
finally as 
immaterial. For this is what is meant by being, the permanent cessation 
(for it cannot be otherwise, being and permanence are utterly coterminous) 
of becoming. But such a state is merely an empty fiction, 
there can be 
nothing which does not perpetually become. Nietzsche writes: 
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"Hätte die Welt ein Ziel, so müßte e erreicht sein. Gäbe e5 für sie 
einen unbeabsichtigten Endzustand, so müßte er ebenfalls erreicht sein. 
Wäre sie überhaupt eines Verharrens und Starrwerdens, eines 'Seins' 
fähig, hätte sie nur Einen Augenblick in allem ihrem Werden diese 
Fähigkeit des 'Seins', so wäre es wiederum mit allem Werden längst zu 
Ende, also auch mit allem Denken, mit allem 'Geiste'. Die Tatsache des 
'Geistes' als eines Werdens beweist, daß die Welt kein Ziel, keinen 
Endzustand hat und des Seins unfähig ist. " 
"If the world had a goal, it must have been reached. If there was for it 
an unintended final state, it also must have been reached. If it were at 
all capable of a pausing and becoming-fixed, of 'being', if for only one 
moment in all its becoming it had this capability of 'being', then all 
becoming would long since have come to an end, along with all thinking, 
with all 'spirit'. The fact of 'spirit' as a becoming proves that the 
world has no goal, no final state, and is incapable of being. " (KSA 11,36 
1151, WM/WP no. 1062, t. m. ) 
So far we have seen that Nietzsche thinks of time as infinite, as does 
Kant (cf. for instance KrV/CPR A32, B47f). But unlike Kant, Nietzsche 
understands the infinity of time as the great affirmation of becoming. But 
perhaps the most significant of all differences between the Kantian and the 
Nietzschean conception of time lies in the fact that the former is utterly 
committed to time (representable) as linear whereas for Nietzsche this 
carries at least one wholly unacceptable implication. If time is infinite 
and yet linear, and that first and foremost means without repetitions, 
if 
the formations which occur in time are never repeated, if time 
itself never 
repeats itself, it must be asked: whence derives this capability 
for the 
eternally new? This, in turn, could only be explained by recourse 
to the 
thought of an infinite force which is capable of an eternity, an 
infinity 
of new creations. And again there is only one model which maps 
perfectly on 
this conception of an infinitely creative force, namely 
that of the 
Platonic-Christian 
god. Because this is the philosophical 
construct which 
-226- 
alone could explain the miraculous aspect of such a cunceptic:, ri of the 
world: 
",.. die Wunder-Fähigkeit zur unendlichen Neugestaltung ihrer Formen und 
Lagen. Die Welt, wenn auch kein Gott mehr, soll doch der göttlichen 
Schöpferkraft, der unendlichen Verwandlungs-Kraft fdhig sein... Das {5t 
Immer noch die alte religiöse Denk- und Wunschweise, eine Art Sehnsucht 
zu glauben, daß irgendworin doch die Welt dem alten geliebten, 
unendlichen, unbegrenzt-schöpferischen Gotte gleich sei,.. " 
. the miracle capability 
for an infinite new structuring of its forms 
and arrangements. The world, if no longer a god, is to be capable of the 
divine creative force, of the infinite force of transformation... That is 
still the old religious manner of thinking and wishing, a kind of longing 
to believe that in something the world is like the old loved, infinite, 
boundlessly creative god... " (KSA 11,36 1151, WM/WP no. 1062, t, m. , my 
omissions) 
But if, conversely, an infinite time and a finite force, as is the will 
to power, are thought as the compass for the post-Platonistic conception of 
the world (and this alone prevents the illegitimate assumption of a divine 
agency as the ground of the world, a known symptom of incomplete nihilism), 
the thought of a circular temporality becomes utterly unavoidable. 
This is 
to say that the three chief components of the eternal recurrence of 
the 
same mutually necessitate each other. Their mutual interdependence can 
be 
expressed in at least three different ways. Firstly, if the world 
is 
thought as self-productive and hence no longer dependent on a notion of 
'god' to sustain it, time becomes infinite and force becomes 
finite; 
secondly, the will to power as the economy of a finite and 
intrinsic (non- 
metaphysical) force demands for its articulation the infinite repetitions 
of eternal recurrence, as a consequence of which 'god', as 
Platonic- 
Christian construct, is rendered redundant; thirdly, an 
infinite time, if 
this thought is not to relapse into the Platonic-Christian 
model of an 
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extra-mundane ground, demands a finite force. However their relations arg 
formulated, in each of these three articulations the combination of these 
elements of thought entails the conception of temporality as circular -, nd 
demands that time be thought as repeating itself - even if this thought is 
perhaps as yet (or even intrinsically) incomprehensible, given that for two 
thousand years this conception of time has been suppressed in favour of the 
one which remains essentially intact up to its formulation in the first 
Critique. But god is dead and it is, if nothing else, an anachronism, in 
the fullest sense of the word, to cling on to a notion of temporality which 
jr, ' so completely parasitic on the old idol as is that of a simple linearity 
of time-"B. 
It might perhaps be asked in what sense Nietzsche can on the one hand 
speak of the eternal recurrence of the same and yet denounce the eternal as 
a characteristic of other things, as for instance when he writes "we do not 
believe in any eternal concepts, eternal values, eternal forms, eternal 
souls" ("wir glauben an keine ewigen Begriffe, ewigen Werte, ewigen Formen, 
ewigen Seelen" KSA 11,38 (141, m. t. ). This seeming contradiction can easily 
be resolved when it is realised that an infinity of time (eternity) can, 
and indeed must, attach to the recurring formations in time, but that as 
soon as eternity is thought as an attribute of something which is thereby 
thought as exempt from the ceaseless becoming that is time, recurring 
'itself' (and hence its related components, discussed above) is again 
suppressed. This is to say that in the eternal recurrence of the same it 
is 
the recurring which takes place in an infinity of time and it may even 
be 
said that recurring is that which recurs infinitely. As Kant had already 
demonstrated in his theorisation of the emergence of objects (in 
the 
Transcendental Deduction), the same, as that which appears to 
be identical 
with itself, is only produced as such in a synthetic temporality. 
This is 
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exactly what Nietzsche says of the same - with the not unimpor'int 
difference that he does not seek anything behind objects as appearar, cc_ :n 
the way Kant does when he assumes what is effectively a noumenal substrate. 
Another way of drawing out the difference between an eternal recurringn 
an assumption of eternal forms would be to say that in the former it is the 
(self -)differing of time which is expressed and hence the perpetuation of 
difference in time, whereas in any Platonistic conception of eternity the 
very opposite is the case insofar as it equates ' eternal' and ' self- 
identical` and hence represses difference. In addition, it is important to 
emphasise that Nietzsche frequently speaks of ' making-equal' (Gleichmachen) 
or 'equalisation' (Ausglelchung), thereby drawing attention to the fact 
that for him (as for Kant) the same is the effect of a spontaneous, 
unconscious activity: 
"Alles Denken, Urteilen, Wahrnehmen als Vergleichen hat als Voraussetzung 
ein ' Gleichsetzen' , noch früher ein ' Gleichmachen' . Das Gleichmachen Ist 
dasselbe, was die Einverleibung der angeeigneten Materie in die Amöbe 
1st, " 
"All thinking, judging, perceiving as comparing has as prerequisite an 
'equating', even earlier a 'making-equal', Making-equal is the same as 
the incorporation of appropriated matter into an amoeba. " (KSA 12,5 [651, 
M. t. ) 
Again, the difference lies in Kant's distinction between the process of 
the production and the product (an object), whereas in Nietzsche's 
conception it is unnecessary to distinguish between the process 
(equalisation) and the 'product' (the same). it is useful to 
think of the 
eternal recurrence of the same as the eternal recurrence of equalisation, 
or even just the eternal recurrence of recurrence, which emphasises 
that 
the accent has shifted from that which recurs to the process of recurrence, 
which Kant had glimpsed as synthesis. 
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To recapitulate what this section attempted to establish, Kant discovers 
the unconscious, spontaneous, temporal actus of an originary sy 11 thesis 
through which objects (identities) emerge as such. But at the same time as 
he discovers this sheer perpetual, productive process, he stultifies it, 
first of all, by anchoring it in the faculty of imagination but secondly, 
and with much more devastating consequences, he grounds this potentially 
de-personalised productivity in the reductive, anthropocentric agenly which 
he envisages in the (to us, imaginary) unity of transcendental 
apperception. I hope to have indicated that Nietzsche takes up the th.. ught 
of an unconscious, temporal synthesising process but that he is able to 
release synthesis from the constrictions of an anthropocentric project of 
the foundation of knowledge into the cosmic delirium of the eternal 
recurrence of the same. 
As has already been discussed (sec. III, above), Nietzsche can be seen to 
adapt the central trope of critique (critique of x by x) to the 
demonstration of a perpetual self-overcoming as the chief mode of the will 
to power or life (overcoming of x by x). Similarly, when it comes to 
weaving the temporal aspects of the will to power, namely the eternal 
recurrence, into the discussion there is one trope which perfectly 
encapsulates the thought that becoming ('time') exceeds itself in a 
repetition or a doubling of itself in which the same formations occur over 
and over again. Whenever Nietzsche speaks of noch einmal, there appears a 
trace of this new conception of temporality, this excessive self-differing 
wherein becoming repeats itself. Unfortunately this is usually rendered 
as 
'once again', the German equivalent of which would be wieder einmal. 
And 
although 'recurrence' (or 'return') translates Wiederkunft (or Wiederkehr), 
I would suggest that noch einmal, the trope of eternal recurrence, 
more 
directly corresponds to 'once more' which retains the 
thought that an 
occurrence repeats itself but which has the added advantage cif 
capturing 
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that in any such occurrence time expends itself, that it dispens-tz Lts 
boundless, eternal excess, that which is ' more' (noch), unctasiný any 
eternally undepleted. This seemingly minor problem of translation becomes 
particularly acute in a note such as the following one. 
"Die 1 wahre Welt', wie immer auch man sie bisher konzipiert hat, - sie war 
immer die scheinbare Welt noch einmal. " 
"The 'real world', however one has hitherto conceived it, - it has always 
been the apparent world once more. " (KSA 13, 11 [ 501, WM/WP no. 566, t. m. ) 
The two-world theory as conceived by Platonism implies that the 'real 
world' is that of the forms and of the ideal, that the ' real world' is in 
fact the ' ideal world' because that which is ideal harbours the highest 
truth, the greatest purity etc. As opposed to this Platonism conceives of 
'this world', as a mere fallen, lesser copy of the immutable ideal/real 
world and as such 'this world' is not real but merely apparent because it 
is in time, is subject to becoming and changes, because it is the world of 
matter, of physical disintegration and of all the perpetual transformations 
which matter undergoes and which the ideal/real world, as that which has 
being, does not have to suffer. 
One of the most important ways in which Nietzsche demolishes this 
dangerous fiction is to say that, on the contrary, 'this world' is the only, 
world which boasts any productive capability and that it is precisely 
the 
excessive temporality of ' this world' which alone can repeat itself 
in such 
a way as to even produce the idealist fictions of Platonism. 
Only becoming 
can produce being, whereas being is incapable of founding 
becoming, because 
it is devoid of the metabolic motor of time which drives on 
the perpetual 
transformations of this world, the only world. In this move, 
in this hugely 
condensed note, the rift between time and matter as 
the two aspects of 
becoming, torn open by the oppositional thinking inherent 
to Platonism, Is 
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healed once more. After philosophy had denied th-- body of the thinker for 
several millenia, 
Nietzschean thinking relea5eý the tide of physiology. In 
the physiological thinking rehearsed by Nietzsche, the economic aspect of 
material becoming which he terms the will to power, and the temporal a ;. ý_t 
of a perpetually mutating materiality, namely the eternal recurrence of the 
same, are fused once more in the nearest, richest phenomenon, in which 




Lqt roduc ti on 
1, Nearly thirty more references can be found in the ' Sgmtliche Briefe'. 
Olivier Reboul in his book Nietzsche critique de Kant makes the following 
remark about Nietzsche' s response to Kant: 
"Kant est le philosophe dont Nietzsche s'est le plus occupe... avec un 
sdrieux qui prouve qu' il avast rencont re daps 1' auf eur des t roi s 
Critiques un vis-a-vis de taille, un penseur en face duquel, contre 
lequel il lui fallait sans cesse se defenir et se redefinir-, un 
philosophe sans qui il n' eut pas ete lui-meme tout ä fait philosophe. " 
"Kant is the philosopher with whom Nietzsche occupied himself the most... 
with a seriousness which proves that he had met in the author of the 
three Critiques an opponent of stature, a thinker in the face of whom, 
against whom, it was necessary to define and to redefine oneself 
ceaselessly, a philosopher without whom he could not himself have been 
the philosopher he was. 11 (p. 7, m. t. ) 
2. Heidegger' s remarks in (section 15 of) Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst, 
entitled 'Kants Lehre vom Schönen. Ihre Mißdeutung durch Schopenhauer und 
Nietzsche', in which he alleges that Nietzsche (like Schopenhauer) utterly 
misunderstands Kant's notion of the ' without interest' of aesthetic 
judgements, have not exactly furthered Nietzsche's reputation as a reader 
of Kant. 
3. In this context I would also like to mention a recent article by Keith 
Ansell-Pearson, entitled 'Nietzsche's Overcoming of Kant and Metaphysics: 
From Nihilism to Tragedy' (cf. bibliography), in which he writes: 
".., in terms of the history of modern European philosophy, Nietzsche's 
fundamental, philosophical project - regarding both principle and task 
(will to power and the revaluation of all values) - is to be examined 
against the backdrop of Kant's critique of metaphysics -a critique 
that 
has determined the parameters and nature of modern Western philosophy up 
to this day. Gilles Deleuze... is the only thinker to have explored the 
relation between Kant and Nietzsche - specifically on the nature and aims 
of 'critique' - in any detail and with some degree of sophistication. 
Once, however, it is accepted and acknowledged that the relation 
between 
Kant and Nietzsche is a crucial one for contemporary thinking 
in 
philosophy... the relation between Nietzsche and the 
'Chinaman of 
Kdnigsberg' will be the focus of much greater attention amongst 
scholars 
and commentators of Nietzsche's philosophy than has 
hitherto been the 
case. " (p. 337) 
As concerns Ansell-Pearson, s assessment of the relationship 
between these 
two thinkers, I am in complete agreement. 
4. Gernot U. Gabel. Friedrich Nietzsche: ein Verzeichnis westeuropgischer 
und nordamerikanischer Hochschulschriften 1900 - 1980, cf. 
bibliography. 
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5. Cf. chapter 3, footnote 10, in which I explain my reasons for 
translating the title of the second part of the third Critique in this way. 
6, Innumerable references to 'physiology' can be found throughout 
Nietzsche' s oeuvre, especially in the Nachlaß, volumes 7-13 of KSA but 
also, for instance, in GD/TI, KSA vol. 6. These increase in frequency 
towards the end of Nietzsche's writing life. A subject index, if it is ever 
done, should confirm this. 
7. It is in the Heideggerian tradition of Nietzsche interpretation that 
this is the case. Typical examples include, firstly, Heidegger' s own 
statement of the issue in his Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst, Nietzsche I 
cf. bibliography, and also Michel Haar' s article "Heidegger and the 
Nietzschean 'Physiology of Art'" in Exceedingly Nietzsche, cf. 
bibliography. Cf also note 8 in chapter four. 
8. In a recent Canadian collection of papers entitled Nietzsche and the 
Rhetoric of Nihilism (cf. bibliography), one can find an article which 
purportedly deals with the issue of Nietzschean physiology (Richard Brown, 
"Nihilism: 'Thus Speaks Physiology'"). One of the most astonishing aspects 
of that piece of writing is that it never states what it understands by 
'physiology', as if this was perfectly self-evident. 
9. Although this is on one level merely a question of the weight lent to 
these different aspects of Platonism, the consequences for a philosophy are 
nevertheless profound. Thus, for instance, Heidegger' s response to 
Platonism can be understood as concentrating on the third of these points, 
namely the suppression of temporality as an effect of a Platonistic 
thinking, and to approach all other aspects of it on the basis of this 
emphasis. I am grateful to Jim Urpeth for pointing out to me this 
connection with Heidegger. 
Although this study is not the place to carry out such a comparison, it 
would be possible to read the differences between Nietzsche's ' materialist' 
thinking and the marked distaste Heidegger displays for any materialist 
thought, to issue from this initial shift of emphasis in their respective 
responses to Platonism. 
10. Contrary to the scandalously unfounded claims about 
the position of the 
will to power in the history of Western metaphysics Heidegger makes 
in Der 
Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis, Nietzsche II, cf. bibliography. 
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11. As Pierre Kiossowski puts it in Nietzsche et le cercle vicleux (cf. 
bibliograhy): 
"Le corps est le resul tat du fortuit: il n' est rien que le lieu de 
rencontre d'un ensemble d' impulsions individudes pour cet Intervalle que 
forme une vie humaine, lesquelles n' espirent qu' d se ddsindi viduer. " 
"The body is the result of chance: it is nothing but the site for the 
encounter of a group of impulses, individuated for this interval which 
forms a human life, which don't aspire to anything but to de-individuate 
themselves " (p. 52f, M. t. ) 
12. This notion of repetition is of course hugely prominent in the work of 
Heidegger (Sein und Zeit), and in that of Deleuze (Repetition et 
Difference, Nietzsche and Philosophie), cf. bibliography. 
13. As witnessed in the famous programmatic formulation with which Kant 
answered the question 'What is Enlightenment? ', 'Enlightenment is the 
emergence of Man from his self-induced immaturity' ("Aufklärung ist der 
Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit", vol. XI 
of the Werkausgabe, p. 53, t. m. ). 
14. It might perhaps be asked why this dissertation is still concerned with 
Kant's categorial framework if Nietzsche has succeeded in devaluing all 
philosophical system-buiding. The answer would have to be that it is useful 
and revealing to read Kant in the terms laid down by his system but that it 
is perfectly possible to do so without subscribing to the absolute belief 
in the primacy of reason which informs his texts. 
15. Perhaps this is what lies behind Heidegger's somewhat cryptic comment 
about Nietzsche in Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst, Nietzsche I (p. 17): 
"'Was Nietzsche zeit seines Schaffens selbst veröffentlicht 
hat, ist immer 
Vordergrund... Die eigentliche Philosophie bleibt als 'Nachlaß' zurück. 
" 
"What Nietzsche himself published during his creative life was always 
foreground... His philosophy proper was left behind as posthumous, 
unpublished work. " 
CHAPTER ONE 
1. For clarification of how to read the proof of this 
Analogy in terms of 
the syllogism as rendered here, cf. Heidegger Die 
Frage nach dem Ding 
p. 181, cf. bibliography. 
incidentally, made by Bergson in quite a 
different context. 
ple is not entirely appropriate simply 
because the operation at 
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the heart of the imputation of the a priori concept of substance to ob; ect 
is here translated into an empirical concept, thereby losing some of the 
momentum of the argument. By definition, though, this loss is inevitable if 
clarificatory examples are to be given at all. 
4. It is not necessary here to enter into the structures of 'proof' t 
which the Phaedo seeks to demonstrate the immortality of the soul, at least 
not in terms of their aspirations to the status of proof - to do so would 
mean nothing other than to revive a branch of theology long since 
desiccated beyond recognition. Only a reading of certain moments within the 
Phaedo in purely symptomatic terms is required to prepare the ground for 
the subsequent reconsideration of the Paralogisms. 
5. It is of course the case that in other writings, be they philosophical, 
scientific or literary, a conception of nature which is not (in this 
restrictive sense) theological, can be found; de Sade's writings would be a 
case in point. But within the tradition of metaphysics, that is to say in 
those texts which constitute the history of Western philosophy, Kant's is 
an original move. 
6. As does Heidegger throughout Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 
especially in the section entitled 'Das dritte Stadium der Grundlegung. Die 
innere Möglichkeit der Wesenseinheit der ontologischen Synthesis', pp. 65- 
84, cf. reference in the bibliography, below) 
7. Despite what Kant says in the Deduction in B: 
"Diese Einheit, die a priori vor allen Begriffen der Verbindung vorher- 
geht, ist nicht etwa jene Kategorie der Einheit... denn alle Kategorien 
gründen sich auf logische Funktionen in Urteilen, in diesen aber ist 
schon Verbindung, mithin Einheit gegebener Begriffe gedacht. Die 
Kategorie setzt also schon Verbindung voraus. Also müssen wir 
diese 
Einheit [ich denke] ... noch höher suchen, nämlich 
in demjenigen, was 
selbst den Grund der Einheit... enthält. " 
"This unity which precedes a priori all concepts of connection, 
is not at 
all that category of unity... for all categories are grounded 
in logical 
functions in Judgements, but in these connection, and thus unity of given 
concepts, is already thought. Thus the category already presupposes 
conection. Thus we have to seek this unity (I think) ... even 
higher, 
namely in that which itself contains the ground of unity.... 
"(KrV/CPR 
B131, t. m. , my omissions and insertion) 
Far from threatening my argument here, I believe that 
the latter part of 
his contention that "all categories are grounded in 
logical functions in 
is 
, 
judgements, but in these connection, and thus unity of given 
concepts, 
-ý Nought" is so utterly unfounded, it inadvertently 
under'. 'ites te 
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point that to attribute unity to transcendental apperception is 
illegitimate. 
CHAPTER TWO 
1. 'Tumultuous' - riotous or turbulent; L< tumere - to swell up. 
2. In fact, perhaps prompted by the realisation of the magnitude of his own 
philosophical project, he praises Hume in rather hyperbolic terms when he 
writes: 
"... seit dem Entstehen der Metaphysik... hat sich keine Begebenheit 
zugetragen, die in Ansehung des Schicksals dieser Wissenschaft hätte 
entscheidender werden können, als der Angriff, den David Hume auf 
dieselbe machte. " 
"... since the emergence of metaphysics... no event has taken place which 
could have been more decisive in regard to the fate of this science than 
the attack which David Hume made on it. " (Prol/P 257, t. m. ) 
For without Hume's work, the implication is, critique would not have had 
this indispensable point of departure. 
3. Nietzsche repeatedly ridicules this type of argument because it short- 
circuits the very process of thinking rather than to contribute to it, for 
instance when he says: 
"... der alte Kant. _.., welcher einmal sich 
die Frage stellte: 'wie sind 
synthetische Urteile a priori möglich? ' Er antwortete endlich, mit 
wunderbarem deutschem Tiefsinn: 'durch ein Vermögen dazu'. " 
"... old Kant... who once posed the question to himself: ' how are synthetic 
a priori judgements possible? ' He answered finally, with wonderful German 
profundity: 'through a faculty for them'. " (KSA 11,30 1 107 , m. t., my 
Omissions). 
4. As concerns the second distinction, namely that between object and 
appearance, Richard E. Aquila in his book on the Transcendental Deduction 
(chapter i. IV. "Objects and Appearances", p. 26, cf. bibliography), makes 
the following remarks: 
"... the apprehension of objective reality involves the apprehension 
of 
appearances... as objective realities" 
and: 
rom having been actually identified as objectively 
real, 
need not be supposed to possess any 
being of their own.. 
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5, For instance, this object grows from the size of a blade of grass to 
that of a full-grown oak tree in minutes because of the speed with which, I 
approach it, whereas that object undergoes the same change in years. 
6. Heidegger, in "Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'" in Holzwege (cf. 
bibliography), asks what Nietzsche understands by 'value' (pp, 222-228 of 
Holzwege deal with this point). He arrives at the conclusion that it is the 
will to power which posits values, a reading I entirely agree with. But by 
this time, Heidegger' s own account of the 'history of metaphysics' so 
entirely depends on according to Nietzsche's writings the position in wh ich 
metaphysics completes itself that in the course of his interpretation of 
these writings, Heidegger has to perform a number of moves which seem to be 
at best disingenuous and which at worst utterly misrepresent Nietzsche's 
thinking. An example from the latter end of the scale seems to me to occ ur 
when Heidegger writes of Nietzsche' s understanding of becoming: 
'"Werden' meint den Übergang von etwas zu etwas, jene Bewegung und 
Bewegtheit, die Leibniz in der Monadologie (911) die changements naturels 
nennt, die das ens qua ens, d. h. das ens percipiens et appetens 
durchwaltet. " 
"'Becoming' means the transition from something to something, that 
movement and turbulence which Leibniz calls changements naturels in the 
Monadology (§11), which range through the ens qua ens, i. e. the ens 
percipiens et appetens. " (Holzwege op. cit. p. 226, m. t. ) 
As a comment on Nietzsche this seems rather crass for two reasons. 
Firstly, the transformations of the will to power are most emphatically not 
"from something to something". Nietzsche incessantly reiterates that in the 
world thought as will to power there is no 'something' and to align 
becoming (will to power) with a 'something' (and that means with beings) 
without thoroughly problematising this proximity is downright misleading: 
... man darf nichts Seiendes Überhaupt zulassen, - weil 
dann das Werden 
seinen Wert verliert und geradezu als sinnlos und überflüssig erscheint. 
" 
"... one must not admit any being at all, - because then 
becoming loses 
its value and appears downright meaningless and superf luous. 
" (KSA 13,11 
1721, WM/ WP no. 708, t. m. ) 
Equally misleading, secondly, is to mention Leibniz in 
this context, as 
if it was the Monadology which inspired Nietzsche' s conception 
of becoming. 
The following is taken from the very note with which Heidegger 
focuses his 
essay: 
! ine dauerhaften letzten Einheiten, ... keine 
Monaden: auch hier 
! sende' erst von uns hineingelegt. " 
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"There are no durable ultimate unities, ... no monads: here too 'a being, 
is first imported by us. " (KSA 13,11 1731, WM/WP no. 715, t. m. ) 
This entire essay is riddled with such, and worse, falsifications. By 
1943, the year of this essay, ' Heidegger' s Nietzsche' had mysteriously 
turned from a nuanced thinker into the intellectual equivalent of a fascist 
thug. 
7. Heidegger was the first to point out this economy in Nietzsche's 
writings, c. f. Nietzsche I. As is well known, he focused on the terms 
'preservation' for phenomena of exhaustion and 'enhancement' for those of 
expendi t ure. 
8. Deleuze elaborates these points with great subtlety in "Plato and the 
Simulacrum", cf. bibliography. 
9. This must be done without lapsing into some puerile, quasi-Rousseauian 
dream of a benign and innocent nature which would heal all the evils 
brought on by a corrupt society if it were only possible to return to it 
and its benevolent reign. Where he deems this necessary, Nietzsche never 
fails to demarcate his own thought from that of Rousseau, cf. for instance 
the following selection of remarks: 
"Die Art Mensch, deren Mundstück ich bin: ... wir leiden nicht an 
der 
'Verderbnis', wir sind sehr verschieden von Rousseau und sehnen uns nicht 
nach dem 'guten Naturmenschen'- " 
"The kind of human being whose mouthpiece I am:.. we do not suffer from 
'depravity', we are very different from Rousseau and do not long for the 
1 good human being of nature' -" (KSA 12,7 1461 ,Lt. ) 
"Rousseau, dieser typische 'moderne Mensch', Idealist und Canaille in 
Einer Person, und das Erste um des Zweiten willen, ein Wesen, das die 
'moralische Würde' und deren Attitüde ni$tig hatte, um sich selber aus- 
zuhalten, krank zugleich vor zügelloser Eitelkeit und zügelloser 
Selbstverachtung: diese Mißgeburt, welche sich an die Schwelle unserer 
neuen Zeit gelagert hat, hat die 'Rückkehr zur Natur' gepredigt - wohin 
wollte er eigentlich zurück? Auch ich rede von 'Rückkehr zur 
Natur'... " 
"Rousseau, this typical 'modern human being', idealist and canaille in 
one person, and the first for the sake of the second, a 
being that had 
need of ' moral dignity' and its gesture to stand itself, sick with 
unbridled vanity and at the same time unbridled self-contempt: 
this 
homunculus, which has settled at the threshold of our new 
time, preached 
the 'return to nature' ... where did he really want 
to return tor? I too 
talk of 'return to nature' ... 11 (KSA 12,9 
1116 1, m. t. ) 
`RÜckkehr zur Natur' immer entschiedener im umgekehrten 
Sinne verstanden 
als es Rousseau verstand. Weg vom Idyll und der Oper! 
" 
"'Return to nature' ever more decisively understood 
in the opposite sense 
from which Rousseau understood it. Away from idyl and opera! 
" (KSA 12,9 
WP no. 117, t. m. ) 
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"Mein Kampf gegen das 18. Jahrhundert Rousseaus; gegen seine 'Natur' 
seinen ' guten Menschen' , seinen Glauben an die Herrschaft des GefUhls 
gegen die Verweichlichung, Schwächung, Vermoralisierung des Menschen: e: n Ideal, das aus dem Haß gegen die aristokratische Cultur geboren ist ;: r. d 
in praxi die Herrschaft der zügellosen Ressentiments-GeftUhle ist... " 
"My struggle against the eighteenth century of Rousseau, against his 
'nature', his 'good human being', his belief in the dominance of feeling 
- against softening, weakening, moralisation of human being: an ideal 
that is born of hatred against aristocratic culture and that is in praxi 
the dominance of unbridled ressent invent -f eel ings... " (KSA 12,10 121, 
WM/WP no. 102 1, t. m. ) 
These quotes clearly demonstrate that Nietzsche, whilst in a sense 
involved in a re-thinking of the 'natural,, brooks no comparison with 
Rousseau because the values which inform the latter are still those of lack 
and need (cf. for instance the first italicised part of the second quote 
above). Rousseau is for him the eighteenth century's decadent par 
excellence. 
For an in-depth discussion of the relation between Nietzsche and 
Rousseau, but one which is focused on the problem of history and modernity 
in the thought of each of these, and the politics which ensue from their 
respective position, cf. Keith Ansell-Pearson's Nietzsche Contra Rouseau 
(cf. bibliography). Ansell-Person considers these comments of Nietzsche, 
and other ones by him in a similar vein, as too simplistic a 
characterisation of Rousseau. As concerns the hermeneutic surface of these 
comments, so to speak, this is undoubtedly the case. Nevertheless I think 
that there is a philosophical 'truth' to these comments beyond the domain 
of historico-textual accuracy, such as Ansell-Pearson investigates. 
10. On this issue Nietzsche remarks: 
"Eine Lehre,... eine Umwertung der Werte... braucht durchaus keine 
Glücks- 
lehre zu sein: indem sie Kraft auslöst, ... bringt sie 
Glück. " 
"A doctrine, 
... a transvaluation of values. .. need 
not at all be a 
eudaemonism: in that it releases force, ... it 
brings happiness. "(KSA 13,11 
138], WM/WP no. 1022, t. m. , my omissions). 
11. The sense in which reason is regulative does of course 
differ 
considerably from the sense in which the dynamic groups of categories, 
relation and modality, are regulative in the context of 
their deployment in 
the understanding. There what is meant by 'regulative' 
is that these 
dynamic categories are not by themselves sufficient 
to produce the 
represent A+ 4 on of an object, they are not constitutive of 
the object, they 
ate the relation of other, already present 
objects to it or, 
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under the name of modality, its relation to the subject's consciousness, 
the status of the modification of the subject's mind. 
12, Not even the abstrusely worded second part of the bridging section 
between the two sets of Antinomies, entitled 'Schlussanmerkung zur 
Auflösung der mathematischtranszendentalen [sic], und Vorerinnerung : ur 
Auflösung der dynamisch-transzendentalen Ideen' KrV/CPR A528,6 56, ent i rel y 
manages to rationalise this slip of the pen. 
13. The German Sinnlichkeit can of course be rendered as 'sensibility', 
'sensuousness' or 'sensuality', but the implications and associations are 
in each case very different. The problem lies with the English which does 
not have an abstract nominal equivalent of the adjective 'sensory'. The 
latter has the advantage of being merely descriptive of that which 
appertains to the senses, and hence much more neutral. In this respect it 
corresponds much more closely to Sinnlichkeit than any of the nouns 
available in English. For the most part I follow the (nonetheless 
unsatisfactory) convention of translating Sinnlichkeit by 'sensibility' but 
in this instance the whole sweep of this quote from Kant' s text would, in 
my opinion, be lost if this were to be done. I am, however, aware that to 
opt for 'sensuality' in this translation produces its own problems. It is 
obviously a case of accepting the lesser evil. 
CHAPTER THREE 
1. 'Putrescent' - becoming putrid; rotting. Putrid - 
1. (of organic matter) 
in a state of decomposition, usually giving off a foul smell. 
2. morally 
corrupt or worthless. 3. sickening; foul. 4. deficient in quality or value. 
2. I am aware that this is a problematic issue, but I think 
that the 
tensions in Kant's text which this reading exposes should not simply 
be 
ignored. 'Pre-conceptual matter' does not of course equal 
` phenomena, and 
yet at this point in the text Kant seems to accord 
it objective reality. A 
more in-depth discussion of this textual hiatus is unfortunately 
beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. 
3. This scalar logic can be seen explicitly in 
the work of Schcp nhauer 
and, in a much more difficult sense, in that of 
Nietzsche but it comes as a 
surprise to find traces of it, however remote, 
in a text of the idealist 
Kant. For an excellent discussion of the scalar 
logics of Schopenhauer and 
i, cf. Land, The Thirst for Annihilation 
(cf. bibliography). 
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4, Again, Deleuze, in "Plato and the Simulacrum" , Logic of Sense op. cit. , 
explores these points. 
5. As Heidegger does, for instance in Kant und das Probt Pm HAS , moo "e...,.:.. 
op. cit. 
6. "The conditions of possibility of experience in general are at the same 
time conditions of possibility of objects of experience" (KrV/CPR A158, 
B197, t. m.. This is discussed by Heidegger in the second part of Die Frage 
nach dem Ding, cf. bibliography. 
7. It should be remembered how unflagging Kant's vehemence is in stressing 
the entirely different constitution of the human faculties of cognition as 
opposed to an - imaginary - intellectual intuition (e. g. KrV/CPR B72, B159, 
B307f, A286, B342), a fact some of his successors conveniently ignored. 
8. Urteilskraft is regularly translated as merely 'Judgement'. For the 
following reasons I consider this inappropriate: judgement (Urteil) or 
judging (urteilen or beurteilen, the difference does not register in 
English) refer to an actus in its nominal or verbal form respectively. As 
we know from the first Critique, this is coterminous with the formation of 
every proposition, insofar as judging implies the subsumption of intuitions 
under concepts. Every proposition therefore implies an act of judging. But 
the question which animates the third Critique (cf. my comment at the end 
of this note) is whether Urteilskraft deserves its own Critique, whether it 
is a separate faculty, containing its own a priori rules etc. Although I am 
conscious of disagreeing in this with one of the most conscientious and 
expert translators of Kant, namely Werner Pluhar (cf. list of primary 
texts), I think it makes a nonsense of the entire project which motivates 
the third Critique if Urteilskraft is translated merely as 'Judgement'. The 
French translation, too, takes account of this and renders `Kritik der 
Urteilskraft' as 'Critique de la facultd de juger'. 
The further question of why Kant does not for the most part employ 
his 
usual term when referring to the a priori sources of (theoretical or 
practical) knowledge, namely the word Vermögen which must 
be translated as 
'faculty', can, I think, be answered by pointing out that 
Kant wants to 
keep Urteilskraft slightly apart from the other two 
faculties of 
understanding and reason. This quote from the Preface 
to the third Critique 
clarifies the reason for this, where he says of Urteilskraft 
that: 
"" .. ihre Prinzipien in einem System der reinen 
Philosophie keinen 
besonderen Teil zwischen der theoretischen und praktischen 
ausmachen 
dürfen, sondern im Notfalle jedem von beiden gelegentlich 
angeschlossen 
werden können. " 
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... in a system of pure philosophy its principles may not c3;,, ti' te 
special part between theoretical and practical philosophy but in arg 
emergency can occasionally be annexed to either of them. " (KU/C' 
t. M. ) 
But in the sentence immediately preceding this one in the Preface he 
gives ample grounds for thinking of Urteilskraft nonetheless as a faculty 
in its own right: 
"Eine Kritik der reinen Vernunft, d. i. unseres Vermögens, nach Prinzipien 
a priori zu urteilen, würde unvollständig sein, wenn die Urteilskraft, 
welche für sich als Erkenntnisvermögen darauf auch Anspruch macht, nicht 
als ein besonderer Teil derselben abgehandelt würde. " 
"A critique of pure reason, i. e. of our faculty to judge according to a 
priori principles, would be incomplete if the faculty of judgement which 
also claims this for itself as a faculty of cognition were not treated as 
a special part thereof [of the critique of pure reason]" (KU/CJ ibid. ) 
Although philosophy as a system only consists of two parts, namely 
theoretical and practical philosophy, the critique of (the legitimate 
employment of) our faculties consists of three parts, namely those of the 
pure understanding, pure reason and the pure faculty of judgement (KU/CJ A 
XXIII, B XXV). If any more grounds for considering Urteilskraft a faculty in 
its own right were needed, one would have to look no further than the end 
of the first paragraph of section V of the first Introduction to the third 
Critique. There Kant establishes the notion of a reflective Urteilskraft of 
which he states: 
"Die reflektierende Urteilskraft ist diejenige, welche man auch das 
Beurteilungsvermögen (facul tas diiudicandi) nennt. " (KU/CJ first 
Introduction, section V, my italics). 
For obvious reasons I do not attempt a translation here. 
Since I bhail 
not at all deal with the first part of the third Critique, namely 
the 
Critique of the Aesthetic Faculty of Judgement, unless the 
text explicitly 
states otherwise, all references to the 'third Critique' are 
to the second 
part of the third Critique or to the Preface or either of 
the 
Introduct ions. 
9. For instance Hume' s Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion, part II where 
Philo insists on the irreducible difference between a mechanical 
contrivance, such as a watch, and the unique properties 
of organic beings. 
This marks a radical departure from the earlier, 
Cartesian view, expressed 
repeatedly throughout Descartes' oeuvre, that the human 
body, as an example 
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of a complex natural object, can be thought of in terms of a machine; cf. 
for instance the Sixth Meditation in the Meditations on first Philosoph,, 
where he writes: 
"... I may consider the human body as a machine fitted together and made 
up of bones, sinews, muscles, veins, blood, and skin in such a way that, 
even if there were no mind in it, it would still carry out all the 
operations that. .. do not depend on the command of the will, nor, 
therefore, on the mind. " 
Although this Cartesian thought contains the important observation that 
physiological processes do not depend on voluntaristic or any other mental 
interventions, it falls short of giving any specificity to the peculiar 
properties of the organic matter of which a body is composed. Although it 
is true that the processes of the body are self-sustaining, it must be 
remembered that Descartes is only thinking of mechanical processes, or 
simply movements, and not of the more complicated physiological, chemical 
and biological transformations a body continually undergoes. Thus the 
materiality of the body is still completely suppressed, it is still only 
res ext ensa. 
10. For example, KU/CJ, the first few paragraphs of section II of the first 
Introduction where Kant mentions this word several times in such a way as 
to denote a generalised cognitive capacity, not exactly just the 
understanding or the faculty of judgement or reason, but the faculties' 
capacity for interaction. 
11. Since this dissertation only deals with critical philosophy insofar as 
it concerns a theory of nature, Kant' s practical philosphy (as well as, 
incidentally, his Critique of the Aesthetic Faculty of Judgement) cannot 
be 
considered here, which also means that a discussion of the 
faculty of 
Judgement's mediating role in the critical system is not possible. 
But 
since many excellent studies on this topic exist already, 
there is no 
immediate need for such a discussion here. 
12. A brief but very attractively formulated passage 
from Cassirer's 
chapter on the third Critique in ' Kant' s Leben und Lehre' 
(ch. 6, p. 358f ) 
puts the issue in a nutshell (sic! ): 
"Wo wahrhafte Entwicklung vorhanden ist, da bildet sich 
nicht ein Ganzes 
aus den Teilen, sondern da ist es bereits in ihnen, als 
richtunggebendes 
Prinzip enthalten. Statt des einförmigen Gleichschritts 
des Vor und ac' 
der Zeit, in welchem jeder vorhergehende Moment vom gegenwärtigen 
ver- 
schlungen wird und gleichsam sein Dasein an ihn verliert, 
denket. wir in 
der Erscheinung des Lebens ein wechselseitiges Ineinander 
greifen der 
Ein2pl "%-e.,, te: derart, daß das Vergangene im Gegenwärtigen 
erhalten 
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bleibt und daß in beiden schon die Tendenz zur künftigen Gestillt ung wirksam und kenntlich ist. Diese Art des Zusammenhar, ý, - ist es, die w: r herkömmlich mit dem Begriff des Organismus bezei chneri. " 
"Where true development is present, a whole is not formed out of 
but it is contained In them, as a guiding principle. Instead of the 
uniform march of the before and after of time, in which every previous 
moment is swallowed by the present one and loses its existence to it, '_n 
the phenomenon of life we think a reciprocal interlocking of the 
individual moments: such that what is past is preserved in what is 
present and that in both the tendency towards future formation is 
effective and knowable. This is the kind of complex which we usually 
signify by the concept of an organism" (t. m. ) 
13. It would be impossible to introduce these issues in more technical 
terms at this point, by mentioning the trace of another temporality, for 
instance, without unduly anticipating a discussion which properly belon8s 
in the next chapter. 
14. Heidegger elaborates on this point, for instance in Die Frage nach der 
Technik, cf. bibliography. 
15. We would have to consider this rather abrupt outburst after Freud as an 
instance of 'the return of the repressed', as mentioned for instance in The 
Language of Psycho-Analysis, by Laplanche and Pontalis, cf. bibliography. 
16. This recalls Kant's discussion of the sublime in the Critique of the 
Aesthetic Faculty of Judgement. The question might be asked whether the 
sublime marks a point at which Kant's need to anthropomorphise nature 
momentarily subsides. Although this would be a fascinating question, in 
particular by way of comparison between the two parts of the third Crit i, ýue 
and their respective conceptions of nature, such a discussion clearly falls 
outside the scope of the present project. 
17. Cf. also sec. V of the first Introduction, where Angemessenheit is 
mentioned several times. 
18. If this dissertation had the space to bring Kant's practical philosophy 
- and its nihilistic tendencies - into the discussion, this would now 
necessitate a reading of the transition from physical to moral 
teleology 
which takes place from §87 onwards. But as this latest 
twist to Kant's 
teleology makes very little sense without an overall consideration 
of his 
practical philosophy, and since such a consideration 
is entirely beyond the 
scope of this study, I can only refer the interested reader 
to this part of 
the third Critique. 
19. WM has ". .. im Begriffe" which, whilst 
not impossible, sounds rather 
too 
stilted and Hegelian for such an elegant writer as 
Nietzsche. 
20. Although Kant very briefly provides this 
'deduction', it jr. ,,, where 
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near as rigorous (or as significant) aý--- that of the categories; cf. Kr'G'/CPR 
A669f, B697f. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
1. Kant confidently proclaims: 
"... Kritik, die zuvörderst die Quellen und Bedingungen ihrer Mögllchke: t 
darlegen mußte, und einen ganz verwachsenen Boden zu reinigen und 
ebenen nötig hatte. " 
",.. Critique which first of all had to expose the sources and conditions 
of its possibility and needed to clear and to level an entirely overgrown 
ground. " (KrV/CPR AXXI, t. in. ). 
2. In terms of the terminology developed by Deleuze and Guattari concerning 
these same issues, it could be said that critique marks the movement of 
deterritorialisation whereas the impetus of the will to truth is that of 
reterri it orial isat ion. 
3. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this dissertation to show in how 
far Nietzsche's strategy for overcoming the dichotomy between mind and 
matter is entirely different from that developed by Hegel. Suffice it to 
say here that not only the Hegelian notions of the dialectic and of the 
sublation into which it enters are utterly foreign to Nietzsche's thinking 
but, more importantly, the notion of synthesis which is operative in his 
texts has nothing whatsoever to do with the Hegelian notion of the same 
name. As Deleuze demonstrates (Nietzsche and Philosophy, ch. 5, op. cit. ), 
Nietzsche' s relation to Hegel is almost as fascinating as his relation 
to 
Kant. I would consider it facile to substitute the in-depth study 
this 
relation deserves by a few casual comments. 
4. The inspiration for reading Nietzsche in these terms is obviously 
derived from Deleuze' s reading of the three essays of the 
GdM/GOM (cf. 3.7 
of Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 87f). Whilst there are potential 
problems 
with this, namely insofar as it might appear to overly systematise 
Nietzsche's thought, I understand Deleuze's reading as an attempt 
to bring 
out the subterranean connections between Kant and 
Nietzsche, connections 
that have gone virtually unnoticed in this century's philosophy. 
My own 
attempts at situating Nietzsche vis-A-vis Kant are very much 
undertaken in 
this spirit of excavation. I don't claim that this reading 
of Nietzsche is 
correct, only that it is useful for bringing out 
the connections bet.. een 
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his and Kant' s thought. 
5. In particular, I would say that much of the work of Heidegger and 
Derrida, and the tradition which their work has spawned, is Laie= on this 
reading of Platonism. 
6. Cf. the previous note. 
7, Bataille, for instance, does this without being in overt d: a'. gigue with 
the tradition. 
8. In this regard the persistent attention to Nietzsche's physiology of 
art, which all too often offers nothing but anaemic, idealising readings of 
the potentially much richer Nietzschean notion of physiology, seems to be 
the symptom of a resistance to this thought, rather than a true realisation 
of it. Cf. also note 7 to the Introduction of this thesis. 
9. As defined in Langenscheidt Greek Dictionary. 
10. In German wertlos encompasses both meanings. 
11. Heidegger writes: 
"With the abolition of Platonism the way first opens for the affirmation 
of the sensuous... What is needed is neither abolition of the sensuous nor 
abolition of the nonsensuous. On the contrary, what must be cast abide is 
the misinterpretation, the deprecation, of the sensuous, as well as the 
extravagant elevation of the supersensuous. A path must be cleared for a 
new interpretation of the sensuous on the basis of a new hierarchy of the 
sensuous and nonsensuous. The new hierarchy does not simply wish to 
reverse matters within the old structural order, now reverencing the 
sensuous and scorning the nonsensuous. It does not wish to put what was 
at the very bottom on the very top. A new hierarchy and new valuation 
mean that the ordering structure must be changed. " (Nietzsche I, p. 209, 
op. cit. ) 
Although this thesis is manifestly not concerned with the intricacies of 
'Heidegger's Nietzsche', it is interesting to note that at this crucial 
point in his text, Heidegger sidesteps the full impact of a reversal ar, 
Li 
overturning of Platonism on the basis of a physiological 
thinking and 
instead privileges Nietzsche's 'physiological aesthetics' 
(for instance, 
p. 211). By doing so Heidegger can circumvent the messiness of 
sexual or 
drug-induced Rausch and sustain the neo-scholastic register 
of purity in 
which he chooses to speak. 
12. See the article by D. F. Krell, entitled "Descensional 
Reflection", cf. 
bibliography. 
13. In contrast to Deleuze, who wants to say that 
Kant' s critical method is 
a way of de-temporalising thinking, and that this tends 
to be a feature of 
all philosophical method (Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 
103f), I think it is 
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legitimate to understand Nietzsche's physiologico-critical 
method in ver', 
different terms, namely as a way of temporalising thinking by `he 
thought is never anything but a function of an energised matter, or simpl; 
will to power. Nietzsche remarks that 
"Die wertvollsten Einsichten werden am spätesten gefunden: aber die wertvollsten Einsichten sind die Methoden. of 
"The most valuable insights are found last: but the most vat ale insights are the methods. " (WM/WP no. 469, t. m. ) 
14. Deleuze and Guattari have shown, and have done so in terms which 
happily go far beyond the rather simplistic reading I offer here, that it 
is perfectly plausible to theorise Capitalist economies in terms of the 
will to power, in their most Nietzschean of ouevres, Anti-Oedipus, cf. 
bibliography. 
15. Nietzsche equates these terms when he writes: 
"Geist (oder die 'Seele' oder das Subjekt, wie die Schulsprache jetzt 
statt Seele sagt). " 
"Spirit (or 'soul' or subject, as the language of the Schools now has it 
instead of soul). " (KSA 11,36 [ 36], WM/WP no. 659, t. m. ). 
16. Leitfaden is literally a' leading thread' but more commonly ti anslat fd 
as 'theme' because it denotes something that draws together the various 
parts, for instance of a text. 
17. Is this what happened to Nietzsche in the end? 
18. See also the rather witty and delightful article by Karen Swasýjan, 
entitled 'Labyrinth. Ariadne. Der Gekreuzigte' in 'Nietzsche-Studien' 
vol. 21,1992, cf. bibliography. 
19. The Colli-Montinari edition has 'Auslösung des Willens' ('release of 
the will, ), whereas it seems to me that ' Auflösung des Willens' 
('dissolution of the will' ) is not only perfectly possible here but 
does ir, 
fact make a great deal more sense, given what Nietzsche says about 
it, 
namely that it accompanies this most superficial, lucid consciousness. 
20. As Heidegger calls the body conceived as res corporea, 
following 
Descartes, cf. , Sein und Zeit, 921 for instance. 
21. "Organisms are transient systems in which energy transformations 
are 
continually taking place, they have virtually no fixed or permanent 
constituents" M. S. Gordon et al (ed. s) Animal Physiology, p" 
25" 
22. "Organisms are delicate but highly adaptable dynamic systems 
that exist 
in a state of continuous exchange of energy and materials 
with the 
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environment that surrounds them, 11 ibid, p. 28, 
23. The converse of ' catabolism' is ' anabolism' ,a kind of reconst it ut i., r; 
or assimilation, in which simple molecules are synthesised into c ý. r=ex 
ones and a storage of energy is effected. 
24. ", .. the 
interacting dynamic systems that constitute the organism cn be 
maintained only by the continuous expenditure of energy, " Animal Ft; ys-ofogy 
op. cit. , p. 34. 
25, Deleuze makes this point in Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 91. 
26. In a short but surprisingly philosophical article under the title 
'Shifting Sand' which appeared in the ' Independent' of the 24th of Jul,, 
1993, the following observations, which seem strangely pertinent to our 
discussion, were made: 
"While American forces have blasted Baghdad with rockets and Mogadishu 
with missiles, back home in the Midwest they have been discovering anew 
that when Nature is the adversary, they must fight her in the trenches. 
The battle against the Great Flood of 1993 is hand-to-hand combat: the 
most useful weapon, human muscles... damage to property in the state [of 
Iowa] estimated at more than $1 billion, damage to crops of more than $ 
750 million, two million acres under water. Some 30 people have died 
across the affected states and total damage is estimated at more thin 15 
billion... Still the work goes on, filling the bags, chucking them one by 
one into helicopters, chucking them one by one out of helicopters and 
down on to the ruptured levees; a Band-Aid in a case of multiple 
fractures. The size of the task is dramatically apparent in satellite 
pictures. Before: the Illinois and Missouri and Mississippi rivers, 
narrow, clearly defined arteries winding neatly through the plains. 
Afterwards: all three rivers have become preposterously swollen, spilling 
promiscuously wherever they break through... But where the land has not 
yet been inundated, it gleams bright emerald green from all the r oinfall. 
It is the paradox of the flood: this quintessentially destructive event 
is also the bringer of new life, the regenerator of lands 
from which the 
farmers have squeezed so much. It's a fact modern man, wit!, 
his levees 
and flood walls, has spent 200 years trying to deny. Perhaps, 
In the 
run, America will benefit from being reminded that she is not, after 
all, 
the only remaining superpower. " 
In this context ch. 7 of The Thirst for Annihilation, entitled 
"Fanged 
Noumenon (Passion of the Cyclone)", also has some interesting 
things to 
say, for instance when Land asks: 
"Is not transcendental philosophy a fear of the sea? 
Something like y 
dike or a sea-wall? Alonging for the open ocean gnaws at 
us, as t r. e : and 
is gnawed by the sea. A dark fluidity at the roots of 
our nature re e' s 
against the security of terra firma, provoking a wave 
of anxiety in which 
we are submerged, until we feel ourselves drowning, 
with representat on 
draining away. " (p. 107) 
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27. Of these two stems of knowledge, the understanding and ity,, 
Kant says that neither is to be privileged over the other ("Keine...: st 1cr 
andern vorzuziehen. 
"KrV/CPR A51, B75) . 
28. If this discussion of the eternal recurrence of the same Is rather 
brief, this is so because our focus is after all Nietzsche' sj h-jysi _. .Si ca, 
thinking and eternal recurrence only warrants a discussi,,, to the extent 
which it contributes 
to the understanding of it. It is uriderstD, -, ý that this 
is in no way an exhaustive account of the thought of eternal rrLurren-e, 
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